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What kind of an impact did the academic discipline of legal history have on legal 
education and juridical self-understanding in the socialist regimes? Hitherto, 
these questions scarcely played any role in research on legal education in the 
socialist regimes.1 Initially, with this project we aimed to address that dilemma. 
At its inception lay the idea that legal history in particular is ideally suited to 
reveal the legal premises of socialism: on the one hand, the point of departure for 
historical materialism—already visible in the writings of Marx—was based on the 
unyielding ideological principle of assessing positive law as a result of the general 
historical development. We therefore assumed legal history to be characterised by 
a particularly close proximity to politics. On the other hand, it was also evident 
that as a mere superstructure (as per socialist theory), legal history was less 
important for the legitimation of socialism than, for example, the history of 
economy. Thus, it was also conceivable that it had merged with the subject of 
political economy and had thereby become nothing more than an irrelevant 
ancillary aspect of legal education. Finally, a third perspective was added to these 
conflicting assumptions: the idea of ius commune is an essential component of 
European legal history. Since the 19th century, however, it has been 
acknowledged that ius commune, with ancient Roman law at its core, was 
among the dominating factors responsible for the rise of capitalism. How did 
socialism deal with this heritage? To pursue these approaches forced us to 
constantly keep yet another aspect in mind: what was left of these traditions of 
legal education after 1989, and does it perhaps still shape the cultures of legal 
education of post-socialist states? 
Against that background we organised a workshop, ‘Socialist interpretations of 
legal history. The histories and historians of law and justice in the GDR, Poland 
and the Baltic states under the reign of communism’, held on 22–23 March 2019 
at the Institut für Neuere Privatrechtsgeschichte, Deutsche und Rheinische 
Rechtsgeschichte at the University of Cologne. Our aim was to collect different 
experiences of and views on the historically oriented legal science of the socialist 
regimes of East Central Europe, especially with regards to continuity from the 
preceding era, common narratives and cooperation between scholars. We wish to 
express our gratitude to the keynote speakers, the participants and the guests, as 
well as to Privatdozent Dr. Carsten Fischer, Katharina Happ, Jacqueline Weertz, 
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Introduction 
Socialist interpretations of legal history 
Ville Erkkilä   
This study of legal historians and legal histories written in Eastern European 
countries during the socialist era after the Second World War concentrates on a 
phenomenon of the recent past. Yet it speaks to the contemporary audience, who 
witnesses the challenging of the European ideal of the rule of law almost on a 
daily basis. Our book focuses on the way in which legal historians and legal 
scientists used the past to legitimise, challenge, and explain socialist legal orders 
that were backed by dictatorial governments. 
The individual chapters of this volume concentrate on the regimes that are 
situated between the Russian (and later Soviet) legal culture and the area covered 
by the German Civil Code. Hence, the geographical focus of the book is on East 
Germany, Russia, the Baltic countries, Poland, and Hungary, but our approach is 
transnational. Instead of concentrating on the differences and distinct features of 
each national legal culture, we focus on the interaction and intertwinement of the 
then hegemonic socialist ideology and the ideas of law and justice as they ap-
peared in the writings of legal historians and historically oriented legal scientists 
of socialist legal orders. Such an angle enables us to concentrate on the dynamics 
between politics and law as well as on identities and legal history. 
Our aim is to study critically the presentations of legal history written under 
political guidance and to illuminate the ideological, academic, and biographical 
context of those presentations. Rather than reducing academic presentations on 
the history of law to mechanical extensions of the political order, the book 
perceives legal historiography as a form of the ever-ongoing dialogue between 
the political constitution of a society and the ideas of the rule of law and justice. 
Socialist legal histories were, nevertheless, attempts to reinterpret and give new 
meaning to the legal tradition after an abrupt change in the political and social 
context of law. Studying the temporal interpretations and representations of law 
of socialist countries enables us to provide a perspective on the more general 
problematic of law’s embeddedness within societies. 
It is clear that socialist interpretations of legal history were not written in an 
environment that followed the standards of the rule of law as described by 
present European convents and agreements. Due to that deviation, they also 
differentiated from their contemporary counterparts in the ‘West’. The ‘Eastern’ 
and the ‘Western’ views diverged in their understanding of the limits of the 
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executive power of the state and on the role of the legal order as an independent 
institute, but they also comprised two different regimes in using the past for 
redefining the relation between society and law. 
After the Second World War in Western continental Europe, legal history was 
mobilised in the search for an untainted core of jurisprudence. Legal scholars 
attempted to locate the heart of legal principles that would not fall under tota-
litarian pursuits and could became a legal cornerstone for the slowly emerging 
coalition of the European nations. Legal historiography was dominated by the 
idea of the separate temporalities of law and general history (Koselleck, 1987; 
Wieacker, 1967). Jurisprudence was depicted as a system that could reinvent 
itself with the means of history, as a historically matured discourse which would 
enable a self-standing, self-regulating, and self-remedial matrix for mediating in 
disputes between the state and society (Liebrecht, 2018; Erkkilä, 2019). 
The socialist regimes of East Central Europe perceived their societies ac-
cording to a different concept of time. Marxism had revealed the underlying 
prior force of historical development, exposing the corrupted structures of 
thinking of the bourgeoisie, concurrently excluding other ways of con-
ceptualising social activity. The establishment of the Soviet Union marked the 
beginning of a new era in which revolutionary ideas were put into practice. There 
was a singular, universal narrative of the historical development for society as a 
whole (Kolár, 2016, pp. 7–10; Schröder, 2016, pp. 64–65). The governments of 
the socialist bloc tried to control the idea of the separate temporality of socialist 
societies by ‘rebooting’ the revolution on a regular basis, sharpening the virtues 
of the true dogma and eliminating false interpretations of the revolution from the 
public sphere (Eckert, 1993; Poláčková and van Duin, 2019). A priority was also 
educating the people into dialectical materialist historical consciousness, in which 
the ruling communist parties invested a lot1 (Connelly, 2000, pp. 208–225). 
In the West, legal scientists were not impressed by the socialist concept of legal 
history. Notwithstanding its constant reference to the historicity of social 
structures, it seemed that socialist jurisprudence was not taking ‘the past’ ser-
iously, which became especially apparent in the sidelining and neglecting of the 
academic disciplines of historical studies, legal history included (Stolleis, 2009, 
pp. 16–18; Schmidt-Hartmann, 1988). After the fall of the Berlin Wall, there was 
little use for the Eastern European concept of history in European academia 
(Lässig, 2007; Varga, 2016, p. 647). Indeed, the legal historiography of the 
socialist bloc took place within a system where law as whole was an instrument of 
the ruling elite in its task of guarding and reforming society. Legal nihilism that 
some of the foundational theories of socialist law manifested reduced the space of 
jurisprudential reflection to a minimum. 
Nevertheless, not many legal cultures in world history can be situated in a 
context of Rechtsstaat, and yet studying different perceptions and uses of the past 
in constructing legal orders is important for the contemporary idea of the rule of 
law (Reimann, Zimmermann and Glenn, 2019, p. 438). Our contemporary idea 
is subject to constant reinterpretation, discussion, and flux. The legal orders of 
socialist East Central Europe were subordinated to politics, but the ruling parties 
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had to express and portray themselves as bound to a legal procedure and to 
legality (cf. Skinner, 2019; Fraser, 2019, pp. 33–38). In order to understand 
socialist legality in a way that is relevant for contemporary discussion, we need to 
make an attempt to understand its own logic, its perception of law’s embedd-
edness in society, and its use of the past. 
This volume scrutinizes the place of legal historical presentations between the 
coercive state and the tradition of legal scholarly independence. It analyses the 
ways in which historical knowledge was applied in commenting on socialist law; 
rather than depicting socialist interpretations of legal history as a monolithic 
entity, it highlights the contradictions within the discourse, continuities with 
previous legal cultures, and different adaptations of the hegemonic dogma of 
Marxist-Leninism. With this approach, the book addresses the question of the 
relations between state pressure, personal and scholarly views, and Marxist- 
Leninism in (re)presentations of history. What was the impact of philosophical 
imperatives and the idea of a singular past on legal historiography? What kind of 
an effect did politically motivated structural changes in academia have on the 
production of legal historical knowledge? How were scholars able to find a space 
for the dissident use of the past within socialist jurisprudence? 
In this introductory chapter, I will first give a brief overview of the political, 
ideological, and institutional context of socialist interpretations of legal history. 
This consists of discussing the concept of Sovietisation and outlining the effect 
that political socialism had on the legal orders, higher education, and legal cul-
tures of the countries of East Central Europe. This is followed by a con-
ceptualisation of the space of legal historical presentations within state socialism. 
My contribution ends with short descriptions of the individual chapters of this 
volume and the way they are thematised. 
Sovietisation, socialism, and law 
Here, Sovietisation means the tactics with which the Soviet Union attempted to 
rule the areas it had conquered during the Second World War—all aimed at 
stabilising the Soviet hegemony in the regions of East Central Europe and Baltic 
Countries and disseminating the revolutionary ideas on the state, politics, and 
the rule of law initially introduced by the Bolsheviks. It is not my intention to 
devalue the factual influence the Soviet Union imposed on the societies of East 
Central Europe but rather to question the one-sided idea of Sovietisation. After 
Stalin’s ruthless use of unreserved terror, there was no supreme plan or even 
consensus among the commissariat for the means and subsistent goals for 
Sovietisation (Naimark, 2017; Kramer, 2017). 
For Estonia and Latvia, there was no escaping their fate as fresh states in the 
Soviet Union. Their population was perceived with suspicion and given a ‘pre-
cautionary procedure’ (meaning, e.g., mass transportations to Siberia), and their 
short-lived national political and legal systems were replaced with Soviet ones 
(Kirby, 1994). Whereas the Baltic states were treated in a very similar fashion to 
the regions in the Caucasus and the Far East, which the Soviet Union assimilated 
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Figure 0.1 Polish war-hero, resistant fighter and spy for the Allied West Witold 
Pilecki at his show trial in Warsaw on March 3, 1948. Pilecki was exe-
cuted two months later. At the picture Pilecki is sitting first on the left in 
the second row. In the first row are the solicitors.  
during the interwar years, the protocol was not as lucid with regard to the 
countries in East Central Europe that fell under Soviet occupation from 1944 to 
1945 (Naimark, 2017, pp. 63–65). Stalin himself, apparently lacking a pre-
conceived and consistent blueprint for disseminating the communist revolution 
to East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary, announced the possi-
bility of ‘different paths’ to communism (Naimark, 2017, pp. 65–70). 
Such a stance seemed to emphasise the varying cultural and historical back-
ground of each region in their transformation process. Notwithstanding the 
comradely tenor in the ‘soft’ approach adopted by the Soviets and their cautious 
take on immediate implementation of major social reorganisations, such as 
sweeping collectivization, they did pay attention to the reorganisation of higher 
education and facilitated decisive attempts to convert the legal institutes of the 
regions they occupied to socialist institutions. Such an act of shaping the essence 
of domestic judicatures was carried out by replacing the judiciary with more ‘class- 
conscious’ lay judges and putting on display trials for the ‘enemies of the working 
class’ (Haferkamp and Wudtke, 1997; Kaluza, 1999; Boros, Gyulavári and Fleck 
1999, pp. 147–151). 
The protests of the 1950s and 1960s—both in the visible form of demon-
strations and strikes and in the indiscernible moves to resist socialist 
reforms—laid down the ground for the later national character of each satellite 
state within the socialist bloc (Kramer, 2017). In East Germany, the political elite 
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crushed the 1953 uprising with the help of the Red Army and succeeded in 
building a remarkably stable socialist system (Ostermann, 2001). The East 
German model was characterised by a tight grip of the state apparatus where 
there was little room for serious dissidence. In 1956 Poland and Hungary re-
volted. The Hungarian uprising was quashed by ruthless military intervention, 
but the Polish domestic leaders were able to convince Moscow that the use of 
brute force was unnecessary and inner-state measures were sufficient to keep 
Poland a loyal member of the flock (Kramer, 2017, pp. 148–154). In Poland, the 
national identity continued to play a significant role throughout the latter half of 
the 20th century, whereas in Hungary the memory of 1956 stood between many 
individual worldviews and the official jargon of socialism. 
The socialist bloc was genuinely recreated in 1968. Crushing the dissident 
spirit of the ‘Prague Spring’ solidified the Brezhnev doctrine as a rule in defining 
the relations between the East Central European countries and Soviet Union on 
the one hand and between the satellite states themselves on the other (Kramer, 
2017, pp. 159–164). Around and after the Helsinki Accord of 1975, when 
human rights became a worldwide lingua franca for evaluating political systems 
and efforts, socialist countries vocally defended their version of the rule of law 
and sharply criticised the ‘Western world’s’ hypocritical advocation of subjective 
rights (Mälksoo, 2018; Kopeček, 2012). That paradigmatic change engaged 
many Eastern European legal scholars, but the broadened discussion at the same 
time inevitably revealed the inherent contradiction between the ideological 
principles and their practical implementation in state socialism. 
Thus, the four-decade era of the Soviet influence in East Central Europe was 
characterised by a varying regional emphasis and temporal changes in the mea-
sures selected, not to mention the actual reception of the Soviet import of so-
cialism. As John Connelly puts it: 
SED members may not have taken socialism seriously, but they and the East 
German population took the state very seriously […] Czech comrades may 
not have taken the state very seriously but they did believe in their version of 
socialism […] Poland’s Party cadre took neither the state nor socialism very 
seriously. (Connelly, 2000, pp. 284–287)  
Whereas Hungarian scholars were able to negotiate between their domestic 
tradition and Sovietisation, and the jurisprudential tradition of the Soviet Union 
was far from being a monolithic one, Baltic legal scholars had no choice but to 
take both the state and socialism very seriously. 
All Soviet satellite states were, nevertheless, socialist countries, and their po-
litical and legal systems can be safely characterised as state socialist. According to 
Peter C. Caldwell, state socialism attempted to guarantee the proclaimed uber- 
democratic and anti-fascist essence of socialist societies—especially in comparison 
to Western countries and Western science—by giving the ‘state plan’ the final say 
with regard to politics, economy, and law (Caldwell, 2003). Yet by doing so, 
state socialism had to provide the state with a special position above the law and 
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suppress some of the basic civil rights of its citizens; sacrifice legal certainty and 
equality in order to safeguard the alleged and necessary cohesion of society; and, 
by announcing that its politics merely implemented the will of the people (i.e. the 
‘working class’), had to surveil and uproot disobedient and potentially harmful 
ideas from the public sphere. In order to cope with the dilemma, the Marxist- 
Leninist dogma of the socialist bloc equated the will of the people with ‘the state’ 
and further concentrated the power of the state apparatus into the hands of a 
small elite, that is, the executive organs of the domestic communist parties 
(Schröder, 2016, pp. 61–62, 78). 
The starting point for all socialist legal orders in 20th-century East Central 
Europe was the Soviet example—not their domestic and national traditions of 
socialism—and its concrete measures in reorganising the legal institutes as well as 
the political manifestations of Marxist-Leninism born out of and in the midst of 
that Bolshevik experiment (Markovits, 1968; Bender and Falk, 1999, 
pp. XIII–XIV). According to Lenin, the Soviet Union had taken the Marxist 
principles to a new, practical level with its concrete fighting, first visible in the 
October Revolution and further advanced in the actualisation of ‘real socialism’ 
(Zagladin, 1983, pp. 6–7). 
The Marxist-Leninist dogma, which was a reinterpretation of the original 
Marxist thought, served as a wrapping in drafting, evaluating, and implementing 
law (Bender and Falk, 1999, pp. XI–XIII; Schröder, 2016, pp. 66–67). Intact in 
this dogma was the Marxist core of the foundational mission of the working class: 
dismantling the bourgeois society and its repressive structures via revolution and 
building a new socialist society, which would ultimately develop into com-
munism. Such a process was to be achieved by cultivating the consciousness of 
the working class and fighting against the sabotage of the imperialistic enemies of 
the state and the socialist process (Zagladin, 1983, pp. 14–16). 
The Marxist-Leninist dogma was translated to the national legal orders of the 
Soviet satellite states by the domestic communists approved by Moscow and the 
Soviet experts working in the countries in the socialist bloc (Connelly, 2000, 
pp. 68–69). The possible leeway for renewal, criticism, and new openings hap-
pened within this frame. Marxist-Leninist dogma—as steered and reinterpreted 
by the domestic communist parties—was the ius commune of the satellite states 
(Schröder, 2016, pp. 68–69). Furthermore, dissident voices were judged by their 
heresy with respect to the ‘true meaning’ of Marxist-Leninism, being judged as 
‘revisionism’ or ‘too formalistic.’ 
The national constitutions of the Soviet satellite states toed the line of the 
1936 Constitution of the Soviet Union, which was assembled by Stalin’s chief 
prosecutor, Andreii Vyshinski. The most prominent principles in the 1936 
Constitution—and later in the Constitutions of the East Central Europe—were 
the democratisation of justice; the substitution of subjective rights with an as-
sortment of social rights and civic duties of citizens; and, contrary to the Soviet 
Constitutions of 1918 and 1924, allotting the communist party an established 
position in coordinating and representing the will of the working class 
(Pomeranz, 2019, pp. 86–88). Although the state socialist governments later to 
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a degree tried to distance their legal orders from Vyshinskian legality,’ the above- 
mentioned basic principles remained (Stolleis, 2009, pp. 25–27; see also 
Richardson-Little, Dietz and Mark, 2019). 
In principle, judges, lawyers, and legal scholars did not have the authority to 
interpret and further develop the law but to implement it (Schröder, 2016; 
Gizbert-Studnicki, Pleszka and Wolenski, 2016). This led to a ‘hyper-positivist’ 
reading of civil codes, with which judicature intended to secure their own po-
sition but also to make their case in such a way that there would be as little room 
as possible for questioning their arguments on political bases. Rather than being 
Rechtsstaats, the legal orders of the East Central Europe were ‘norm-regimes’ 
(Normenstaats) (Stolleis, 2009, p. 38). 
The Soviet Union to a degree watched over the legal development of its 
satellite states. Sometimes in concrete administrative problems, the Soviet 
communist party expressed its ‘opinion’ on the preferable solution via the 
common networks of the socialist bloc or through diplomatic connections.2 
Especially important was to homogenise the legal concept of property, and 
socialist legal systems all, in one way or the other, adopted the idea of socialist 
property as defined by soviet legal theoristVenediktov (Raff and Taitslin, 2014). 
Nevertheless, soon after the end of the Second World War, in accordance with 
the ‘different paths’ doctrine, Stalin published his reinterpretation of Marxist- 
Leninist dogma, where he rearranged the relations between ‘base’ and ‘su-
perstructure’ (Stalin, 1951). This enabled the domestic leaders of the socialist 
bloc to maintain their national civil codes, and rather than focusing on re-
pealing the existing legal orders, the communist party elite could concentrate 
on controlling the interpretations of private law, in which legal history played 
an important role. 
Higher education in socialism and national  
legal traditions 
Education had a central position in the state socialist ideology of East Central 
Europe. That was due to Marx’s emphasis on cultivating the consciousness of the 
working class as a prior task for the communist party but also to the aim of 
Leninism to distinguish the party cadre from the old institutions in establishing a 
new social elite (Lenin, 1977, pp. 23, 375). In the reality of post-Second World 
War Eastern Europe, it meant dismantling the prestige of the old academic 
bastions; replacing the university staff with a new, loyal one; and erecting new 
facilities of higher education aside from the universities. 
Seizing the monopoly on education was vital in view of raising a new social 
elite from working class youth, but another, and in practice at least important, 
objective was the training of a new class of judges. The ‘democratisation’ of 
justice necessitated the replacement of the old judiciary with ‘people’s judges’ 
whose education was situated—or at least that was the plan—outside the legal 
faculties (see, e.g., Schröder, 2016, p. 73; Boros, Gyulavári, and Fleck, 1999, 
pp. 344–359). 
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In general, state socialist governments determinedly diminished the societal 
significance of the traditional law faculties in favour of the natural sciences, new 
institutes of a technical character, or newly established academies for delicate 
disciplines like law or social studies (Stolleis, 2009, pp. 47–49, 121–122; 
Connelly, 2000, pp. 60–61, 67–70). The reforms for higher education were 
steered from offices and ministries of education under the leadership of the 
domestic communist parties and concentrated on recruiting students from 
working class backgrounds or people whose preliminary training consisted of 
courses in Marxist-Leninism. The aim of the educational means, such as regular 
revisions of the legal curricula, was to control the judiciary and legal scholarship 
in each of the satellite states (Haferkamp and Wudtke, 1997; Bena, 1999, 
pp. 377, 406). 
In the Soviet Union, Bolsheviks had determinedly stripped the ‘bourgeois 
traits’ from universities. Already before the Second World War, social sciences 
had undergone a process of reorganisation in which the disciplines across the 
spectrum had been merged into a branch of ‘new historical science’3 (Fitzpatrick, 
1979). In Soviet satellite states, the adaptation of the Stalinist view in the na-
tional cultures of higher education was, again, a more complex and dynamic 
thing. The universities within East Central Europe had all adhered to a 
Humboldtian ideal of free scholarship and could build on a prestigious past even 
though their individual national histories were very different. In addition, the 
universities had opted for different adaptation strategies in the face of the pre- 
Second World War National Socialist onslaught and had a varying relation to the 
middle and working classes of their respective nations (Connelly, 2000, 
pp. 2–16). Thus, the Sovietisation of the higher education in the Eastern 
bloc—despite considerable effort to produce homogeneous institutions in their 
aims and ethos—produced diverse results. 
The Soviets considered the German professoriate thoroughly corrupted by 
fascist ideas, and, in accordance with the Western occupation zones, conducted 
a sweeping ‘denazification’ within the universities during 1945–1946 and 
ousted approximately 80% of the professors on the bases of their involvement in 
fascist policies and their memberships in the organisations of the National 
Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP). What made Soviet denazification 
different from the Western equivalent was its thoroughness and rigour. 
Although some of the removed staff were later able to return to a teaching 
position, there was no general amnesty for those who had been denazified 
(Stolleis, 2009, pp. 45–46). 
Denazification paved the way for reintroducing German universities as re-
producers of Marxist-Leninism, and, indeed, German professors and students 
seldom openly challenged the party policies but rather internalised their mission as 
a loyal instrument within state socialism (Markovits, 2018, pp. 44–48). As a state, 
the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was an anomaly in the socialist bloc. It 
was a model region among the Soviet satellite states despite its culture, history, and 
legal tradition that had just recently been forged into a totalitarian society and 
turned against the Soviet Union. The memory of a common past and legal culture 
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with the Western neighbour never ceased to exist, and relations with the Federal 
Republic of Germany (FRG) and ‘Germanness’ very much overshadowed legal 
historiography, despite serious efforts to the contrary (Joseph, 1995, p. 584). 
The main tenet in pre-Second World War jurisprudence in Hungary—unlike, 
for example, in Czechoslovakia (Bröstl, 2016)—was the dominance of the legal 
sociological stance and the rejection of the strict legal positivism of the Vienna 
School. It might have been the Hungarian legal scholars, nevertheless, who were 
able to cultivate the narrow Vyshinskian dogma furthest and into scientifically 
considerable legal theories, but naturally not outside the Marxist-Leninist frame 
(Varga, 2016). The coercive politics of state socialism also restricted the aca-
demic institutions in Hungary, and the shadow of the crushing of the 1956 
uprising constantly hovered over civil society, reminding scholars of the limits of 
academic freedom. 
It is not perhaps a coincidence that the first socialist Civil law code of the 
Soviet satellite states was promulgated in Hungary in 1959. Vilmos Peschka and 
Imre Szabó were renowned legal theorists in the socialist bloc, and their legal 
philosophical follow-up on Soviet ‘revolutionary legality’ was a starting point for 
a substantial body of socialist legal scholarship (Schröder, 2016, p. 80). In the 
discipline of legal history, the works of Hungarian scholars gained wide atten-
tion, and probably the most famous of them was the Roman law scholar Elemér 
Pólay. Pólay contributed significantly to the contemporary study of the history of 
Roman law and enjoyed wide appreciation in the West. Paradoxically, while in 
the West the narrative of Roman law was used to back up the freedom of private 
property, Pólay used the same narrative to outline the scientific standards of legal 
historiography in compliance with the Marxist understanding of historical 
development. 
In Poland, Sovietisation measures failed to dismantle the traditional prestige of 
university professors. Moreover, the Polish national version of state socialism 
maintained and cultivated a strong notion of national identity and an idea of the 
special, historical path of Polish society and its structures (Connelly, 2000, 
pp. 127, 142–161, 283–284; Danyel and Behrends, 2019, p. 9). Among the 
countries in the socialist bloc, Poland’s jurisprudential culture was the most 
pluralistic. The state did, however, control academic freedom and during inter-
nationally or domestically tense periods, the state’s grip was tighter, e.g., in the 
form of censorship, than normally (Danyel and Behrends, 2019, p. 154). 
After the Polish thaw (the 1956 revolt and its nonviolent ending), it was 
possible in Poland to portray oneself as a non-Marxist legal scholar, a combi-
nation of words that would not have been possible, for example, in the GDR. 
Polish legal scientists were entitled to a creative use of Marxism, but they were 
also aware of and discussed Western legal theories from Kelsen to Hart (Gizbert- 
Studnicki, Pleszka and Wolenski, 2016, p. 567). Poland’s national legal culture 
was characterised by the heritage of Leon Petrazycki, whose remarkably wide 
learnedness and oeuvre benefited the whole field of Polish legal sciences and 
formed a basis for further innovative theorising in the latter half of the 20th 
century (Cotterrell, 2015). 
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Polish legal science was, however, careful not to cross the line and provoke the 
political sphere—a stance that might well represent Polish civil society in general 
during the 1960s and 1970s (Fijalkowski, 2016; Danyel and Behrends, 2019, 
pp. 150, 154). The authority to draft and further develop laws was the sole 
privilege of the state and the communist party. Lawyers or judges did not in-
terpret the law in ways that would have resulted in precedents in further uses of 
the law. They studied the existing law and went no further. It was not possible, 
or at least not wise, to evaluate the existing law in the light of justice or fairness or 
any other criteria (Gizbert-Studnicki, Pleszka, and Wolenski, 2016, p. 581). But 
by means of legal history, it was nevertheless possible to indirectly challenge the 
existing legal order. 
Mapping a space for socialist interpretations of  
legal history 
The political frame of Sovietisation, the ideological language of socialism, and 
the concrete restrictions on the academic space of legal historians composed a 
framework for the legal historiography of the East Central European countries 
from the late 1940s to the final years of 1980s. In many cases, the academic 
careers of scholars depended on the level of loyalty they expressed towards the 
leadership of the communist party. Especially in the Baltic countries, the parallel 
state of the secret police watched over the teaching of academics, and its ex-
istence had to be taken into account in all scientific activity. 
Concentrating on these boundaries, however, leaves scholars as mute re-
producers of the hegemonic discourse and ignores their own identity and agency 
as citizens, scientists, and moral beings. In fact, the framework was not stagnant 
but historically situated. The context of Sovietisation in itself brought about 
constantly shifting circumstances within the fields of the domestic sciences. Both 
the state and legal historians had their opinions on the ways in which ‘the past’ 
could be mobilized in socialist societies on their historically determined journey 
to becoming communist. 
Most of the legal historiography produced in the socialist bloc toed the official 
line and produced results that supported the self-justification of the socialist 
state. It presented socialist legality as a historically evolved model that, by ad-
hering to the scientific principles of Marxist-Leninism, efficiently implemented 
the ‘will of the people’ in administration and legal institutes and as a system that 
was both equal for all and able to keep up with the pace of historical develop-
ment. Consistently, by means of using the past, socialist legality was shown to be 
the ultimate answer to the perennial questions of justice, freedom, and democ-
racy, while the Western idea of the rule of law appeared as its mere negation, 
‘imperialistic,’ corrupted, and ‘fascist’ (Stolleis, 2009, pp. 27–31, 41; see, e.g., 
Tschernilowski, 1980, pp. 27–31). 
Socialist legal historiography should not be perceived as a dysfunctional copy 
of the Western ideal, nor as a diluted application of the Bolshevik model of 
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its own dynamics and rules, unavoidably connected to the past it shared with the 
‘Western’ legal tradition (Luhmann, 1984). In what follows, my attempt is to 
describe the tension, on the one hand, between the state direction (‘law as a 
practice of political will’) and the autonomy of the legal historiographical dis-
cipline (‘law as a learned tradition’) and, on the other hand, between legal his-
torical presentations whose primary aim is to comment on the phenomena of 
their contemporary society (‘applicable historical knowledge’) and histories that 
seek to exclude any direct relevance with their social-political context (‘legal 
historiography for its own sake’). Associating these two axes in a scheme creates a 
model with which both the dynamic and historical nature of legal historiography 
can be analysed.4 The socialist interpretations of legal history can be mapped 
within this space and between those polarities. 
The tension in the horizontal axis between the ideas of law as a ‘practice of 
political will’ and ‘learned tradition’ did not lie in questions whether anti- 
fascism/anti-imperialism was a righteous norm for common identity or whether 
Marxist-Leninist dogma was an accurate matrix in steering society. The majority 
of scholars did not question, or had no choice but to accept, these principles. 
Furthermore, legal historiography in socialist countries did not challenge the 
instrumental essence of law in executing the ‘state plan’ of the domestic com-
munist parties. The Marxist-Leninist methodology, as it displayed itself in legal 
historiography, can be described in a nutshell as follows: 
The economic structure of society is the base from which the superstructure 
arises. The superstructure consists, for example, of the state as well as the re-
ligion, law, and philosophy of the given society. The various elements that make 
up the superstructure significantly influence the processes that take place at the 
base.5 Also crucial is the way in which actual social events and developments are 
reflected in the minds of the participants and their political, legal, philosophical, 
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and other views. Nevertheless, the state and law in the last instance are always 
determined by the economic conditions. Class antagonism creates the state and 
its legal system, and they can be conceptualized only in terms of class. Regardless 
of its multiple manifestations, the state is nothing more than the organised 
collective exercise of power of the propertied classes. Its law is an expression of 
the interests of the ruling class. These interests do not arise arbitrarily but are 
always dependent on the respective conditions of production, ‘objectively’ 
conditioned. With the help of law, the ruling class secures its control over the 
other classes and strata of societies (Tschernilowski, 1980, p. 26; also 
Sellnow, 1963). 
The idea of ‘law as a learned tradition’ in implementing Marxist-Leninist 
dogma was not an ideal but a tacit idea that consisted of many different particles. 
Central was the romantic notion of law as a concrete manifestation of legal 
thinking (Schröder, 1980; Klenner, 1957, pp. 82, 84). Legal history was a 
narrative of the relation between law and society. It valued the past expressions 
and representations of law (in other words, the European legal tradition) as 
examples of a particular, legally oriented thinking, and learning from them was 
useful for contemporary socialism (Joseph, 1995, p. 584). The study of these 
past expressions had to respect the characteristics that distinguished legal 
thinking in the first place; in other words, one had to have a legally trained and 
conscious mindset in writing legal historiography (see, e.g,. Csizmadia, 1968, 
pp. 104, 114; Schöneburg, 1987, pp. 309–310, 319–320). 
The idea of ‘law as a learned tradition’ bore some resistance to Sovietisation 
and implementations of ‘socialist legality.’ Especially in the Baltics, it was a 
concept that embedded the preservation and cultivation of national identity. 
Both history and legal history were spheres where the characteristics of different 
ethnic groups could be given a voice (Kolár, 2016, pp. 143–147). It did not 
comprise, however, a coherent ideological alternative for socialist legal science, 
and legal historians who advocated the idea did not perceive themselves as be-
longing to a particular school of thought. Especially in retrospect, many scholars 
claimed that their only goal within the state socialist society had been defending 
science (Wissenschaft) and the institutions that represented it, but on closer in-
spection, what they really might have defended were the privileges of the pro-
fessoriate or the social status of the academic (Connelly, 2000, p. 283). 
Neither of the ideas existed in their absolute form. It was not possible to re-
treat exclusively into a world of pure legal methods and scientific standards in a 
socialist science community. At least if one wanted to make a career. And yet a 
legal historical study that would have analysed law from an overtly orthodox 
starting point in which law was politics per se was not useful in legal education or 
in real administrative challenges. Even for an ‘advanced socialist nation,’ training 
judges capable of ruling on the basis of, and according to, the ‘socialist con-
sciousness,’ or building a legal order where some legal certainty prevailed, 
without taking into account the jurisprudential tradition, was impossible. 
The same requirement for adhering to and expressing ‘socialist consciousness’ 
also applied to legal scholars. State socialist governments attempted to bind 
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scientific thinking to their political aims and harness it in building a communist 
society. The political instrumentality of law as expressed in legal curricula and in 
the announcements of the party assemblies also demanded ‘responsibility’ from 
legal historians, and their representations had to advance the cause of interna-
tional revolution (Stolleis, 2009, p. 34; Joseph, 1995, p. 557):6 
While the bourgeois historian seeks to disguise his partisanship, the Marxist 
historian frankly takes the side of that class whose representative he is 
himself, openly advocating the positions of the working class, which is the 
only progressive social class. (Tschernilowski, 1980, p. 27)7 
That sphere of ‘socialist responsibility’ was, nevertheless, not merely restrictive in 
nature. Many scholars genuinely believed in the anti-imperialism and anti-fascism 
of socialism, and even if they did not, especially the older generation of re-
searchers had a vivid memory of the fascist totalitarianism of the 1930s and 
1940s. To legal scholars in the latter half of the 20th century, it was equally clear 
that the idea of ‘law as a learned tradition’ had not been able to resist the 
National Socialist attack (Caldwell, 2003, pp. 71–73). Whether the West con-
tinued to be possessed by those traits was debatable, but the Eastern European 
media was quick to point out, for example, the faults in the West German de-
nazification programme and the capitalist connections—real or alleged—in the 
scholarly culture of the Western world (Joseph, 1995). 
Adhering to and expressing ‘socialist consciousness’ was a largely accepted 
state of affairs, although many privately grieved for the incomplete political ex-
ecution of that ideal. Certainly, some legal historical studies had opportunistic 
intentions, and quite a few scholars adopted an indifferent attitude towards so-
cialist ideology (Danyel and Behrends, 2019, pp. 207–230). Yet the ‘emanci-
patory’ ideal of socialism remained more than rhetoric to many scholars; thus, 
rearranging the relation between ‘law as a practice of political will’ and ‘law as a 
learned tradition’ was in some sense justified to them (Heuer, 1995). 
In this space between the polarities, the communist governments regularly at-
tempted to move the focus more towards the ‘practice of political will.’ They did 
this by rebooting legal curricula and by ‘starting the revolution anew’ on a regular 
basis in party assemblies (Markovits, 1968, pp. 14–15; Joseph, 1995; Danyel and 
Behrends, 2019, p. 214). In these events, the political guidelines and limitations 
for social sciences for the next few years were announced. Sometimes there was a 
public denouncement of legal scientists who had deviated from the implicit 
guidelines set by the party elite. Sometimes another scientist, stronger in his or her 
faith in the party, flayed the heretics and their indecent works in the pages of the 
few scientific journals (see, e.g., Otto 2008, pp. 375–382). Constant outcries 
about placing ‘practice’ over ‘theory’ in public statements were also expressions of 
the need of the communist parties to place legal science within the same revolu-
tionary narrative than the rest of society (Haferkamp and Wudtke, 1997). 
The vertical axis in the figure, between ‘applicable historical knowledge’ and 
‘legal historiography for its own sake,’ stands for the tension between the 
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polarising extremes in using the past. In the German legal science 
tradition—whose influence stretched far to the east and south beyond the actual 
borders of the German Empire—history had always had a special place. In the 
Central Eastern European legal systems that rested on a codification of law, ar-
guments in interpreting and developing the law were derived from the classics of 
the legal tradition and preceding works on the national legal problematic. It was 
the task of jurisprudence to reinterpret its own tradition in order to come up with 
solutions in situations where the social need or new legislation was possibly in 
conflict with the letter of the law (Liebrecht, 2018). Thus, in East Central 
European societies in the early 20th century, legal historical knowledge, pro-
duced both in the past and in contemporary legal science, was highly relevant 
since it could be used to adjust the legal framework and to set the rules within 
which all other social activity took place. 
In principle, admitting the historical nature of law and legal order as well as 
continuity in the legal sphere was a very difficult question for communist parties. 
On the one hand, the socialist revolution for Marx and Engels was based on 
historical necessity and the iron laws of historical materialism denoted the ma-
turation process of societies towards communism. Socialism was history (Marx 
and Engels, 1970, pp. 36, 43, 45; Tschernilowski, 1980, p. 32). On the other 
hand, adhering to such an axiom opened the door for inconvenient questions 
concerning the existence of a bourgeois legacy within the legal orders of socialist 
societies. Had not Marx, Engels, and Lenin built their reasoning on previous 
philosophical and legal traditions? Should socialism also reject the concepts of 
Roman law, the ideals of natural law scholars, and the preceding bourgeois 
contribution in the fields of, e.g., contract and trade law? 
However, attempts to historically contextualise the effectual legality of socialist 
societies did inevitably bring about larger dilemmas concerning the relation 
between an individual and the state, the nature and extent of universally valid and 
equal normative order, and the legitimation of the division of power (Joseph, 
1995, p. 583). The critical dialectical materialist view on the past was not be 
extended all the way to contemporary state socialism: 
The basis for this development of law must be generally understood 
from the interests of the full application of [contemporary] norms. Hence, 
it does not mean that the exploration of the political and legal history of past 
epochs directly benefits the interpretation and application of Soviet 
law. That is impossible, and such a purpose cannot be seriously debated. 
(Tschernilowski, 1980, p. 33)8 
That said, due to its historical self-justification and constant competition with the 
West, the communist parties needed legal historical research and ‘critical’ legal 
historical analysis. The countries of the socialist bloc had to prove that their 
system was able to produce a considerable scientific output and display an aca-
demic sphere that was capable of competing with their Western counterparts 
(Mälksoo, 2018). 
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With the model of the space of socialist interpretations of legal history, I have 
attempted to illuminate certain traits of continuity with regard to the ‘bourgeois’ 
or national tradition within the socialist legal historiography, and concurrently 
unfold the paradox that the communist parties both needed historical research to 
back their legitimacy and yet had to uproot vehemently some particular historical 
views. This was not a matter that concerned direct criticism of the party—such a 
thing did not belong to state socialism. Instead, a historical study of law that left 
the interconnections between law in the past and the contemporary socialist 
legality undone—even if the researcher represented the idea of the ‘law as a 
learned tradition’—was from the party perspective harmless and, from time to 
time, useful as a façade (see, e.g., Sellnow, 1963, p. 16). 
The communist parties to a degree encouraged theoretical explorations in 
legal science—advancement from ‘revolutionary legality’ was necessary in order 
to bring forth more sophisticated models. This offered some leeway for scholars 
to offer applicable historical knowledge without reducing law to a mere ‘practice 
of political will.’ Some employed ‘the past’ in their indirect criticism of the 
prevailing dogma and, by historically contextualising the discourse of Marxist- 
Leninism itself, distinguished between proper socialism and dogmatism 
(Sellnow, 1968, p. 40; Mamut, 1979; Klenner, 1985). The communist parties 
were determined in controlling their sole authority to reinterpret the dogma of 
Marxist-Leninism and attacked dissenting scholarly views as well as regularly 
narrowed the space for accepted legal science. Nevertheless, their status as oracles 
deteriorated over time. Thus, the last decades of the socialist bloc were char-
acterised by an increased scholarly interest in Marx’s thoughts outside the official 
canon (Varga, 2016). 
Socialism and legal history 
In concrete terms, this book traces the essence of socialist legal historiography on 
three levels—the legal culture, the academic structures and legal principles, and 
the biographical sides of socialist legal historiography. The first part of the book, 
Framing the socialist legal historiography, traces the tensions between the 
European legal tradition and socialist legal orders, and the ways in which these 
frictions were overcome or, alternatively, emphasised. The tensions became 
evident especially in relation to the preceding canon of legal historical works and 
to ‘Western’ legal historiography. 
Some of the individual chapters in the first part of the book investigate the 
relation between legal historiography and socialist society in the context of legal 
academia concentrating on the demands that communist society placed on legal 
historians and the scholars’ response to these challenges as a community in the 
context of e.g. teaching and research questions. Some chapters in the first part 
also analyse shifting meanings and the use of the fundamental building blocks of 
European legal science, such as open concepts or traditional legal virtues, in 
socialist legal historiography. An example of this kind of use of the legal tradition 
is the drafting of Hungarian Civil Code of 1959. András Földi illustrates the way 
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in which fundamental concepts of bona fides and boni mores maintained their 
connection to their original historical framing in the text of the new code and, 
despite pressure from the political sphere and hard core Marxist-Leninists, re-
mained as gateways for legal interpretation in reference to the jurisprudential 
tradition rather than vehicles of socialist state planning. 
In his article, Martin Otto gives an overview of the development of legal 
historiography in the GDR between the pressure of Sovietisation and the attempt 
of legal scholars to retain their identity as members of a distinguished discipline 
within legal studies. The article follows the process of the reestablishment of the 
law faculties in East Germany, their afterlife in a society that guarded knowledge 
production via structural rearrangements in higher education, and also scrutinises 
the dominant research themes in the GDR as a result of ideological restriction 
and lopsided, yet existing, international contacts. 
One might assume that Soviet legal historiography and its view of the 
European past provided a model example in implementing the idea of ‘revolu-
tionary legality.’ Certainly, the discipline experienced the political and ideological 
steering of state socialism first-hand, but the same paradox of the indispensability 
of acknowledging the historical roots in socialist legal science remained. In their 
chapter, Anton Rudokvas and Ville Erkkilä present the long line of Roman law 
studies in the Soviet Union and both highlight the effect that politically origi-
nated shifts in the research stance imposed on the understanding of Roman law 
and show that the field remained a background for further historical and legal 
studies. Marju Luts-Sootak focuses on the Baltic experience within legal his-
torical teaching in the Soviet Union. Although the state curriculum was designed 
to give students an orthodox illustration of the relation between law and material 
historical continuity from the viewpoint of the emerging socialist thought, tea-
chers were able to deploy a vast historical time span and include national ele-
ments in their de facto teaching. The strict coercion of the state could be evaded 
in a subtle use of emphasis and hyperbole. 
Like many other concepts dealing with Russia and legal science, the ‘com-
munist legal tradition’ is a simplification of a very rich and diverse tradition whose 
geographical context and borders with respect to other legal traditions are hard 
to define. Adolfo Giuliani addresses in his chapter the struggle to give a com-
prehensive definition for the legal historical development taking place both in the 
‘East’ and the ‘West.’ Although legal historians in the West have constant pro-
blems in placing ‘the East’ in their narratives of European law, the ‘communist 
legal tradition’ has prevailed as a convenient other for the ‘European legal tra-
dition.’ This from its start has enabled the construction of the coherent entity of 
the ‘Western legal thought’ that has accommodated legal and political scientific 
works on the essence and origins of human rights. 
The second part of the book, Legal historians of socialist regimes, concentrates 
on some significant individual legal historians in East Central Europe. Their 
biographies and professional choices within drastically altering post-Second 
World War societies witness the deep intertwinement of personal values and 
scholarly work in 20th century European legal science. In what ways did scholars 
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‘start from scratch’ after 1945, distinct from the ‘bourgeois worldview’ and 
previous historical narratives, and what stayed over from the inter-war period? 
Of the countries in the socialist bloc, the GDR stands out as an example of the 
wide influence of the state in jurisprudence. Continuity with the national past 
was difficult because German scholarship in the 1930s and 1940s was used as an 
absolute antithesis to proper Marxist legal historiography. Some continuity, 
nevertheless, existed, and a few scholars who had started their careers in the pre- 
Second World War period remained active in the academia of the GDR. Adrian 
Schmidt-Recla and Zara Luisa Gries examine the works of legal historian 
Gerhard Buchda and the continuities and discontinuities within them. Further 
emphasis is paid to the possible impact that Buchda’s scholarly identity had on 
the thoughts of his students and on the methodology of the theses he supervised. 
In some regions in East Central Europe, the drastic changes in the political 
climate of the early 20th century, from hegemonic nationalism to authoritarian 
and finally to state socialist, were more temporally concentrated, clear-cut, and 
thorough than in others. In the Baltic countries, scholars witnessed not only the 
devastating occupation of their home countries by Nazi troops but also their 
ruthless assimilation into the Soviet Union and the totalitarian rule of the public 
sphere associated with such political ruptures. Sanita Osipova examines the career 
of the Latvian legal historian Valdemārs Kalniņš and shows that despite Kalniņš 
carefully excluding any elements from his texts that might have been interpreted 
as a nod towards the recent national past, he nevertheless succeeded in preserving 
the idea of Latvian national legal entity in his works. Marta Bucholc portrays a 
parallel contradiction between the official ideology and methodology and the 
scholar’s identity in her article on Polish historian Juliusz Bardach. Bardach is a 
tragic example of how the Second World War not only changed structures and 
ideologies but also affected scholars on a personal level. Yet despite, or possibly 
because of, his personal experiences during and right after the war, Bardach was 
able to forge a remarkable scientific career and became an established figure in 
Polish academia. 
With the collapse of the socialist bloc, dialectical materialism or the Marxist 
stance have become more or less marginalized in the field of legal historical 
study. For understandable reasons, these theories are still heavily associated with 
state socialism, although they were not responsible for the legal nihilism that 
state socialism in itself advocated. The works of Elemér Pólay are examples of the 
fact that it was indeed possible to produce self-standing research on the history of 
law applying Marxist methodology and in societies that devalued legal science. In 
her article on Pólay, Éva Jakab describes Pólay’s academic oeuvre but also focuses 
on the difficult moral and ethical choices he faced while pursuing a career as a 
legal scholar and later when he became a renowned historian of Roman law. 
The socialist regimes of East Central Europe announced their systems as ul-
timate answers to the perennial questions of democracy, the rule of law, and 
social justice and excluded other alternative explanations as ‘imperialistic.’ In 
practice, however, their political and legal orders embedded bureaucratic illeg-
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oppression. This volume, however, does not concentrate on that framework, but 
on the self-justification of the legal orders of state socialism, and on the dynamics 
within this legality, to which the ruling elite portrayed themselves as bound. 
Concentrating on the mere framework would exclude the phenomenon of so-
cialist legal historiography from the wider context of European history, leaving it 
nothing more than a temporary abnormality, without roots and further con-
sequences. The socialist interpretations of legal history compose a nuanced and 
diverse discourse at the core of the socialist project of East Central Europe, which 
tells a lot about the interaction between law and society. Analysing that level is 
the aim of our book. 
Notes 
1 ‘It is the main task of the science of state and law in the German Democratic 
Republic to educate men […] to think in terms of dialectical materialism in dealing 
with questions of state and law, and to propagate insight into the requirements for 
development of our state and law during the construction of socialism.’ Editorial in 
the leading East German legal journal Staat und Recht in 1958, quoted in 
Markovits, 1968, p. 14.  
2 See Földi in this volume.  
3 See Rudokvas and Erkkilä in this volume.  
4 The figure is an adaptation of Juhana Aunesluoma’s scheme, which he presented in 
his talk ‘Narratiivit vastakkain. Kylmän sodan päättymiseen liittyvät historiakiistat’, 
in Historiantutkimuksen päivät-conference (October 25, 2019) at the University 
of Oulu, Finland.  
5 This was the change that Stalin introduced into the original dogma of Marxist- 
Leninism (Stalin, 1951).  
6 This was, of course, in line with the norm of the socialist states to evaluate not only 
the acts but also the intentions of its citizens and, if needed, to punish any dissident 
spirit (Stolleis, 2009).  
7 ‘Während der bürgerliche Historiker seine Parteinahme zu verschleiern sucht, stellt 
sich der marxistische Historiker offen auf die Seite jener Klasse, deren Vertreter er 
selbst ist, vertritt er offen die Positionen der Arbeiterklasse, als einzig fortschrit-
tlicher Gesellschaftklasse.’ 
8 ‘Die Gründe für diese Entwicklung des Rechts müssen im Interesse einer umfas-
senden Anwendung der Normen allgemeinverständlich sein. Daraus folgt nicht, 
dass dei Erforschung der Staats- und Rechtsgeschichte vergangener Epochen un-
mittelbar der Auslegung und Anwendung des sowjetischen Rechts zugute kommt. 
Das ist unmöglich, und ein solches Ziel kann nicht ernsthaft debattiert warden.’  
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1 The transformations of some 
classical principles in socialist 
Hungarian civil law 
The metamorphosis of bona fides and 
boni mores in the Hungarian Civil 
Code of 1959 
András Földi   
On the historical background 
As is well known, the concepts of bona fides and boni mores originate in Roman 
law. Before examining their fate in the socialist Hungarian civil law, it is necessary 
to refer briefly to the relationship between Hungary and the Roman law tradi-
tion. Until the middle of the 19th century, the Hungarian legal system did not 
belong to civil law jurisdictions. Apart from during the Roman times, Roman law 
has never been the law in effect in Hungary. In the Middle Ages as well as in the 
early modern period, Hungary had a conservative national customary law 
strongly characterised by feudalistic features. In these times, Roman law only had 
a limited impact on the development of Hungarian law (Bónis, 1964; Zlinszky, 
1983, pp. 56ff; Hamza, 2009, pp. 366ff ). 
The modernisation of Hungarian law in terms of the reception of the Roman law 
tradition—I am speaking now about private law—began in the 19th century. 
Hungarian private law acquired a civilian (Roman law) character due to the in-
troduction of the Austrian Civil Code (Allgemeines bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, ABGB) in 
1853. Some years later, the ABGB was repealed but, as a matter of course, it was 
hardly possible to return to the old Hungarian private law. Judicature and other 
factors of legal development aimed for the creation of a modern Hungarian private 
law, mainly on the basis of German law (besides the impact of the Pandectists, it was in 
a certain period especially the Saxon Civil Code of 1863 which was regarded as a 
model code for developing the Hungarian private law), but the Austrian law and later 
(after the First World War) sometimes the Swiss law were taken into consideration as 
well.1 At the end of the 19th century and in the first decades of the 20th century, 
several drafts of a Hungarian Civil Code were elaborated, even presented as bills to the 
Hungarian Parliament, but they were never adopted. Among these drafts, especially 
the last one, the Private Law Code of Hungary in 1928 is to be stressed, not only 
because of its high professional level, but also because of its considerable impact on the 
judicature, which tacitly recognised it as an effective source of law (cf. Zlinszky, 1983, 
p. 65; Földi, 1988, pp. 364ff; Képes, 2016, pp. 112f ). 
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As far as the social-historical context of the development of Hungarian 
private law before the First World War is concerned, it is to be noted that 
this development took place within the framework of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy. After the Compromise between Austria and Hungary was con-
cluded in 1867, a golden age began for Hungary for some decades when both 
the economy and culture developed to a great extent (Rigó, 2017). These 
decades were dominated by the increasing influence of liberal ideas. In this 
context, it is important to refer to the emancipation of Jews in Hungary (Act 
No. XVII of 1867) and to their continuously growing role in the Hungarian 
economy and society. The Tiszaeszlár blood libel trial in 1882 and 1883 
showed the presence of antisemitism in Hungary, but in spite of antisemitic 
agitation, the rule of law triumphed. 
Unfortunately, the First World War did not only break the belle époque, it also 
led to the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in 1918. It is not so much the 
emergence of new national states that is to be lamented in this respect but rather 
the loss of a number of high values, especially the devaluation of liberal ideas, not 
to mention socialist ones. 
The definitive end of the liberal period of the former decades was marked by a 
short communist intermezzo that took place in 1919, namely, the formation of 
the first communist regime in Hungary on the March 21, 1919. The so-called 
‘Hungarian Soviet Republic’ led by Béla Kun (1886–1938) had extremist ideas 
and applied terrorist means. It collapsed after 133 days. Since the majority of 
communist politicians leading the Soviet Republic of 1919 were of Jewish origin, 
albeit they were not members of the Jewish community, antisemitism in 
Hungary became stronger in the interwar period and it became a part of gov-
ernment policy as early as 1920 (Karady and Nagy, 2012). 
The restoration of the Kingdom of Hungary in 1920 was possible in a territory 
reduced to two-thirds of its original size. Due to the Trianon Treaty of 1920, 
Hungary lost not only large and important territories, but also more than a 
quarter of native Hungarians suddenly found themselves outside of Hungarian 
borders, mainly in Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. After such ante-
cedents, from 1920 a national Christian course prevailed in Hungarian politics, 
characterised by strong anticommunism and increasing antisemitism as well 
as antiliberalism. 
In the framework of the present study, I can refer only briefly to the tragic 
events of the Second World War and of the Holocaust that afflicted Hungary to 
a tragically great extent. The political and moral responsibility of the Hungarian 
governments and other influential political factors should not be under-
estimated in this respect. Between September 1944 and April 1945, the terri-
tory of Hungary was liberated or, as it turned out later, occupied by the Soviet 
Red Army. Soviet troops left the country only after the fall of communism in 
1991. The Hungarian Communist Party took power in 1948 and in the same 
year the communist (called ‘socialist’) transformation of the Hungarian legal 
system began. 
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Creation of the first Hungarian Civil Code of 1959 
In this transformation process, the greatest task was the creation of the first Civil 
Code of Hungary. The codification works began in 1953 and it was on July 30, 
1959, that the Parliament adopted the Civil Code of the People’s Republic of 
Hungary as Act No. IV of 1959. The Civil Code entered into force on May 1, 
1960, and after several amendments remained in force until March 15, 2014, 
when the new Civil Code (Act No. V of 2013) entered into force. 
Hungary in the 1950s as well as other socialist countries in Europe experi-
enced a dark era characterised by massive brutality from the communist party, 
which made use of the state organs. On the other hand, there were a number of 
highly qualified jurists who had, fortunately, an important role in the gigantic 
project of civil law codification in Hungary. As we know from history, legal 
science (or at least the validity of private law) and a totalitarian regime do not 
necessarily exclude each other. The classical Roman jurists as well as the excellent 
jurists of Justinian worked in an autocratic empire (cf. Honoré, 
1973–1974, p. 869). 
As for the preparation of the first Hungarian Civil Code (Act No. IV of 1959), 
which began in 1953, its main drafters were Miklós Világhy (1916–1980), Gyula 
Eörsi (1922–1992), Endre Nizsalovszky (1894–1976), Elemér Pólay (1915–1988), 
and Béla Kemenes (1928–2000). Nizsalovszky was perhaps the greatest Hungarian 
private lawyer of his time. From 1938 he was the Professor of Civil Procedure Law 
at the University of Budapest, and from 1943 he was also Professor of Private Law 
there. He was a member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences from 1939. He is 
mentioned in third place in the list given above because as a non-communist, he 
could have only a limited influence on the actual codification. 
It was in fact remarkable in those times that Nizsalovszky was invited to the 
codification committee at all. Many of his colleagues, having been labelled 
‘bourgeois scholars,’ were forced to retire between 1945 and 1950; if they had 
been members of the Academy of Sciences, as a rule they lost their membership. 
Nizsalovszky, however, was an extremely renowned legal scholar, and he was, 
moreover, politically more liberal than conservative being by no means hostile 
towards progressive ideas prior to the Second World War.2 
The leading members of the codification committee were Világhy and Eörsi. 
Formerly as law students they had been Nizsalovszky’s pupils. A semi-official letter 
written by Nizsalovszky to Eörsi in 1954 attests that the esteemed professor 
treated his young colleague as a good friend (see Bodzási, 2018, fol. 16, 
pp. 1146ff ). In spite of their ‘bourgeois’ family background, both Világhy and 
Eörsi as persons open to new ideas—Eörsi being in addition a Holocaust 
survivor—became convinced communists after 1945. They were appointed 
Professors of Civil Law at the University of Budapest in 1953 and later also became 
members of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. The fact that the Civil Code of 
1959, despite some socialist institutions, remained a Romanistic one is especially 
due to Világhy and Eörsi who, possessing a certain political influence, could 
successfully insist that a number of classical traditions of private law be preserved. 
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At this point, the Soviet jurists to some extent controlled to what extent 
socialist principles were present in the new Hungarian Civil Code. A well- 
known Soviet jurist, Anatolii Venediktov (1887–1959), professor at 
Leningrad State University and member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences (cf. 
Benevolenskaya, 2013, pp. 173ff ), sent a letter containing general observa-
tions on the draft of the new Hungarian Civil Code in December 1957. 
Venediktov welcomed the fact that the new Hungarian Civil Code as the 
first socialist civil code would not contain a general part (cf. Baldus and 
Dajczak, 2013).3 Venediktov adds, however, that just that is why the pre-
liminary provisions should be more detailed than in a civil code having also a 
general part. Lacking a Russian translation, Venediktov, as he himself ob-
served, was not in a position to ascertain whether the preliminary provisions in 
the Hungarian draft contained to a satisfactory extent the principles of so-
cialist civil law, even if taking into account the current lower stage of the 
development of socialism in Hungary.4 A less rigorous and at the same time a 
less detailed letter was sent by the Institute of Legal Sciences of the Soviet 
Academy of Sciences (Antimonov, Bratus, Sadikov) to Gyula Eörsi in May 
1958 (Bodzási, 2018, fol. 8, pp. 567ff ). 
As highly qualified jurists, although hardly being convinced communists, Pólay 
and Kemenes had important roles in the codification. They were appointed 
professors at the University of Szeged in 1951 and 1961, respectively. Pólay was 
especially renowned as a scholar of Roman law.5 
As for the preparatory materials of the Civil Code of 1959, it is an advanta-
geous recent development that on the basis of a mandate given by the Minister of 
Justice of Hungary these materials stored in the National Archives of Hungary 
were digitalised in 2015 and 2016 (Verebics, 2017, p. 12). These materials, 
amounting to 16,000 pages, were rendered accessible online in 2018 (Bodzási, 
2018). A part of these documents was published in printed form in 2017, and 
the corresponding volumes are also accessible online.6 
The materials mentioned above—typically typed, sometimes written with a 
pen, and sometimes printed—attest that the preparation of the Hungarian Civil 
Code of 1959 was carried out at a highly professional level. Excellent jurists who 
had been educated during the previous era took part in the work and clearly did 
their best. It is characteristic of the high professional standards that both a former 
project of the famous Professor of Roman law, Géza Marton (1880–1957),7 and 
a study written by Ferenc Mádl (1931–2012)8 were taken into account with 
regard to civil liability regulations. 
The coming into being of the socialist equivalent of 
bona fides 
In the framework of the present study, I will deal with the socialist transfor-
mation of two classical principles of private law, namely, that of ‘good faith and 
fair dealing’ (bona fides) and that concerning the prohibition of contracts ‘con-
trary to good morals’ (contra bonos mores). 
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The Bill of a Private Law Code for Hungary, published in 1928 mentioned 
above, contained, similar to the Swiss Civil Code (para. 1 of art. 2), the principle 
of ‘good faith and honesty’ (section 2) and also contained, like the French ‘Civil 
code’ (Code civil) (old art. 1133), the prohibition of contracts ‘contrary to good 
morals and public policy’ (section 973). From 1949 these concepts were re-
garded in Hungary as being incompatible with socialist civil law. These notions 
were regarded as expressions of the relationships of capitalism. This evaluation 
was reflected not only in the Hungarian legal literature of the 1950s but also in 
the subsequent decades. 
Eörsi laid down in his monograph on the development of ownership published 
in 1951 that the principle of good faith applied in the traffic of goods, i.e., ‘good 
faith and fair dealing’ (Treu und Glauben) served as an instrument to moderate 
the impoverishment (‘proletarisation’) of small capitalists and to prevent anarchy. 
He regarded this principle as a reflection of the impotence and class character of 
the imperialist patrimonial law (Eörsi, 1951, II, 65, 388). In a later monograph 
published in 1965, Eörsi ascertained that ‘good faith and fair dealing’ had been 
inserted into the German and Swiss civil codes as an ‘alien body’ since these 
codes reflected the cold business mentality of capitalism. Eörsi added that the 
principle of good faith was a ‘rubber rule’ that generated legal uncertainty (Eörsi, 
1965, p. 72). 
In 1965 a monograph of Imre Sárándi was published about the abuse of rights. 
Sárándi explains that good morals, the habits of an honest man, and good faith and 
fair dealing are bourgeois principles, the content of which is always being estab-
lished in accordance with the current class interests of monopoly capitalists 
(Sárándi, 1965, p. 69). In the following year, a monograph by László Asztalos was 
published on sanctions in civil law. Being a highly qualified jurist, Asztalos was an 
expert on both civil law and legal history. He also considered the principle of 
‘good faith and fair dealing’ to be a symptom of the crisis of monopoly capitalism 
(Asztalos, 1966, p. 153; see similarly Szabó, 1964, p. 99). 
In his comprehensive book on comparative private law published in Hungarian 
in 1975 and also in English in 1979, sometimes called the ‘socialist Zweigert/ 
Kötz,’ Eörsi regarded ‘good faith and fair dealing’ to be the most efficient in-
strument of monopoly capitalist law that served as a ‘Jack of all trades’ (Mädchen 
für alles) (Eörsi, 1975, pp. 452ff; idem, 1979, pp. 476ff ). In 1981 Eörsi eval-
uated the principle of good faith in a more positive manner, at least as regards the 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 1980, 
otherwise known as the Vienna Convention. Eörsi welcomed the weakening of 
the former rigor commercialis and expressed his hope that the principle of good 
faith would play a greater role during the actual application of the Convention 
rather than being a compromise merely worked out on paper among the re-
presentatives of the United Nations member states (Eörsi, 1981, pp. 19f ). 
References to the capitalist character of ‘good faith applied in the traffic of 
goods’ can also be found in the preparatory documents of the Civil Code of 
1959. In a document written by Gyula Eörsi and Béla Csánk in 1951, it is 
emphasised that the good faith applied in the traffic of goods is a product of the 
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constant crisis of capitalism that had to alleviate the antagonistic conflicts espe-
cially in favour of the small capitalists so that they would not become proletar-
ians. The authors ascertained that such conflicts would not arise in people’s 
democracies (Bodzási, 2018, fol. 4, p. 831).9 
Since the principle of ‘good faith and honesty’ laid down in the Bill of 1928 was 
considered a bourgeois concept, it was replaced by new principles in section 4 of 
the new Civil Code. The text of paragraph 1 was published in the following form: 
‘In the course of exercising their rights and fulfilling their duties the parties in civil 
law relations shall display such a conduct that enforcement of their interests shall 
be in harmony with the interest of society.’ 
The coming into being of this passage can be observed very well in the light 
of the preparatory documents. In some versions up to December 1958, the 
reference was not made to the interests of ‘society’ but to those of the ‘com-
munity.’10 Moreover, in the first drafts up until 1957, the expression ‘interest of 
the public’ applied.11 The reference to ‘society’ was in this way the third stage 
in a development during which the drafters were always looking for a better 
expression. I think that the word ‘society’ was finally preferred because as a rather 
abstract notion, it could serve as a milder means regarding the limitation of 
private autonomy. 
Paragraph 2 of section 4 in its published form laid down that ‘[i]n civil law 
relations [the parties] shall cooperate mutually and act in compliance with the 
requirements of socialist coexistence. Cooperation shall be realised by the exact 
fulfilment of duties and by such an enforcement of rights which is in compliance 
with their [social] destination.’ This formulation appeared already in the first 
Draft of 1955. Later only small corrections of a stylistic nature took place. 
The duty of mutual cooperation laid down in this passage can be regarded as a 
progressive idea that spread from the 1950s in Western legal cultures and is 
present also in art. III. 1:104 of the Draft Common Frame of Reference (Bar 
et al., 2009, I, pp. 685ff ). The reference to the requirements of socialist coex-
istence is of ideological nature, but it is not to be regarded as a limitation on 
private autonomy but much more as a principle requiring consideration of the 
interests of other persons and in this way it constitutes continuity with the classic 
principles of good faith and honesty.12 
The next phrase contains strict rules concerning both parties of the civil law 
relations. The requirement of exact fulfilment of duties is in a way contrary to the 
classical principle of good faith, which sometimes renders possible a milder 
treatment of the debtor’s duties (cf. Brox, 2000, p. 149; idem, 1984, p. 91; 
Medicus, 1999, p. 113). It is to be noted that the vision of a negligent debtor 
could have a role when drafting this rule, against whom the legislator had to 
protect the other party. The reference to the exercise of rights is a sign of a 
significant extension of the prohibition of chicane in socialist civil law, which is 
more thoroughly explained in section 5 treating the abuse of rights. 
In the first versions of the Draft, a third paragraph in section 4 laid down that 
‘[t]he socialist organisations exercise their rights in order to fulfil their duties 
based upon the plan of the people’s economy’ (see the Draft of 1955 in Bodzási, 
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2018, fol. 16, p. 233). This paragraph, however, was deleted at the end of 1956 
or somewhat later and was not included in the final text.13 The deletion of this 
paragraph is a sign that the socialist character of the draft of the Civil Code was 
moderated.14 
In the first Drafts, such provisions in section 4 were substituted for the former 
principle of good faith and honesty. One similarity to para. 2 section 2 of the Bill 
of 1928 is that section 4 of all versions of the draft was followed by a section 5 
containing the prohibition of the abuse of rights, albeit the effectiveness of the 
prohibition was significantly extended. 
Neither the expression ‘good faith’ nor the word ‘honesty’ appeared in the 
various versions of section 4. ‘Fair dealing’ is not mentioned in these texts, either. 
It is still more remarkable that not even the first versions of the rationale contain 
any reference to the fact that section 4 was substituted for the former principle of 
good faith and honesty.15 
As referred to briefly above, these classical notions were omitted since they 
were regarded as reflections of capitalism. On the contrary, emphasis was laid on 
collective aspects, namely on the interests of society, and on the relationships 
between parties, especially on their duty of cooperation. At the same time, only 
the expression ‘socialist coexistence’ has an explicit ideological connotation in 
these provisions. 
During the preparation of the Civil Code, proposals were made suggesting 
preserving some reference to good faith. Among the preparatory materials, a 
voluminous study amounting to 100 pages can be found that was presented in 
November 1957 by judge Kornél Berndt. This study contained an explicit 
proposal to insert into the Civil Code the principle of good faith and honesty 
with reference to a similar provision in the Bill of 1928 (Bodzási, 2018, fol. 16, 
p. 72).16 It is not surprising that this proposal was rejected. It is in fact more 
remarkable that the Bill of 1928 could be referred to as a model. In this era, the 
entire old Hungarian law was regarded by a number of influential communist 
jurists to be an obsolete reflection of capitalism with some surviving elements of 
feudalism. Indeed, in the 1950s, the interwar period was often referred to as the 
era of Horthy fascism.17 
In the beginning of 1959, the Hungarian minister of foreign affairs, Endre Sík 
(1891–1978), proposed that the presumption of good faith should be inserted 
into the Preliminary provisions of the Civil Code, similar to section 3 of the Bill 
of 1928. This proposal was rejected with the explanation that the new code 
would have a more severe regulation and, in some cases, even the presumption of 
bad faith had to apply. Such an inverse presumption of bad faith could be fea-
sible, in particular, if ‘capitalist elements’ were concerned who were, however, 
slowly disappearing from Hungarian society (see Bodzási, 2018, fol. 8, p. 107). 
Even if such conservative efforts failed, they had still some consequences, 
namely, some surrogates for the missing classical principle of good faith and 
honesty were finally inserted into the Civil Code. At the end of 1957 or some-
what later, somebody noted the Latin word nemo written in pen in a copy of the 
Draft published in printed form in the autumn of 1957, in the rationale of 
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section 4 (see Bodzási, 2018, fol. 11, p. 701). This was obviously a reference to 
the maxim ‘no one alleging his own turpitude is to be heard’ (nemo suam tur-
pitudinem allegans auditur). As a consequence, in the Draft of December 1958, 
a third paragraph appeared in the text of section 4, laying down that ‘[n]obody 
can rely on their own misfeasance in order to acquire an advantage. […]’ (See 
Bodzási, 2018, fol. 14, p. 4.) 
A further supplement concerning good faith and honesty appeared in the Draft 
published in the autumn of 1957. It is in the third paragraph inserted into section 5, 
which deals with the abuse of rights. The new provision laid down that ‘[t]he court 
may obligate to full or partial reparation the person whose intentional behaviour has 
induced another person in good faith to such an action whereby the latter has 
suffered a damage through no fault of his own.’ This paragraph became in the Draft 
of December 1958 the separate section 6 (see Bodzási, 2018, fol. 14, p. 4). This 
state of affairs is known as ‘implicit conduct,’ and it preserved its position and 
wording also in the published version.18 The text of the provision as well as the 
rationale to the (final) section 6 attest that the ‘implicit conduct’ was really a sur-
rogate for the lack of good faith. The text of the provision contains an explicit 
reference to the ‘good faith’ of the possible plaintiff and the rationale refers several 
times to the importance of ‘confidence in good faith.’ 
Can we say that the classical principle of good faith and honesty could survive 
in a way in the Civil Code of 1959 due to the provision on implicit conduct? I am 
afraid that the answer to this question has to be negative since the good faith 
referred to hereby is the so-called subjective good faith (in German guter 
Glaube), while the classical principle of good faith and honesty is connected with 
the objective good faith (in German Treu und Glauben).19 
A further impact of the conservative proposals mentioned above can be verified 
in the ministerial rationale to the Bill of 1959 which was later published together 
with the norm text of the Civil Code. While the former drafts of the rationale did 
not refer to this problem at all, the rationale in its final form observes that the Bill 
does not lay down the presumption of good faith, although such a presumption 
can be found in the Bill of 1928, in many bourgeois civil codes and also in article 5 
of the ‘Polish General Part’ of 1950 (of a Polish civil code being that time 
scheduled only). The further explication treating ‘good faith and fair dealing’ as 
well as the good faith of the possessor without any distinction shows that the 
drafter of the rationale was unable to distinguish between the subjective and the 
objective meanings of good faith (Hungarian Civil Code of 1959, hereinafter 
HCC, 1959, p. 25). 
Even if considering the confusion of the meanings of good faith in the ra-
tionale, it was advantageous that the norm text of the Hungarian Civil Code of 
1959 emphasised some objective standards instead of laying down the principle 
of good faith and honesty. Thanks to this solution, in the subsequent decades, 
there was no Hungarian jurist who would have confused the objective and the 
subjective senses of good faith, at least not within Hungarian civil law. The 
terminology applied by the Civil Code of 1959 guaranteed that good faith meant 
only (or overwhelmingly) the subjective state of mind, while the principle of 
The transformations of some classical principles  33 
objective good faith (and honesty) had an entirely different terminology. The 
advantage of the solution preferred in the Hungarian Civil Code of 1959 is 
obvious if we compare it with para. 3 of art. 1134 of the French Code civil of 
1804 (abrogated in 2016) that laid down that ‘the contracts shall be performed 
bona fide’ ([e]lles [viz. les conventions—A. F.] doivent être exécutées de bonne 
foi). This provision, namely the ambiguous term bonne foi, constituted one 
source of confusion concerning subjective and objective good faith in French 
civil law (cf. Tallon, 1994, p. 12). 
Developments since the Novel of 1977 
As far as the subsequent fate of section 4 is concerned, during the preparation of 
the Novel of 1977, László Asztalos proposed that the prohibition of unfair 
business activity and unfair profit making be inserted into the preliminary pro-
visions (Asztalos, 1976, p. 120). A more radical proposal was made by Imre 
Sárándi, who suggested laying down the principle of exercising rights and duties 
in compliance with their destination and in good faith (Sárándi, 1977, pp. 35ff ). 
Asztalos’s proposal was accepted to some extent and the Novel (Act No. IV of 
1977) laid down the prohibition of unfair business activity in para. 2 of section 4. 
Sárándi’s proposal including the restoration of the principle of good faith could 
not be accepted at that time.20 
As far as the background of the Novel of 1977 is concerned, in 1968 a sig-
nificant modification of the regulation of the economy took place in Hungary, 
namely, the so-called ‘new economic mechanism’ was introduced that was 
aimed at diminishing the role of central planning and at increasing the role of 
market relations. 
It was only Act XIV of 1991 that later restored the classical principle of good 
faith and honesty overwriting para. 1 of section 4. Since ‘good faith’ meant in 
Hungarian civil law for some decades (between 1960 and 1991) an exclusively 
subjective notion, the restoration of the classical principle caused considerable 
misunderstandings. Most jurists did not remember the principle of ‘good faith and 
honesty’ as being formerly fixed by the Bill of 1928 (Földi, 2003, pp. 82ff ). An 
amendment, namely Act No. III of 2006, was required to make matters less am-
biguous, both by means of some slight corrections of the relating terminology and 
through the relating rationale, namely that in Hungarian civil law objective and 
subjective good faith are to be distinguished (Földi, 2007, pp. 53ff ). In the new 
Hungarian Civil Code (Act. No. V of 2013), the same terminology applies (para. 1 
of section 1:3; cf. Földi, 2016, pp. 173ff ). 
The coming into being of the socialist equivalent of  
boni mores 
The Bill of 1928, mentioned several times above, contained not only the principle 
of good faith and honesty (its section 3, being similar to art. 2 of the Swiss Civil 
Code) but also, similar to the French civil code (Code civil) (old art. 1133),21 
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the prohibition of contracts ‘contrary to good morals and public policy’ (section 
973). Just as the principle of good faith and honesty was not compatible with 
socialist ideas, so, too, this was the case with regard to boni mores. That is why a 
new provision was substituted for boni mores in para. 2 of section 200 of the Civil 
Code of 1959 with the following wording: ‘Any contract contrary to legal rules or 
made to elude the legal rules is rendered null and void unless a legal rule attaches 
different legal consequences to it. A contract is likewise null and void when it is 
evidently contrary to the interests of the working people or to the requirements of 
socialist coexistence.’ 
This ruling came into being as a result of a development that had several 
stages. In the first draft of the law of obligations made in July 1953,22 there was a 
shorter formulation according to which ‘[a] contract is null and void if it is 
contrary to legal rules or made to elude the legal rules or is not in the interests of 
the working people in some other way.’ (See Bodzási, 2018, fol. 19, p. 8.) 
In the draft of the law of obligations of October 1954 signed by Nizsalovszky, 
Világhy, and Eörsi, three further states of affairs were added to the first version of 
the new rule. One of them was a reference to the contracts contrary to the 
planned tasks of both parties. A further type of nullity was constituted by 
contracts contrary to the requirements of socialist coexistence, and a third case 
was constituted by the contracts aimed to damage the state (see Bodzási, 2018, 
fol. 19, p. 74). 
The reference to the interests of the working people was modified in the 
version in question by inserting the adverb ‘evidently.’ This addition could have 
been inspired by art. 2 of the Swiss Civil Code,23 and it obviously served to 
increase the certainty of the law. This modification is a little sign of the political 
changes after Stalin’s death in 1953. 
Moreover, the codification commission wished for a reference to ‘socialist 
morals’ to be added to the wording of the law (see Bodzási, 2018, fol. 19, p. 74). 
This proposal does not seem to have any echo in the later materials. It is strange 
that the word ‘morals’ was not acceptable even though accompanied by the 
word ‘socialist.’ 
It was Gyula Eörsi who inserted (in ink) the word ‘determined’ before the 
words ‘planned tasks’ in a copy of the September 1955 Draft. At the same time, 
Eörsi also added (again in ink) that the reference to damaging the state should be 
discussed (for both corrections by Eörsi see Bodzási, 2018, fol. 19, p. 174). 
These proposals were also aimed to increase the certainty of the law that Eörsi felt 
was being endangered by such general clauses. 
In a later version of the Draft probably at the end of 1955, the reference to the 
conflict with planned tasks was struck out in ink but the reference to damaging 
the state was left untouched (see Bodzási, 2018, fol. 17, p. 1). In a somewhat 
later version of the Draft, which no longer contained a reference to the planned 
tasks, the reference to damaging the state was also struck out in ink (see Bodzási, 
2018, fol. 19, p. 218). 
In spite of the corrections aimed to increase the legal certainty, critical ob-
servations were made that the reference to ‘fraudulent intention to evade the law’ 
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(in fraudem legis agere) was not exact enough.24 According to another, more 
radical criticism, the reference to the conflict with the interests of working 
people and the requirements of socialist coexistence would be superfluous since 
the corresponding cases were covered by the prohibition of contracts contrary to 
legal rules as well as contracts made ‘in circumvention of the rules of law’ (in 
fraudem legis). Furthermore, according to this criticism, these general clauses 
were dangerous as they made it possible to pass arbitrary sentences.25 
These concerns, which can sometimes appear nowadays, did not have any 
impact on the legislation. The text formulated in the Draft of September 1956 
(para. 2 of section 181 [later 200], see Bodzási, 2018, fol. 11, p. 59) was also 
preserved in the later versions and if compared with the final enacted version 
reveals only minor modifications of a stylistic character. 
The ministerial rationale of the Bill of 1959, published together with the norm 
text of the Civil Code, referred explicitly to the fact that the reference to the 
conflict with the interests of the working people and with the requirements of 
socialist coexistence was substituted for the former prohibition of contracts 
contrary to good morals (HCC, 1959, p. 154). 
Developments since the Novel of 1977 
In the Novel of 1977, a more timely reference was substituted for the ‘working 
people,’ namely, ‘society.’ It was only the Novel of 1991 mentioned above in 
which the prohibition of contracts ‘against good morals’ (contra bonos mores) was 
substituted for the modified socialist formula in section 200, preserving, how-
ever, from the socialist definition the restrictive adverb ‘evidently.’ At the same 
time, the former reference to the ‘public order’ known in the respective provision 
of the Bill of 1928 was omitted by the Novel of 1991. Therefore, the Novel in 
question did not restore the formula of the Bill of 1928 completely. The new 
Hungarian Civil Code (Act No. V of 2013) has preserved the provision in-
troduced in 1991 (section 6:96; cf. Földi, 2016, pp. 183f ). 
The judicature dealt thoroughly with the problem, in which cases an evident 
conflict with the interests of society or with the requirements of social coex-
istence could be verified. The selling of real estates of the state at a low price in 
bad faith was a typical case of violation of the interests of society. Violation of the 
requirements of socialist coexistence was verified when a person who was aware 
of the grave illness and bad medical prognosis of the other party concluded with 
him or her a contract for support (maintenance) or for life annuity in order to 
acquire the other party’s apartment at a low cost.26 
Conclusions 
Drawing some general conclusions, we can ascertain that the socialist transfor-
mation of some classical principles of civil law in Hungary did not cause extremely 
grave damage. The contents of bona fides as well as that of boni mores were 
translated into a new and sometimes surprising language, but the changes can also 
 
36 András Földi  
be seen as a kind of modernisation. The details of application of these general 
clauses of ancient origin sometimes became more understandable. Moreover, in 
the case of bona fides, the transformation was useful, namely, in order to avoid the 
confusion of the subjective and objective meanings of good faith. It should be 
noted that the traditional technical term ‘good faith’ itself is very problematical and 
has constituted a source of misunderstandings for many centuries (Juenger, 1995, 
p. 1253; Földi, 2007, pp. 53ff ). It is less understandable why in socialist 
Hungarian civil law the notion of ‘morals’ could not apply even with the attribute 
‘socialist’ either, despite such proposals attested by the preparatory materials. 
As for the background of the low level of ‘communist distortions’ appearing in 
the codification of the HCC of 1959, several advantageous circumstances can be 
mentioned. The members of the codification commission were jurists qualified at 
a very high professional level in the period before the Second World War. They 
often represented a higher professional level than many of the jurists trained later 
in the socialist era, having to create the new ‘capitalist’ private law of Hungary 
after 1990. This inverse development of the recent past has not been less para-
doxical than the former situation was in the 1950s. 
Most of the members of the codification commission of the HCC of 1959 
were not engaged communists or at least not before 1945. Some of them as-
sumed the task because of opportunism. It has to be added, however, that the 
former regime known as Horthy era (1920–1944) became odious not only be-
cause of the tragic events that happened during the last years of the war. With 
regard to the adverse antecedents, the communist regime did not seem so much 
unacceptable in the time of its emergence as it seems nowadays. 
As far as the preparatory materials allow us to judge it, the Soviet Union 
controlled the process of codification in an absolutely soft way. No detailed 
translations of the drafts were sent to Soviet jurists. There are only a very few 
direct references to the Soviet law in the preparatory materials. The more re-
markable is that a number of references to the Bill of 1928 can be found in the 
same documents. These references are not always negative. As attested by the 
preparatory materials, the socialist features of the draft were moderated both 
after Stalin’s death (1953) and after the revolution of 1956. 
Naturally there were strict limits determining the socialist character of the 
codification. As referred to above, neither the notion of good faith and fair 
dealing nor that of the good morals could be mentioned in the norm text of 
the HCC until 1991. They might be referred to only in the rationale. These 
‘bourgeois’ notions could not be admitted in the Novel of 1977 either, in 
spite of repeated proposals, albeit also this Novel reduced a bit the socialist 
character of some of the provisions in question. There was a slow, by no means a 
continuous, but in any case a long process of erosion of socialist character of the 
provisions limiting the private autonomy. 
Finally, it was fortunate that the codification of the Hungarian Civil Code of 
1959 was led by two highly qualified jurists, M. Világhy and Gy. Eörsi. Having 
become communists despite their ‘bourgeois’ roots, they had the political in-
fluence to retain a great many elements of the civil law tradition in Hungary. 
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Notes 
1 Commercial law was regulated in Hungary by the independent Commercial Code 
of 1875, cf. Zlinszky, 1985, p. 435, p. 441.  
2 On the basis of political considerations the communist regime distinguished a 
number of ‘strata’ of ‘bourgeois’ scholars and applied different treatment towards 
them. Some older professors like Endre Nizsalovszky (private law), Géza Marton 
(Roman law), or Ferenc Eckhart (legal history) could keep their chairs; 
Nizsalovszky and Marton could also keep their membership in the Academy of 
Sciences. Other professors appointed before 1944, e.g., Sándor Kornél Tury 
(Professor of Commercial Law in Budapest), were sent to the Institute of 
Administrative and Legal Sciences of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences so that 
they would not disturb the ideological development of the students. Tury had the 
opportunity to make observations on the drafts of the new Civil Code; see, e.g., 
Bodzási, 2018 [http://impp.mhk.hu/document/view/id=17], p. 192 (as for 
the following references to the Preparatory Materials, the number of the corre-
sponding folder and that of the electronic page will only be given). The case of 
István Szászy (Professor of Private Law and Private International Law in 
Budapest, known also as Étienne de Szászy) was peculiar because he was forced to 
retire in 1951 but he did not lose his membership in the Academy of Sciences. In 
the 1950s, he could earn money as a translator. From the 1960s, a number of his 
monographs were published in Hungary in English. See Burián, 2001, pp. 147ff.  
3 The role or even the raison d’être of the general part was discussed in Soviet legal 
literature as well as in some other socialist countries. A letter sent by the Secretary 
of State of the East German (GDR) Ministry of Justice, Dr. Toeplitz, to the 
Hungarian Minister of Justice in February 1959 seems to be sceptical as regards 
the rejection of the general part. Dr. Toeplitz was curious about the arguments 
for this solution being discussed in the GDR, see the original letter in Bodzási, 
2018, fol. 8, pp. 781ff. A head of department, István Timár answered that the 
system of the civil code did not have to be identical with the scientific system of 
civil law and the latter necessarily contained a general part. See Timár’s letter sent 
in April 1959 in Bodzási, 2018, fol. 8, p. 785ff.  
4 I did not find the original text of Venediktov’s letter. Among the preparatory 
materials published recently a Hungarian translation can be found, see Bodzási, 
2018, fol. 8, pp. 570ff. This document does not contain any reference to whom 
the letter was sent.  
5 For the scientific oeuvre of Pólay, see Éva Jakab’s study in this volume. A folder of 
the preparatory materials of the Civil Code of 1959 contains Elemér Pólay’s 
offprint from the Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae (vol. 5 
[1957]; this is a study entitled Die Blütezeit des römischen Wirtschaftslebens und 
die klassiche Zeit des römischen Rechts) dedicated to Béla Kemenes on the February 
15, 1958 (see Bodzási, 2018, fol. 23, p. 704). It is, however, not probable that 
this study could be used during the codification work, and Pólay’s study can be 
regarded here as a kind of ‘textus fugitivus.’ The preparatory materials attest that 
Pólay made several proposals in order to preserve as many classical institutions as 
possible in the new Civil Code, see, e.g., Bodzási, 2018, fol. 19, p. 963.  
6 See http://impp.mhk.hu/document/view/id=49.  
7 See G. Marton, Tervezet egy polgári törvénykönyv kártérítési fejezetéhez (A draft of 
the chapter on damages of a new Civil Code) in Bodzási, 2018, fol. 17, 
pp. 257–329. Marton’s draft was first published (in a different version) in his 
posthumous monograph: Marton, 1992, pp. 298–327. For more on Géza 
Marton himself, see Szabó, 2001, pp. 424f.; Hamza, 2009, pp. 398f.  
8 See F. Mádl, Az objektív felelősségi rendszer történelmi kialakulása (Historical 
formation of the system of strict liability) in Bodzási, 2018, fol. 23, pp. 640–703. 
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Ferenc Mádl was a professor at the Eötvös Loránd University (Budapest); a 
member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences; and, between 2000 and 2005, 
President of the Republic of Hungary.  
9 This document was written for the professional and political training of jurists in 
the framework of a conference organised by the Department of Codification of 
the Ministry of Justice; see the cover on p. 822 (Bodzási, 2018, fol. 4).  
10 So still in the Draft of December 12, 1958 in Bodzási, 2018, fol. 14, p. 4. In this 
copy, however, the word ‘community’ is crossed out in pencil and the word 
‘society’ is substituted. In another copy, the same correction was made with a 
pen, see ibid. p. 498.  
11 See a copy of the Draft of 1955 with corrections made in both pen and pencil. 
Bodzási, 2018, fol. 16, p. 351. This correction was made prior to July 27, 1957, 
cf. ibid. p. 374.  
12 Gy. Eörsi in Eörsi and Gellért, 1981, I, 49 observes that the socialist character of 
the cooperation laid down in section 4 means that the parties shall not be only 
neutral or peaceful as regards the other party’s interests (as is the case in bourgeois 
legal systems) but they shall carry out activity as well if it is necessary in the given 
case. As an example, Eörsi refers to a judgment passed in 1970 according to which 
a special (remedial) recreation home, if being specialised also for receiving motor- 
disabled guests, should put carpets on the floor so that walking is made safer.  
13 A section crossed out with red pencil can be found in a copy of the Draft of 
September 1956 (see Bodzási, 2018, fol. 11, p. 247). In the Draft published in 
autumn 1957 this provision is already omitted (see ibid. p. 699). ‘Enterprises ha[d] 
to report on the state of plan fulfilment of the annual plan every quarter or even at 
shorter intervals,’ see Földi, 1992, II, p. 582.  
14 The Novel of 1977 inserted a new provision into section 4 in which the idea of 
the planned economy reappeared. This modification was, however, in connection 
with the liberalisation of the economy. 
15 See the Draft Rationale of Spring 1957 in Bodzási, 2018, fol. 12, pp. 15f; si-
milarly in the (printed) Draft Rationale of August 1957 in fol. 2, p. 113 as well as 
in the (printed) Draft Rationale of Autumn of 1957 in fol. 11, p. 701, p. 974.  
16 Berndt also made further conservative proposals, e.g., to receive sections 4–7 of the 
Bill of 1928 as well as to include also family law in the Civil Code; see ibid. 
fol. 16, p. 44.  
17 A prominent representative of this course was also the internationally well- 
known legal philosopher and comparatist Imre Szabó (1912–1991), Director of 
the Institute of Administrative and Legal Sciences of the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences. In 1955 Szabó published a controversial monograph radically con-
demning the older Hungarian legal philosophy. Szabó stated in a conference on 
the civil law codification in his Institute on February 14, 1957, that the Draft 
Rationale contained too many historical elements while the earlier Hungarian 
private law should be forgotten and the new Civil Code as a tabula rasa should 
not be interpreted on the basis of the former judicature but on its own basis, in 
accordance with the principles of the people’s democracy (see Bodzási, 2018, 
fol. 21, p. 1360).  
18 Currently, in the new Hungarian Civil Code adopted as Act V of 2013, the 
implicit conduct is no longer regulated in the Preliminary provisions but in the 
chapter entitled ‘Further facts generating an obligation,’ and specifically in section 
6:587. Such a transplant was earlier suggested in 1958 by the Supreme Court (see 
Bodzási, 2018, fol. 8, p. 491) as well as by Endre Nizsalovszky, with reference to 
the variae causarum figurae of Roman law (see Bodzási, 2018, fol. 9, p. 116). 
Nizsalovszky ascertained, however, that the implicit conduct does not belong to 
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19 At this point it is necessary to refer to the problem of the different interpretations 
of good faith in various legal cultures. A number of jurisdictions firmly differ-
entiate between (1) subjective good faith characterised by belief in the lawfulness 
of one’s possession, etc. (in German guter Glaube) and (2) objective good faith 
and fair dealing (in German Treu und Glauben). The dualist interpretation derives 
from the older ius commune, but it gained importance only as a consequence of a 
monograph by Wächter, 1871. Since then the dualist interpretation has been 
embraced the world over. For a detailed treatment, see Földi, 2007, pp. 53ff; 
idem, SZ Rom. Abt. 124 (2007), pp. 603ff; idem, 2010, pp. 483ff; idem, 2014, 
pp. 312ff. See also, e.g., Martins-Costa 2015, pp. 40ff; Novaretti, 2010, pp. 953ff. 
Before the global spread of a dualist interpretation, a kind of ‘subjective monism’ 
prevailed which regards good faith always as a subjective state of mind. Besides 
these interpretations a kind of ‘objective monism’ is also known, which is domi-
nant in Austrian law in which good faith is called Redlichkeit. As for the future, it 
cannot be ruled out that a pluralist interpretation will become predominant, 
which acknowledges various meanings of good faith. Cf. Zimmermann and 
Whittaker, 2000, pp. 690ff. Cardilli, Dajczak, Fiori, Stolfi and Zannini warn of the 
dangers of a dualist interpretation, see Garofalo 2003, and cf., with detailed 
bibliographic data, Földi, SZ Rom. Abt. 124 (2007), pp. 603ff, idem, 2007, 
pp. 53ff.  
20 The Novel of 1977 inserted into para. 1 of section 4 a second phrase, which laid 
down that ‘[e]conomic organisations shall act in their civil law relations in 
compliance with the requirements of the planned and proportional development 
of the people’s economy.’ The same Novel inserted into para. 4 of section 4 a first 
phrase, according to which ‘[un]less this Act provides a stricter requirement, one 
has to proceed in civil law relations as it may generally be expected in the 
given situation.’  
21 As is generally known, in 2016 an important reform of the French Code civil in 
some places deleted references to bonnes mœurs. 
22 As observed in the preliminary remarks, the Department of Codification thought 
that it was feasible to create a draft of the law of obligation, i.e. not in the fra-
mework of a civil code, see Bodzási, 2018, fol. 19, p. 2. See also Eörsi’s note in 
the same sense in a copy of a draft of 1953 (written in ink), ibid. p. 39.  
23 See para. 2 of section 2 of the Swiss ZGB: ‘Der offenbare Missbrauch eines 
Rechtes findet keinen Rechtsschutz.’ The official translation is: ‘The manifest 
abuse of a right is not protected by law.’ It is to be noted that the corresponding 
provision in the Bill of 1928 (para. 2 of section 2) inspired otherwise by the Swiss 
Civil Code, did not contain the attribute ‘manifest.’  
24 This observation was made by the Legal Department of the Hungarian National 
Bank in February 1955, see Bodzási, 2018, fol. 19, p. 1166. It is remarkable that 
the most Western civil codes do not declare the prohibition of in fraudem legis 
agere, except the Italian Codice civile of 1942 in its art. 1344 (contratto in frode 
alla legge). This prohibition can be traced back to Roman law, see Paul. 
D. 1.3.29. 
25 This criticism was made by an attorney called László Sarlós at an official con-
ference held in Szekszárd in January 1958, moderated by Professor Lóránt Rudolf 
(University of Pécs), see Bodzási, 2018, fol. 19, p. 1261. A similar criticism was 
presented by a public prosecutor named Gyula Zoltay at another official con-
ference held in Győr in January 1958, moderated by the Vice President of the 
Supreme Court, László Sztodolnik, see ibid. p. 1268. 
26 See K. Benedek in Eörsi and Gellért, 1981, I, p. 920 for data on related judge-
ments. See more recently Menyhárd, 2004, pp. 31f; Deli, 2014, pp. 11ff.  
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	2 We few, we happy few?  
Legal history in the GDR 
Martin Otto   
Introduction: The very beginning 
By May 1945, Germany was totally defeated. Total reversal replaced total war. 
Universities had been closed during the last months of the war, and many of their 
buildings were destroyed or out of use. During wartime the number of students 
was already small, and with the peace and after political deliberation, legal lec-
tures and teaching of legal history ceased to exist. But 1945 was not a ‘Point 
of Zero’: when the universities reopened in the following years, the National 
Socialist past was present. The official point of reference in all education was 
‘before 1933.’ Yet courses in the ‘History of Private Law’ (Privatrechtsgeschichte) 
were not integrated into the official part of the legal studies until 1935 
(Haferkamp, 2010), and taking up an older tradition of legal history seemed 
impossible. Some legal historians even considered abolishing the lines between 
German, Roman and Canonic legal history for a genuine new beginning.1 By 
the same token, the whole history of universities in the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR) had to face a vast number of contradictions. 
On the one hand, the GDR defined itself as completely new—a renunciation 
of the evil German tradition, the first workers’ and peasants’ state. Only the 
‘good’ parts of German heritage like Humanism, Enlightenment or ‘progressive’ 
culture were adopted. On the other hand, even the Communists knew that a 
total restart was impossible. Hence, a general tension between the remaining 
‘bourgeois’ and the upcoming, new generation of Marxist scholars was accepted, 
and as long as the German reunification was the official aim of Soviet politics, ties 
between the universities in the East and the West were generally maintained 
and tolerated by the government. An idea of the common past with the 
Western neighbour and even a continuity in the ‘good’ parts of history were 
supported—as long as the leading role of the SED (Sozialistische Einheitspartei 
Deutschlands; Socialist Unity Party of Germany; “unity” refers to the merge of 
Communists and Social Democrats) was not disputed. 
In legal sciences, there was at first sight less continuity. But as, for example, 
most non-socialist lawyers left the GDR by 1949, some traits that dated back to 
the pre-war years did exist. Most notable of them was the German civil code BGB 
(Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) that was still in effect in both German states. In many 
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cases there was no real alternative in referring to the old scholars and tradition. 
German universities were mostly conservative, and the left-wing (not to speak of 
communist) scientists had composed a small minority already in the Weimar 
Republic. For the large part, academics were conservative and a considerable 
number of the university professors of the GDR had been in office already 
before 1945. 
Typical for German legal science since 19th century was the definition of jur-
isprudence as a historic discipline, resulting in a strong role of the legal historical 
studies as part of the university training. Likewise, the GDR could not offer legal 
studies without legal history, so legal historians were needed, and because there 
was no Marxist legal history before 1945, the continuity among legal historians 
was even bigger than in other legal disciplines. For the legal science of the GDR, 
the presence of the ‘other’ German state (and the jurisprudential research carried 
out within it) was self-evident, yet all the initiatives and research results from the 
‘West’ were categorically rebuked. For the legal historiography of the GDR, the 
fact that it did not represent the stance of the ‘whole German jurisprudence’ was 
even more awkward since it did share a common national past—which often was 
the object of legal historical studies—with the ‘Western’ German legal historical 
writing. The research results derived from that common past and understanding of 
the essence of the common tradition were nevertheless in many places very dif-
ferent from the Western equivalent. 
Where have all the universities gone? 
During the first post-war years, the difference between ‘Zones of Occupation’ 
(Besatzungszonen) was small. Allied forces mostly kept politically quiet. 
Everywhere a lack of professors and scholarly literature was remarkable 
(Rückert, 1995). A genuine new beginning was intended, but in reality this 
was hopelessly impracticable, especially for the universities in the Soviet area 
of occupation. 
Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena (originally founded in 1558) was reopened 
in October 1945 by the Soviet military government (Steiger, 1980). Like 
most parts of Thuringia, Jena was originally occupied by the US army. Under 
American rule, Thuringia seemed to be returning to the German ‘rule of 
law’ (Rechtsstaat) (Wahl, 1999). But American occupation lasted only one 
summer—and it had no effect on the university. Although Americans made plans 
to re-open Jena University, this only became reality under Soviet rule, and the 
university was faced with a marked ‘brain drain’ to West Germany, the Faculty 
of Law especially (Stolleis, 2009, pp. 100–109). When in October 1946, 
Hermann Schultze von Lasaulx finally left Jena, there were no remaining legal 
historians—and it was not until 1949 that Gerhad Buchda returned from Halle 
to fill his place (Lingelbach, 2008). 
Rostock University (originally founded 1419) was reopened in January 1946 
(Lieberwirth, 1988, p. 195). The famous legal historian Heinrich Mitteis was a 
member of the Faculty of Law, but he left for Berlin in 1947, and legal history 
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and church law were lectured by the enigmatic Hans Gotthilf Strasser 
(Mechow, 1970, p. 278 and Soldwisch, 2007, p. 225), a former journalist and 
member of the liberal political party LDPD (Liberal-Demokratische Partei 
Deutschlands). Strasser was also the Minister of Finance in Mecklenburg from 
1946 to 1948 (Handschuck, 2003). The Rostock Faculty of Law was closed 
down for political reasons in 1951. 
Leipzig University (originally founded 1409) was reopened in autumn 1945 
(Lieberwirth, 1988, p. 194). Leipzig as well was first occupied by the Americans. 
The famous ‘Jurist Faculty’ (Juristenfakultät) began lecturing in January 1946. 
The Supreme German Court (Reichsgericht) was no longer in operation. The 
faculty of law boasted an impressive number of names from the old days, in-
cluding Alfred Schultze in German legal history and Heinrich Siber in Roman 
legal history, both old-aged. Senior faculty member and long-term Dean was 
Erwin Jacobi, a former friend of Carl Schmitt and one of the leading public 
lawyers in the Weimar Republic with merits in labour law and church law. 
During the first post-war years, Leipzig was considered the most ‘bourgeois’ law 
faculty in the Soviet area of occupation (Stolleis, 2009, pp. 109–121). 
In 1946 in Leipzig, the first post-war habilitation thesis in legal history 
(Lieberwirth, 1986) was passed by Gertrud Schubart-Fikentscher, a student of 
Alfred Schultze (Lieberwirth, 2010, pp. 1–26). The year 1947 saw the installa-
tion of the ‘Social Science Faculty’ or GEWIFA (Gesellschaftswissenschaftliche 
Fakultät, a Marxist faculty) and the ‘Worker and Peasant Faculty’ (Arbeiter-und-
Bauern-Fakultät) in the ‘socialist redesign’ of the university. Another brain drain 
to West Germany began, concerning nearly all the lawyers with the exception of 
Jacobi (Otto, 2004), who in 1950 was the only non-socialist left. The teaching 
of legal history nearly disappeared completely, although this was not the inten-
tion of the politicians. When Jacobi died in 1965, the Leipzig faculty specialised 
in socialist economic law without covering legal history. 
The traditional Prussian university, Martin-Luther-University Halle-Wittenberg 
(Wittenberg University was founded in 1502 Halle University in 1694), was 
reopened in February 1946 (Stolleis, 2009, pp. 93–99) with the returned POW 
Gerhard Buchda as the ‘surviving’ legal historian. Buchda, however, was soon 
dismissed for political reasons. The 78-year-old Rudolf Joerges, although specia-
lised in economic law, went back to his scientific roots, and gave preliminary 
lectures in Roman law. In 1948, Gertrud Schubart-Fikentscher, now a member of 
the socialist SED, became the chair of legal history, the first female German 
professor of law (Lieberwirth, 2000). Schubart-Fikentscher made Halle into a hub 
of legal history in the GDR. 
The world-famous Friedrich-Wilhelms University Berlin (founded 1809) 
reopened in January 1946. It was situated in the Soviet sector of Berlin, which 
eventually came completely under Communist rule (Will, 2010). After 1947, 
legal history was represented by Heinrich Mitteis, who left for Munich in the 
same year (Brun, 1991). Lectures by Gerhard Buchda, who soon left for Jena, 
were only given for a short time (Stolleis, 2009, p. 84). In 1949 the university 
was renamed Humboldt University. 
46 Martin Otto 
Ernst-Moritz-Arndt-Universität Greifswald (originally founded in 1456) was 
reopened in February 1946, though this coincided with the Faculty of Law 
closing down. The legal historians Bernhard Rehfeldt and Heinrich Molitor 
moved to West Germany. In 1958 small attempts to establish Marxist con-
stitutional history were made by Karl-Heinz Schönherr in his position as 
‘Rubenow Chair for State Law,’ although these attempts ended with his sudden 
death in 1961 (Otto, 2009, p. 319). 
‘Polak versus Mitteis’ 
In the first years of the GDR the illusion that traditional approaches and Marxist 
science could coexist was still alive. Heinrich Mitteis and Karl Polak clearly revealed 
their differing views on legal history in the leading journal Neue Justiz (Mitteis, 
1947 and Polak, 1947), but it was a debate that never was (Schröder, 2001). The 
orthodox Marxist Polak became the GDR’s most influential lawyer and was a 
member of the official ‘Council of State’ (Staatsrat). With no chance of succeeding 
in the GDR, Mitteis decided to go to Munich University (Ogorek, 1994, 
pp. 34–36). Ironically, the consequence of this mock-debate was not the total 
withdrawal of ‘bourgeois’ legal history. 
The GDR had no interest in losing all its non-socialist scientists, and in other 
fields, such as medicine, there was a real need for skilled professionals. From 1949 
to 1957, about 1.5 million people left the GDR, among them a large number of 
academics, and maintaining a proper academic sector caused an increasing need for 
manpower. Some parts of the GDR wooed non-communist scientists, even in the 
humanities. East German playwright Heiner Müller ironically called it a kind of 
socialist ‘Popular Front Policy’ (Volksfront) (Müller, 1992, p. 122): 
[T]o the cultural ‛Popular Front’ concept of the GDR belonged of course an 
alliance with the bourgeois, traditional and conservative university people. 
One was not allowed to criticise them.2 
Müller’s opinion was an extra-legal interjection, but especially fitting for legal 
history. Nevertheless the ‘Popular Front Policy’ had no effect on the continuing 
decline of legal history in the GDR. Even scholars sympathetic to the socialist 
state claimed that there was continuing discrimination and defamation of their 
field of study. Horst Schröder—who might have expressed his opinion as a 
disappointed Marxist—wrote: ‘From the beginning until the end of the GDR, 
legal history was a politically defamed and theoretically discredited discipline.’ 
(Schröder, 2001, p. 5).3 
Mostly no Marxists: Centres of legal history research 
in GDR 
Most legal historians were not Marxists. The GDR claimed to be the first 
German ‘Worker and Peasant State,’ but legal historians obviously did not care 
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Figure 2.1 Heinrich Mitteis in 1937 as Dean of Vienna Legal Faculty. (Archiv der 
Universität Wien – Bildarchiv Signatur: 106.I.2986)  
about this. In any case, they formed a minority among the comparatively small 
number of legal scientists, the ‘happy few.’4 They worked in a small niche and 
for political reasons they concentrated mostly on the German Middle Ages, the 
early modern age and the Enlightenment. Legal history was concerned with 
local issues, but it was also more conservative and traditional than in West 
Germany. Even the third GDR ‘university reform’ (Dritte Hochschulreform) 
in 1968 had in fact no effect on legal history. The ‘old school’ of GDR legal 
history consisted of two chairs pari passu. In 1951 the GDR government gave 
an order for university courses in legal history (Lieberwirth, 1988, 
pp. 196–197). They were initially intended to take place in each legal faculty in 
a to-be-founded ‘Institute for Constitutional and Legal History’ (Institut für 
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Staats- und Rechtsgeschichte). In Leipzig such lessons were not arranged from 
above and the institute failed, more by chance than by intention. The neigh-
bouring institute of Marxist legal philosophy in Berlin played a special role 
here, as will be discussed later. The most powerful places of traditional legal 
history in the GDR were at Jena and Halle. 
The Jena chair 
Jena chair was initially held by Gerhard Buchda (Lieberwirth, 1988, p. 198; see 
also the article of Adrian Schmidt-Recla and Zara Luisa Gries in this book). Born 
1901 in Stadtroda (Sachsen-Altenburg, Thuringia), Buchda attended Jena 
University in 1923 and became a member of a conservative student fraternity. In 
1929 Buchda wrote his thesis on the legal philosophy of natural law and 
Immanuel Kant under the supervision of the Romanist lawyer Hans Albert 
Fischer (Tilitzki, 2002, p. 179). In 1934 Buchda passed his habilitation in 
German private law and legal history on ‘joint ownership’ (Gesamthand) under 
the supervision of Rudolf Hübner und Arwed Blomeyer in Jena. After 1934 
Buchda worked as a judge in Thuringia, where the NSDAP already played an 
important role in public service before Hitler came to power. 
In 1937 Buchda joined the Sturmabteilung (SA) and accepted the chair of 
legal history at Prussian Halle in the following year (Lieberwirth 1996, 
pp. 30–31). He joined the NSDAP in 1939. His research interests covered 
traditional areas of German legal history (Hirtenschutt, i.e., ‘shepherd’s wages’), 
mostly history of procedural law, but also made innovative attempts in history of 
economic law (Buchda, 1938) according to Justus Wilhelm Hedemann. In 
1943, Buchda joined the armed forces of Nazi Germany (Wehrmacht) but re-
mained only a private during the war. Buchda lost his chair as did nearly all the 
former members of the NSDAP in the Soviet Occupation Zone; he was dismissed 
very early in 1945, but in 1949 he regained the chair of legal history and 
commercial law at Jena. In 1946 Buchda, a Lutheran, became a member of the 
liberal party LDPD, a political reservoir of the remaining ‘bourgeois’ on the way 
to a nearly no-ruling but legal ‘Blockpartei’ closely tied to the Socialist Unity 
Party of Germany or SED (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands). Buchda 
focused on medieval and early modern legal history, especially ‘juror chair’ 
(Schöffenstuhl) in Thuringia and Saxony. He made an edition of judgements from 
Pößneck court (Buchda, 1954–1962). Other publications concerned the 
German zoologist Alfred Edmund Brehm (Buchda, 1976). In 1958 Buchda 
became a member of the endangered Saxon Academy of Science in Leipzig and 
always kept in touch with colleagues in West Germany and abroad. From 1971 
onwards he wrote many entries for the West German legal encyclopedia 
Handwörterbuch zur Deutschen Rechtsgeschichte.5 He served for a long time as 
the dean of the legal faculty, defending scientific standards against the gathering 
Marxism (Lenski, 2017, p. 112). He retired from the university in 1967. His role 
as a member of the NSDAP was never revealed (Waibel, 2011, p. 56); probably 
it wasn’t even known. He died 1977 in his hometown of Stadtroda, aged 76. 
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The Halle Chair 
The Halle Chair, probably the most important chair in the GDR, was initially 
given to Gertrud Schubart-Fikentscher. Born Gerturd Fikentscher in 1896 
in Zwickau (Saxony), she grew up in a wealthy family that had for generations 
been industrialists and artists; her grandfather was founder of a chemical factory in 
Zwickau (Lauterbach, 2013). In 1916 she became a ‘social engineer’ (Fürsorgerin) 
and worked for a long time in Berlin. Confronted with the legal problems of 
juvenile delinquents, she attended Berlin University to improve her legal knowl-
edge. In 1928 she married papyrologist Werner Schubart (1873–1960; 
Fikentscher, 2014). After passing the Prussian legal ‘state examination,’ she stu-
died under Berlin legal historian Ernst Heymann and became one of the first fe-
male researchers in legal history. She wrote her thesis on German marriage law in 
the town Brünn in Moravia, continued research during National Socialism colla-
borating with Monumenta Germaniae Historica, and also taught at Leipzig 
University. In 1945 she became a member of the Social Democratic Party of 
Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD) in Halle, the SPD being 
taken over by the SED in 1946. In 1948 she became the first German female legal 
professor, holding the chair of legal history at Halle. She continued in medieval 
German ‘city law’ (Stadtrechte; Schubart-Fikentscher, 1950) but mostly specialised 
in the history of natural law at Halle (Schubart-Fikentscher, 1960, and Schubart- 
Fikentscher, 1967) and she also served as the dean of the Halle Faculty of Law. In 
1951 she left the SED without consequences and retired from the University in 
1957. In 1959 Schubart-Fikentscher became a member of the Saxon Academy of 
Science in Leipzig. She still maintained ties to West Germany as a member of 
Monumenta Germaniae Historica in Munich and since 1971 as an author of many 
entries for Handwörterbuch zur Deutschen Rechtsgechichte.6 By the time of her 
death, she was one of the last survivors of the German pre-war academia. When she 
was born in 1896, Queen Victoria had still four years to live; when she died in 
1985, Gorbachev was already the chairman of the Soviet Union Communist Party. 
And now for something completely different: The 
Babelsberg Conference 1958 
The Babelsberg Conference on April 2–3, 1958, represented a real fracture in 
East German legal science. Opened by Walter Ulbricht with a keynote speech 
written by Karl Polak, it marked a great rift with what remained of traditional 
jurisprudence (Eckert, 1993). ‘Babelsberg’ ended the illusion of at least a semi- 
autonomous legal science in the GDR. Attempts to construct a discipline of 
‘Marxist’ legal history ceased to exist after the Babelsberg Conference, and 
subsequent efforts to re-establish legal history were small. The festschrift for 
Erwin Jacobi also in 1957 was a case in point as it contained little reference to 
legal history (but see Brehme, 1957).7 By this time, traditional legal historians 
were a real minority, and everyone knew that legal history would never regain a 
major role in the GDR universities even in a Marxist sense. 
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During the GDR years, legal history had no confirmed place in the regular 
legal studies. It was a ‘marginalised science,’ a discipline of scientific bystanders, 
isolated but international. It would have been easy to abolish legal history, but 
there was an official desire for a kind of reservation for remaining scientists, rated 
strange but harmless. In this reservation, personal continuity was high. Gerturd 
Schubart-Fikentscher was followed in 1957 by her first student Rolf Lieberwirth 
(1920–2019),8 who held the chair until 1986. The Lutheran Lieberwirth was, 
like Buchda, a member of the LDPD, and was called by Karl Kroeschell ‘the last 
stronghold of civic legal history in the GDR,’ and this hit the target exactly. 
(Stolleis, 2009, p. 94; Lieberwirth, 2005; Cordes, 2007). Lieberwirth focused on 
Sachsenspiegel-research and had strong collaboration with the Saxon Academy of 
Science. A related area of research with ties to East European legal history was 
‘Madgeburg Town Law’ (Magdeburger Recht), which concerned areas in the 
socialist ‘brother countries’ (Bruderländer) Poland and the Soviet Union. Both 
areas of research also had special roots before 1949 (Lieberwirth, 1982; 
Lieberwirth, 1986a; Lück, 1999). 
In Halle, local and specific field of research was natural law, and especially 
Christian Thomasius (Lieberwirth, 1955). This continued an old Halle tradition of 
research, begun by Max Fleischmann in 1928. Lieberwirth, who published a lot in 
‘non-socialist countries abroad’ (Nichtsozialistisches Ausland9), retired in 1986 and 
was gradually replaced by his former student Heiner Lück (born 1954).10 In Jena, 
the long-time vacant chair was given in 1988 to Gerhard Lingelbach (born 1948), 
originally a student of Gerhard Haney.11 Lück and Lingelbach formed together 
with Lieberwirth scholar Bernd Schildt (born 1948)12 the last generation of the 
GDR legal history outside Berlin. However, the few happy scholars were more 
international than many GDR scientists and seemed more a part of the Western 
scientific community. Also, the Savigny-Zeitschrift, the leading German-speaking 
periodical for legal history, was published in the GDR town of Weimar. 
On the other hand, East German legal historians were methodologically more 
conservative than their Western colleagues. The link with a worldwide com-
munity of researchers was gone with the extinction of Roman law, which in GDR 
only played a marginalised role in classical history (Härtel and Pólay, 1987). 
GDR legal history was very national, and the focus on German legal history was 
becoming old-fashioned in Western Germany. Academic life after ‘Babelsberg’ 
was largely quiet. The ‘third university reform’ (3. Studienreform) of 1967 closed 
down university institutes and also ‘Academies for State and Law’ that had played 
a large role in the reforms of the higher education in the early years of the GDR. 
At the level of university administration, however, significant efforts for saving 
the institutes were made—the institutes were simply changed into research 
‘areas’ (Bereiche). There was no ‘1968’ in the GDR, no ‘New Universities,’ no 
increased number of students, no ‘university for the masses’ (Massenuniversität), 
and no methodological controversies. 
Legal historians remained careful, and even informal get-togethers between the 
minorities of legal historians and the very few students opposing the state were not 
remarkable at all. Legal historians in the socialist provinces lived in an academic 
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bubble of Sachsenspiegel, town law and Enlightenment. This formed a restricted area 
of research between ‘refuge and political justification’ (Lück, 1998), very regionally 
based, and fitting for a Marxist ‘historic heritage.’ The objects of legal historical 
research included the famous law book Sachsenspiegel (i.e., literally ‘Saxon Mirror’), 
early courts of appeal like the ‘jury stool’ (Schop̈penstuhl) in Thuringia and Saxony or 
the Wismar ‘supreme court’ (Obertribunal) (Wernicke, 1984)13 of the Baltic area. 
Natural law and the Enlightenment were the main focuses of research at Halle 
University. A remarkable ‘long-term seller’ was a small book on ‘Latin in Law’ 
written by Rolf Lieberwirth in 1986 (Lieberwirth, 1986c; second edition 1988). 
Topics concerning modern phenomena, for example, the history of labour law 
(see Zierholz, 1985) or welfare legislation, never played a big role. Hence, Günther 
Baranowski in Berlin carried out research on Pufendorf (Baranowski, 1982) and 
Lieselotte Jelowik in Halle on the political struggle against criminal punishment 
for abortion (‘§ 218 StGB’) in Weimar Republic (Jelowik, 1984). A legal history 
on the class struggle remained outside the possibilities of the minority. This was 
reserved for reliable Marxists like Polak and his successors (Schöneburg, 1975). 
Marxist Island: Berlin 
The West German trials of Uwe Wesel and others for ‘legal historical materialism’ 
(Materialistische Rechtsgeschichte) (Wesel, 1974), a Marxist approach, had no effect on 
the legal historiography written in the GDR. Legal historians accepted their role of not 
interfering with the official Marxist interpretation of law. Only Berlin played a special 
role with a more political legal history promoted by Horst Schröder (born 1930)14 
and Marxist bystanders like Hermann Klenner (born 1926). Werner Sellnow (born 
1913)15 approached legal history from a very Marxist point of view (Sellnow, 1968) 
but also in the secrecy of conferences abroad published on non-socialist lawyers like 
Hugo Preuss (Sellnow, 1972). A similar legal historian with a focus on the 19th and 
20th centuries was Horst Kuntschke.16 Schröder first started as a lecturer in 1968 and 
obtained a chair in 1971 (Stolleis, 2009, p. 84). But these scholars, mostly members of 
the SED, acted mainly as legal philosophers (see Schröder, 1971). They formed a 
Marxist Wing of GDR legal history in the capital, close to the power and endangered 
(Lieberwirth, 1988, p. 199). Research on Prussian civil code ‘General Land Law’ 
(Allgemeines Landrecht) (Heuer, 1960) and Friedrich Carl von Savigny (Schröder, 
1984) took place mostly in Berlin with its special circumstances and special challenges. 
Publishing and academia 
Important parts of legal history like Roman law, canon law or constitutional 
history did not exist at GDR universities. Some parts of research only took place 
at the ‘Academies of Science.’ However, some research groups in the GDR were 
internationally recognised. Such groups worked at the Academies of Science in 
Berlin and in Leipzig. The former concentrated on Byzantine Law (Winkelmann, 
2002), the latter on Sachsenspiegel (Jelowik, 1998) and Magdeburg Law 
(Lieberwirth, 1986a). Ties to legal historians of Western Germany, Austria, 
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Switzerland and Scandinavia remained relatively strong during the whole GDR, 
and Savigny-Zeitschrift, the most important German-speaking journal of legal 
history, was also published in the GDR (Ogris, 2008). 
Legal history trickling down 
A part of the short-lived GDR legal history dealt with a small but secure cultural 
position. Some results of research ‘trickled down’ (Liebrecht 2018, p. 299) from 
academia. A lavish book called Unser Deutschland, introduced in 1957 as an 
official present for the socialist coming-of-age ritual called ‘youth consecration’ 
( Jugendweihe), interpreted German history as more national than socialist, 
noting the merits of famous Germans like Luther, Goethe (see Schubart- 
Fikentscher, 1977), Schiller (see Lingelbach, 1984), Lessing and related heroes. 
German Enlightenment was also represented by the lawyer Christian Thomasius 
(Zentralausschuss für Jugendweihe, 1957, p. 35): 
Christian Thomasius (1655–1728) was a professor, solicitor and philosopher 
in Halle, who successfully stood up for the use of the German language in 
teaching instead of Latin at the university.17 
Thomasius was mentioned more as an impassioned advocate of the German language 
than as a lawyer (though in this tradition, see Lieberwirth, 1987). This was another 
version of socialist ‘Popular Front’ (Volksfront), but Thomasius had to share his 
humble place in the book with the Communists Ernst Thälmann and Wilhelm Pieck. 
Mentioning Thomasius meant offering an intellectual homeland to non-socialist ci-
tizens. Unser Deutschland was inspired by the more intellectual Marxist scientist Paul 
Wandel (Neubert, 1997, p. 119) and it was replaced again in 1958 by its 1954 
precursor, the more communistic and atheistic ‘Space-Earth-Man’ (Weltall-Erde-
Mensch), and so the references to the enlightened lawyer Thomasius disappeared. 
Scholarly without a doubt was the 1973 publication of ‘Atlas of History’ 
(Atlas zur Geschichte), which continued a special German tradition (Wolf, 1977) 
begun in 1886 by Gustav Droysen, that was also observed in West Germany even 
in the conservative newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in 1974. The 
versatile ‘atlas’ offered legal history a small place on the map, seeing the spread of 
‘Magdeburg Law’ in Eastern Europe. This spread was interpreted from a Marxist 
perspective as a part of the history of feudalism (Zentralinstitut für Geschichte, 
1973, p. 32): ‘The Feudal German eastward expansion’ (Die feudale deutsche 
Ostexpansion (10.–14. Jh.) 
The Luther Jubilee in 1983 meant an opportunity to present the GDR as a 
culturally and religiously free state. This also gave room for ‘Legal History’s 
Contribution’ written by Gerhard Lingelbach (Lingelbach, 1983) and Hermann 
Klenner (Klenner, 1983). In practice this was more a surviving strategy for an 
endangered species than the real desire of a very secure GDR at the climax of its 
international recognition. The jubilee of the revolutionary theologian Thomas 
Müntzer in 1989 had even less of an impact for legal history (but see Lück, 1989). 
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The last bid 
Continuing the mode of the Luther Jubilee, the newly introduced history ca-
lendar in the official periodical Staat und Recht (Mohnhaupt, 1984) represented 
the last concerted effort to maintain GDR legal history. In the last years of the 
GDR, the jubilees were initiated by Gerhard Lingelbach. In 1989 he re-
membered the birthdays of Montesquieu, Max Weber and even the 70th anni-
versary of the Weimar Constitution, the ‘most progressive German constitution 
in power at that time’ (Lingelbach, 1989, pp. 69, 71, 74). When Lingelbach 
wrote his history calendar for 1990, German reunification in 1990 was not yet 
predicted. As worthwhile Jubilees Lingelbach picks the 100th anniversary of the 
abolishment of Bismarck’s anti-socialist law (Sozialistengesetz), the 150th anni-
versary of August Bebel, and the 50th anniversary of the death of Hermann 
Kantorowicz (Lingelbach, 1990, p. 82–83). The 175th birthday of Bismarck, 
praised for his ‘modest realism’ (Realitätssinn mit Augenmaß) in foreign politics, 
was mentioned equal to the 30th anniversary of the death of Communist GDR 
President and ‘popular statesman’ (volkstümlicher Staatsmann) Wilhelm Pieck 
(Lingelbach, 1990, pp. 85, 91). Lingelbach ended his calendar with the putative 
800th birthday of Eike von Repgow (Lingelbach, 1990, p. 95). So GDR legal 
history ended with an outmoded date, as seen from a contemporary Western 
point of view, but it also showed impressive Janus-faced discipline. 
Conclusion 
In its first years the GDR had to face an enormous brain drain to the West, and 
jurisprudence was heavily affected as well. Despite all ‘antifascist’ and revolu-
tionary rhetoric, it was not in the interests of the GDR and its leading party SED 
to burn all the bridges behind. The SED could not dismiss the importance of 
universities in its socialist project, and as a result the need for academics was real. 
As far as the legal studies in the German tradition were concerned, legal his-
torians and the GDR government shared a common goal of maintaining legal 
historical studies in the remaining universities with legal faculties. Legal histor-
ians like Gerhard Buchda and Gertrud Schubart-Fikentscher were fully integrated 
members of the early GDR academia—with strong but quiet roots in the years 
before 1945. Their ‘bourgeois’ approach to legal history was not a problem as 
long as the research themes were specific and dealt with distant times. The 
presence of non-socialist scientists, and not only in legal history, was mostly 
welcome. It seemed to prove that recognised scientists, too, could find a place in 
the GDR, but in reality, that place was narrow and endangered. 
Already during the first years of the GDR, the teaching of and research on legal 
history was heavily diminished in comparison to the pre-war universities. The 
‘Babelsberg conference’ was a turning point for legal science in the GDR. It 
marked a change to a more applicative and political legal science, but legal history 
as discipline was hardly affected. The discipline continued to play an insignificant 
role inside and outside academia, but its international recognition was 
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indispensable. Thus, the discipline was allowed to encapsulate to its own research 
dimension. This was the reason for the relatively conservative GDR approach to 
legal history. Legal history was parochial, knotted with the ‘province,’ or with the 
neighbouring universities of Halle and Jena. The areas of research emphasised 
‘regional’ items like the Sachsenspiegel and Halle Enlightenment. From the point 
of view of the SED, this was harmless. 
In the academic sphere of Berlin, legal history played a special role in the vicinity 
of legal philosophy. There historically oriented legal scholars—like Horst 
Schröder—were Marxists and mostly members of the SED. They had to face a 
stronger supervision by the SED and were more at odds with the official ideas of 
proper legal science. Conflicts were numerous. Legal history did not, however, 
lose its jurisprudential prestige and significance to legal philosophy. In fact, legal 
philosophers were even more endangered, at risk of unwanted party attention and 
consequent sanctions—of which the fate of Hermann Klenner is a good example. 
Yet, many legal historians, like Gerhard Lingelbach, had roots in legal philosophy. 
Classical legal history was written outside the capital. The GDR legal 
historians, except for a small number of Marxists, formed a kind of scientific 
cloister throughout these years—a refuge that was sometimes called upon by 
their Marxist colleagues when ‘historical background’ was required. German 
reunification ended the GDR, but some scholars got an opportunity to 
continue and succeed in the new unified Germany and abroad. The end of 
the GDR was followed by the end of the scientific sanctuary of distant and 
specific research topics for the few GDR legal historians. The challenge to 
explain why as modern lawyers we need to know about Sachsenspiegel is still a 
valid issue in all parts of Germany. 
Notes 
1 Erwin Jacobi in a letter to Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, ‘Leipzig p. 3, 
November 8, 1946: In Berlin however prevails a conservatism that would 
preferably fall back on the course catalog of 1912.’ (Leipzig S 3, am 8. 
November 1946. In Berlin allerdings herrscht ein Konservatismus, der am 
liebsten auf die Vorlesungsverzeichnisse von 1912 zurückgreifen möchte); 
quoted in Otto (2008), p. 276–277.  
2 ‘Und so wie damals gehörte nun zum Volksfront-Konzept in der DDR im 
Bereich der Kultur natürlich die Allianz mit den bürgerlichen, traditionellen, 
konservativen Universitätsleuten. Sie durften nicht kritisiert werden.’  
3 ‘Bei der Rechtsgeschichte handelte es sich um einen in der DDR vom Beginn bis 
zum Ende ihrer Existenz politisch diffamierten und theoretisch diskreditierten 
Wissenschaftszweig.’ 
4 William Shakespeare, Henry V., IV, 3: ‘We few, we happy few, we band of 
brothers […].’  
5 Buchda’s articles include ‘Altmärkische Glosse zum Sachsenspiegel,’ 
‘Aktenversendung,’ ‘Anklage,’ ‘Anwalt,’ ‘Appellation,’ ‘Appellationsprivilegien,’ 
‘Artikelprozeß,’ ‘Berufung,’ ‘Beschlagnahme,’ ‘Beweisinterlokut,’ ‘Büttel,’ 
‘Cautelarjurisprudenz,’ ‘Contumacia,’ ‘Delegation,’ ‘Einlassung,’ ‘Fallrecht,’ 
‘Freischöffe,’ ‘Freistuhl,’ ‘Fronbote,’ ‘Fronung,’ ‘Gebundene Tage,’ ‘Gelehrte 
Richter,’ ‘Gelöbnis,’ ‘Gemeines Sachsenrecht,’ ‘Gerichtsgefälle,’ ‘Gerichtsverfahren,’ 
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‘Gerichtsverfassung,’ ‘Gerüfte,’ ‘Gesamthand, gesamte Hand,’ ‘Görlitzer 
Rechtsbuch,’ ‘Heimbürge,’ ‘Hermann von Oesfeld,’ ‘Jus evocandi,’ ‘Klage,’ 
‘Kursächsische Konstitutionen,’ ‘Kummer,’ ‘Läuterung,’ ‘Landfriedensgericht,’ 
‘Landgemeinde,’ ‘Landrechtsbücher,’ ‘Landrechtsglosse,’ ‘Laten,’ ‘Leipzig’ and 
‘Magdeburger Recht.’  
6 Schubart-Fikentscher’s articles include ‘Johannes Althusius,’ ‘Karl von Amira,’ 
‘Matthias Berlichius,’ ‘Georg Beseler,’ ‘Just Henning Böhmer,’ ‘Sebastian Brant,’ 
‘Heinrich Brunner,’ ‘Benedict Carpzov,’ ‘Emil Goldmann’ and ‘Johannes Friedrich 
Harpprecht’ (all 1971). For Neue Deutsche Biographie she wrote articles on Wilhelm 
von Brünneck, Dietrich II. bishop of Naumburg, Max Fleischmann, Christian Gottlieb 
Haubold, Ernst Heymann and Carl Gustav Homeyer (1955–1972).  
7 For contemporary Marxist criticism see Otto (2008), pp. 366–381. 
8 PhD thesis: Die gesetzlichen Pfandrechte zur Zeit der Aufklärung unter be-
sonderer Berücksichtigung der Halle-Wittenberger Juristen Augustin Leyser und 
Samuel Stryk, Halle 1952.  
9 For Handwörterbuch zur Deutschen Rechtsgeschichte Lieberwirth wrote during the 
GDR period (all 1971) the articles ‘Amtsvergehen (Amtsverbrechen)’ ‘Angstmann,’ 
‘Armesünder,’ ‘Auslieferung von Missetätern,’ ‘Ausstäupen,’ ‘Beleidigung,’ ‘Bigamie 
(Doppelehe),’ ‘Carolina,’ ‘Crimen laesae maiestatis (Majestätsverbrechen),’ 
‘Diebstahl,’ ‘Ehebruch,’ ‘Entführung (crimen raptus),’ ‘Entmannung,’ ‘Ertränken,’ 
‘Feldfrevel,’ ‘Folter,’ ‘Freiheitsstrafe,’ ‘Frevel,’ ‘Friedebann,’ ‘Gefangene, Gefängnis,’ 
‘Glücksspiel,’ ‘Gotteslästerung,’ ‘Gundling, Nicolaus Hieronymus,’ ‘Haftstrafe,’ 
‘Halsgerichtsordnungen’ and ‘Halslösung’; for Lexikon des Mittelalters the article 
‘Eike von Repgow’ (1985), for Neue Deutsche Biographie (1961–1971) articles on 
August Finger, Ernst von Globig, Nicolaus Gundling, Gottlieb Heineccius and Karl 
Ferdinand Hommel, for Kindlers Literaturlexikon (1971) an article on Thomasius, De 
Crimine Magiae.  
10 PhD thesis: Die Spruchtätigkeit der Wittenberger Juristenfakultät, Halle 1982; 
‘Habilitation’: Die kursächsische Gerichtsverfassung von 1423 bis zur Mitte des 16. 
Jahrhunderts unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der landesherrlichen 
Gerichtsorganisation, Halle 1988.  
11 PhD thesis: Das Verhältnis der deutschen Rechtswissenschaft, insbesondere 
der Juristenfakultät der Universität Jena, zur Französischen Revolution 
zwischen 1789 und 1820, Jena 1978; ‘Habilitation’: Änderungen der 
Beschuldigtenstellung bei der Überwindung des feudalen Inquisitionsprozesses 
im Spiegel der deutschen Rechtswissenschaft, Jena 1985.  
12 PhD thesis: Die Spruchtätigkeit der Halleschen Juristenfakultät nach dem 
Wiener Kongress, Halle 1980; ‘Habilitation’: Verfassung und Wirtschaftsrecht 
der spätfeudalen Landgemeinde im Spiegel thüringischer Dorfordnungen, 
Halle 1988.  
13 The courts of ‘Hanse’ were part of common history and so increased after 1989.  
14 PhD thesis: Die antidemokratische und antinationale Politik der rechten SPD- 
Führung in den Jahren 1945–1952, Berlin 1961. ‘Habilitation’ (1976): 
Schröder, 1984.  
15 PhD thesis: Gesellschaft—Staat—Recht. Zur Kritik der bürgerlichen Ideologien 
über die Entstehung von Gesellschaft, Staat und Recht von der bürgerlichen 
Aufklärung bis zum deutschen Positivismus des 19. Jahrhunderts, Berlin 1963; 
‘Habilitation’: Zum Problem der Rechtsgeschichte im Werk von Marx und 
Engels, Berlin 1968.  
16 PhD thesis: Die geschichtliche Stellung des Reichsgerichts im Deutschen 
Kaiserreich von 1871 und seine Rechtsprechung zu den demokratischen 
Freiheiten gegenüber der Arbeiterklasse, Berlin 1964. 
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17 Christian Thomasius (1655–1728) war Professor, Jurist und Philosoph in Halle 
und trat mit Erfolg für den Gebrauch der deutschen Sprache an Stelle der la-
teinischen im Lehrbetrieb der Universität ein.’  
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3 Roman law studies in the USSR 
An abiding debate on slaves, 
economy and the process of history 
Anton Rudokvas and Ville Erkkilä1 
Introduction 
In pre-revolutionary Russia, both lawyers and historians studied Roman law 
intensively. In accordance with their colleagues in Continental Europe, Russian 
lawyers considered Roman private law to be the foundation of civil law doctrine 
in the modern legal system. Developing and applying that legal doctrine 
necessitated an understanding of Roman law in its ancient context as well as its 
significance in the construction process of the legal doctrine of Russian Empire. 
In the Soviet Union, the situation, however, changed for the worse. The 
teaching of Roman law vanished for almost three decades, and although the 
faculties of law at the main universities of the USSR included Roman private law 
courses in their curricula again in 1948, they were unable to produce any con-
siderable research on Roman law (see, e.g. Rudokvas, 2017, pp. 261–288). 
Hence, in this chapter we will focus on the study of the history of Roman law in 
general (that is, both public law and private law) by Soviet historians. These 
scholars were specialists in the history of Ancient Rome and dealt with issues 
related to Roman law in the context of their works on the wider development of 
ancient societies. 
In the academic field of humanities in the socialist bloc, the historiography 
produced in the Soviet Union was surrounded by an aureole of prestige. The 
Soviet Union was displayed as a model regime also with regard to its scientific 
achievements. Any ambitious and comprehensive study in law, history or 
sociology had to at least refer to Soviet research.2 That was done either in order 
to show that the author had comprehended correctly the wider (socialist) 
aim that all study was supposed to advance or for the purpose of demonstrating 
that the study at hand was well aware of the previous, ideologically appropriate 
takes on history. Hence, the Soviet historiography of antiquity was an important 
point of reference for all legal historical works on ancient law produced in the 
socialist East Central Europe. 
Soviet historians aimed at an all-encompassing elaboration of the socio-
economic and political history of Ancient Rome. They studied Roman law as an 
important element, but only as one element among others, in the political and 
social history of classical antiquity. Therefore, and in order to provide an 
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overview of the study of Roman law in the USSR, in what follows we will 
describe the evolution of Soviet historiography on Ancient Rome and the 
ideological and intellectual historical context of its presentations. 
Soviet historiography in the first decade  
after the Revolution of 1917 
After the revolution, the traditional structures of educational and scientific 
institutions in Russia broke down. The Bolshevik regime took decisive actions in 
order to recreate science as a social institution and practice. One part of the 
project was to replace the existing university staff with a new class of professors 
and researchers imbued with the spirit of Marxist-Leninism. This meant that 
virtually all faculties of law and history were abolished during the first decade 
after the Revolution of 1917 (see, e.g. Connelly, 2000, pp. 22–30). 
Historical, legal, sociological and other similar studies were assimilated into newly 
established and artificial ‘Faculties of Social Sciences’ (Fitzpatrick, 1979, p. 71). The 
ideological justification for the rearrangement came on one hand from the will to 
generate a synthesized (socialist) human knowledge and demolish the harmful di-
visions between separate special sciences and on the other from the conviction that 
law will ‘wither away’ during the imminent social development to communism 
(Engels, 1970, p. 147). The Bolshevik reformers’ enthusiastic pursuit of the ideal of 
the universality of human knowledge in practice abolished the teaching of general 
history courses from both universities and secondary schools. 
The utter abandonment of specialization in the field of humanities was an 
obvious utopia. In the academy, considerable historical research (including the 
ancient world) was carried out in the Russian Academy of History of Material 
Culture established in 1919. After the creation of the USSR, it was in 1926 
renamed The State Academy of History of Material Culture (see, e.g. Alexeev- 
Popov, 1936, pp. 193–194; Dlužnevskaja, 2006, pp. 128–138; Ivanova, 1968; 
Narodnyj Komissariat Prosveŝeniâ RSFSR, 1935). 
In addition, special research institutes, in particular historical institutes, were 
established within the new faculties of social sciences and within the academy. 
These institutes sometimes further founded sections for the study of the history 
of antiquity, medieval history, modern history and Russian history. The 
researchers affiliated with these organizations often held on to the pre-
revolutionary stance on historical research and continued their scientific activities 
using their usual methodology. 
The Soviet government, however, was persistent in its renewal project and 
insisted on creating a new historical science. For this purpose, in 1924 all 
research institutes of social and economic sciences were merged under the um-
brella of the Russian Association of Research Institutes of Social Sciences, led by 
the ideologist of the new Marxist historical science, Michail Pokrovskij. From 
May 1918 to the end of his life in 1932, Pokrovskij was Deputy People’s 
Commissar of Education for the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic and 
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was referred to as ‘historian number one’ in Communist Russia (Brandenberger, 
2006, p. 202). 
Pokrovskij himself studied the history of Russia, but his associates tried to 
apply Marxist methodological techniques of ‘historical materialism’ also in other 
areas of historical science. Characteristic for the research of the ‘Pokrovskij 
school’ was an attempt to depict the historical reality of the past with modern 
concepts and principles of contemporary society. In particular, Pokrovskij himself 
introduced the concept of ‘trade capitalism’ for describing the socioeconomic 
realities of the preindustrial era (Pokrovskij, 1915–1918). However, in their 
struggle with the ‘idealistic bourgeois historiography’ of the pre-revolutionary 
school, on whose flaws and features Pokrovskij’s supporters elaborated meticu-
lously and in a laborious manner, they themselves gradually moved further away 
from Marxism. 
As a result, instead of Marxism’s idea of the progressive movement of social 
progress from more primitive stages to more developed forms of social and 
economic order, the Pokrovskij school began to deviate from the main line of the 
theoretical teaching of historical materialism in the direction of long-held ideas 
about the ‘cyclicity’ of the historical process. For the Pokrovskij school, various 
historical periods appeared as alternating combinations of different economic 
structures, rigidly defining the social and political structures of society. Clearly, 
this approach easily justified the direct extrapolation of modern phenomena into 
the past and the use of modern concepts to describe the social processes of past 
eras (Kuziŝin, 1980, p. 328). 
The new regime favoured and emphasized the importance of publishing lit-
erature suitable for teaching material in higher education. The Bolsheviks wanted 
to ensure that the teaching of social sciences in higher education, necessary for 
training personnel for new ideological positions in society, was carried out in a 
proper socialist manner. The sociological approach to history, directed against 
the more traditional and antiquarian historiography and affected by the mod-
ernization process of society, had nevertheless started long before the Revolution 
of 1917 (see, e.g. Frolov, 1999, pp. 312–397). 
Hence, one can say that the stance of the Pokrovskij school represented a 
continuation of the older methodology in the post-revolutionary period in a new 
ideological wrapping. In this respect, the Marxist historical science of the first 
years of the Soviet regime actually offered nothing fundamentally new. 
The most notable Pokrovskij school historians of classical antiquity were 
Alexander Tȗmenev, Vladimir Serǵeev and Serǵey Kovalev. Tȗmenev was the 
first to apply the Marxist concept of the slave-owning formation to the history 
of ancient Greece. However, he considered the societies of the Ancient East 
and the societies of Ancient Greece and Rome to be two different types of slave 
societies. His main contribution to the socioeconomic historiography of anti-
quity was Did Capitalism Exist in Ancient Greece?: On the Genesis 
of Capitalism: The Experience of Comparative Historical Research, which was 
published in Petrograd in 1923. Both the topic and the long title were char-
acteristic of the works of the Pokrovskij school. 
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If Tȗmenev mainly engaged in the research of the Ancient East and Ancient 
Greece, his associates Serǵeev and Kovalev paid more attention to Ancient Rome. 
During the first decade of the Soviet regime, Serǵeev published two textbooks on 
the history of slave societies of Ancient Greece and Rome (Serǵeev, 1922; 
Serǵeev, 1925), and Kovalev contributed with a two-volume Course of Universal 
History, published in Petrograd in 1923–1925. Both authors shared Pokrovskij’s 
ideas about the coexistence of slavery with feudalism and ‘trade capitalism’ in 
antiquity (see, e.g. Serǵeev, 1926). In particular, Kovalev’s texts show his 
commitment to the cyclic theory of the development of the historical process and 
the tendency to operate with the concepts of ‘capitalism’, ‘feudalism’, ‘the 
proletariat’ and ‘the peasant revolution’ in the description of the history of so-
cieties of classical antiquity (Frolov, 1999, pp. 433–434). 
The modernizing ideas of the Pokrovskij school and its commitment to the 
idea of cyclical world history were clearly heretic with respect to orthodox 
Marxist-Leninism, which was based on the principle of linear progressive 
development. Paradoxically, in this sense, some historians representing more 
traditional views on history appeared more Marxist than their ‘progressive’ col-
leagues. One of them was Professor Dmitry Petruševskij from Moscow 
University, who, among other topics, was engaged in the research of the pro-
blems of transition from Late Antiquity to the Middle Ages. 
In 1925, Petruševskij edited the Russian translation of Max Weber’s book The 
Agrarian History of the Ancient World.3 This book stood in clear opposition to 
the ideas of the new historical school of Pokrovskij, since Max Weber, as we 
know, perceived ancient society as a primitive counterpart of the modern world, 
whereas Pokrovskij and his disciples attempted to describe ancient history using 
modern concepts. However, in 1928, following the publication of the Russian 
translation of Weber, Professor Petruševskij published his own book Essays on the 
Economic History of Medieval Europe, which also demonstrated a clear deviation 
from the Marxist canon. Petruševskij now portrayed feudalism as an exclusively 
political institution, not associated with certain forms of economic life. As a 
result, he denied the existence of any free community of citizens in medieval 
society, insisted on the eternity of private ownership and emphasized social 
inequality among the ancient Germans. For these reasons, he is usually char-
acterized in the literature as a neo-Kantian (Kuziŝin, 1980, p. 332). 
Only a few historians in the first years of the Soviet Union clearly opposed the 
ideological principles of the new rulers. Nevertheless, the efforts of both the 
ideological supporters and the ‘fellow travellers’ of the Bolshevik regime already 
then began the entropic process of socialist state ideology. Such an inherent con-
tradiction was emblematic in the specific provisions that the state conditioned to 
particular spheres of social sciences and in the more or less successful attempts of the 
scholars to fulfil these provisions. Probably it was not so difficult because the classics 
of Marxism-Leninism wrote so much on various occasions that in their works it was 
easy to find a justification for any diametrically opposed points of view. 
Obviously, under the screen of ideological uniformity in the first decade of 
Soviet Russia’s existence, there was a plurality of different opinions and their 
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clashes, which corresponded to the plurality of the factional struggle in the 
Communist Party of this period. Hence, in an analogous manner to the process 
of Christian faith becoming the dominant religion in the Late Roman Empire, 
the ideological consolidation of the new regime necessitated the institution of 
the one and only true doctrine. Such an undisputed foundation was needed for 
determining the goals and methods of further development, not only of science 
but of society as a whole. 
For this purpose, by 1927 the first twenty-volume canonical edition of the 
complete works of Lenin was published. After 1928, volumes of the canonical 
collection of works by Marx and Engels in the Russian translation began to appear. 
For the Soviet Marxist historical science, the publication of Lenin’s lecture entitled 
‘On the State’ (O gosudarstve) in the newspaper Pravda, N 15, 18.01.1929, was a 
particularly important and ground-breaking moment. For the emerging ideology 
of Marxist-Leninism in Russia, the collected works constituted a specially selected 
body of ‘Holy Scriptures’, and therefore endowed with absolute authority, a 
collection of texts from the founders of the new secular religion. 
If described using theological terms, the advent of the scriptures was inevitably 
followed by the formation of a sacred tradition, i.e. the canonical interpretation 
of sacred texts. The years subsequent to the institution of the ideological 
foundation of the new secular religion of Marxist-Leninism were characterized 
by a struggle to define the proper reading and application of the doctrinal texts. 
The theoretical debate that had real-life consequences included detecting and 
excluding the heretical deviations associated with the use of non-traditional 
methods of interpreting the canonical works and attempts to supplement the 
scriptures with noncanonical statements of the founders. 
The official intervention and the eradication  
of the Pokrovskian view 
The processes of ideological consolidation in the early 1930s ended the existence of 
factions in the Communist Party. They also led to the revision of the new historical 
science formed in the previous decade. The political leadership of the USSR began 
to bring down the predominant view of the Pokrovskij school with the decree On 
teaching civil history in schools of the USSR by the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party and the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR on May 
16th, 1934, published in issue 113 of the News of The Central Executive 
Committee of the USSR and the all-Russian Central Executive Committee. 
The decree ordered the introduction of a systematic course of history in higher 
and secondary schools and for this purpose demanded the production of com-
prehensive history textbooks. According to the decree, since September 1, 1934, 
the Communist government restored history faculties in Moscow and Leningrad 
universities, and the reopened faculties were designated to teach all sections of 
world and Russian history. Following this decision, on June 9th, 1934, the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party adopted a resolution On the 
introduction of an elementary course of general history and history of the USSR in 
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primary and lower secondary school. In the wake of the Party decisions, during 
1935 and 1936 several history faculties were opened in universities and peda-
gogical institutes of the Soviet Union (Kuziŝin, 1980, p. 336). With the decree 
On the history textbooks on January 26, 1936, the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party and the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR an-
nounced a contest for the best history textbook.4 
However, the ideological consolidation also took a more concrete form. The 
open persecution of the historical school of Pokrovskij, and the scholars asso-
ciated with it, began in January 27th, 1936, with the publication of the official 
report on the decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and 
the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR (On the situation in historical 
science and history teaching). In page 4 the report stated: 
[A]mong some of our historians, especially historians of the USSR, [there 
are] rooted anti-Marxist, anti-Lenin, in fact liquidator, anti-scientific views 
on historical science. The Council of People’s Commissars and the Central 
Committee of the CPSU(b) emphasize that these harmful trends and 
attempts to eliminate history as a science are primarily associated with the 
spread among some of our historians of erroneous historical views inherent 
in the so-called ‘historical school of Pokrovskij’.5 
At the same time, Joseph Stalin and some other figures of the Soviet political 
leadership commented critically on the history textbooks of the USSR and the 
‘new history’ for higher education. The above-mentioned Party and state 
documents manifested the need for a deep combination of Marxist-Leninist 
theory with a thorough analysis of historical sources, the need to create a full- 
fledged world history and the rejection of schematism and dogmatism in his-
torical research (Brandenberger, 2006, pp. 204–205). 
In the context of historiographical methodology, the shifting tide of politics 
turned the scale in favour of the traditional and moderate opponents of the 
Pokrovskij school. The substitution of specific studies of historical sources with 
retrospective sociological speculation was no longer welcomed by the political au-
thorities, and therefore such a speculation had to give way to a more balanced ap-
proach, which was naturally advocated by pupils of the old pre-revolutionary school. 
Accordingly, the eradication of theoretical constructions of the Pokrovskij 
school in the field of historical materialism began. Cyclic theory of history was 
dismissed as incompatible with Marxist-Leninism. The only accepted approach 
comprised the concept of a single world-historical process of development of 
human society that passed from primitive to slave, then to feudal and finally to 
capitalist formations and moved after 1917 to the Communist formation. At the 
same time, each subsequent formation represented a higher stage of social 
development than the preceding formation (Kuziŝin, 1980, p. 337). 
Professors Serǵeev and Kovalev recognized the change in the ideological 
atmosphere and took an active part in the scholarly discussions concerning the 
reorientation of historical science. They noted that their previous views on the 
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essence of the social and economic nature of the ancient world were incompatible 
with what the political leadership regarded as a correct understanding of his-
torical development. In short, their previous views were now erroneous. As a 
result, they started to emphasize and endorse the concept of the slave-owning 
formation and the specific ancient mode of production corresponding to it (see, 
e.g. Tolz, 2014, pp. 80–81). 
In their subsequent writings, they paid much attention to the ancient economy 
and slave revolts in antiquity, clearly avoiding paying special attention to the 
obvious diversity of this economy as well as the fact that slaves in their social 
position in the community could play completely different roles. Furthermore, it 
is obvious that the social position of the slave working on a plantation or in a 
mine was strikingly different from the position of a slave who was a city police 
officer (see, e.g. Frolov, 2004, pp. 200–220) or the manager operating a com-
mercial enterprise belonging to his owner (see, e.g. Cerami and Petrucci, 2010, 
pp. 36–67, pp. 166–171). 
Despite these flaws, scientific research focusing on the economic circum-
stances of the phenomenon of slavery and slave revolts as crucial social turning 
points made a significant contribution to the historiography of the ancient 
world. The kind of Marxist approach that emphasized the tensions between 
the owners and the slaves and the economic narrative to which that inherent 
inequality connected has provided knowledge on the provisions of Roman law 
corresponding to the legal regulation of slave relations and on the general 
economic relations in antiquity (Frolov, 1999, pp. 429–430; Kuziŝin, 1980, 
p. 338, pp. 349–350). 
The governmental intervention resulted in the rearrangement of the institu-
tional base of teaching and researching history as well as producing the desired 
scientific contributions. In the recreated historical departments, a systematic course 
in ancient history was introduced and departments of the history of the ancient 
world were set up. In 1936, the Institute of History of the USSR Academy of 
Sciences was established, including a sector on Ancient History. The Journal of 
Ancient History has been published continuously since 1937. Responding to the 
call of the Communist Party and the USSR government, Professor Serǵeev pub-
lished in 1939 a textbook Essays on the History of Ancient Rome. Two years earlier 
than this, Professor Kovalev had published a course of lectures consisting of two 
volumes: The History of Ancient Slave Societies, Part 1–Greece and Part 
2–Hellenism and Rome (1937). Ten years later in 1948, he saw the publication of 
his major work, The History of Rome. 
Stalinism and the legal historiography  
of the Roman world 
The histories of the classical ancient world produced during Stalin’s reign were in 
general characterized by a consolidated approach to present the history of clas-
sical antiquity as the history of passing stages of socioeconomic formation. 
Moreover, the slave-owning method of production was conceived as the 
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socioeconomic base of ancient societies. Historians saw the driving force of an-
cient society in the class struggle of two main class antagonists: the class of slaves 
and the class of slave owners. The history of ancient societies was considered to 
be a progressive process of slave-owning relations, their subsequent flourishing 
and final disintegration. Scholars focused on social relations that emerged from 
this decomposition and, after the fall of the ancient world, became the basis of a 
new, higher feudal formation. 
The active involvement of the political elite in historiographical issues put an 
end to the sociological experimentalism of the Pokrovskij school, but the re-
presentatives of the old pre-revolutionary school were also forced to demonstrate 
their loyalty to the new approach. The ideological consolidation of the Soviet 
Union and the obvious, real-life consequences for dissident views on the past 
framed the space of historical interpretation. The historians of antiquity had to 
respect the requirements provided by the political elite, and yet totally aban-
doning or ignoring one’s previous scholarly views while writing politically correct 
historiography was often complicated, to say the least. 
One peculiar aspect of the 1930s research on the ancient past is that the 
leading Soviet historians of classical antiquity turned to the study of the forma-
tion of Imperial power in Rome. Many studies focused on the legal embodiment 
of Imperial rule and the social essence of Caesarism as a political phenomenon. 
This interest clearly correlates with the strengthening of Joseph Stalin’s regime of 
personal power in the USSR. 
During these years, Professor Serǵeev wrote a lot about the dictatorships of 
Sulla and Julius Caesar, as well as about the Roman emperors of the period of the 
regime of the Principate—Augustus, Tiberius, Claudius, the Antonin dynasty 
and the Severian dynasty (Serǵeev, 1938). Another fundamental textbook on the 
history of ancient Rome (The History of Ancient Rome) was reissued three times 
(1947, 1949 and 1956) by Professor Nikolai Maškin of Moscow State 
University. In his research, Maškin studied the problems of transition from 
Republic to Empire as well as the relationship of the provinces with Rome, the 
culture of Rome and Roman Africa. His work The Principate of August (1949), 
published shortly before the author’s death, became a classic in Soviet science. It 
was translated into Hungarian, Italian, German and Romanian. In this work, 
Maškin investigated the Principate as a form of statehood, its genesis, ideology 
and social essence. In 1951 Professor Maškin was awarded (posthumously) the 
Stalin Prize second degree for The Principate of August. 
The case of Serǵei Žebelëv gives an illustrative example of the incorporation of 
the contemporary doctrines of historical development to traditional scholarly 
views. Žebelëv made his academic career in Imperial Russia and in 1927 became 
an academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences (Kozlov, 2011, p. 376). He 
was a well-known expert in classical philology and ancient history, who spent his 
life studying the history of Ancient Greece. Fear of persecution and possible 
repressions forced him first in 1932 to make biased conclusions about the so 
called ‘discovery’ of a previously unknown slave rebellion in the Bosporan 
Kingdom in the second century BC (Žebelev, 1932). 
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Žebelev based his whole presentation on a tendentious interpretation of one 
Greek term from the text of ancient inscription found on the Northern shore of 
the Black Sea. Then he, together with Professor Kovalev in 1934, turned to the 
study of the slave revolts in Sicily in the Roman period and the Spartacus 
movement (Žebelëv and Kovalev, 1934, pp. 139–180). Thus, paying tribute to 
the official ideology, he bought indulgence for the continuation of his favourite 
activities, namely epigraphy and classical philology. 
The new direction of research of ancient history in the Stalinist USSR is 
especially eminent in the studies concentrating on the ‘slave revolts’ of the 
Roman world. A good illustration of the body of scholarly works focusing on the 
theme is the monograph Spartacus Uprising by Alexander Mišulin, Professor at 
Moscow University, which appeared in 1936. The author interpreted Spartacus 
revolt as the culmination of many years of slave struggle for freedom, the highest 
point of the contradictions in Roman slave society. All other social conflicts of 
ancient Rome, including movements of the ruined free peasantry, he considered 
to be minor, accompanying the main conflict of the main antagonistic classes, 
slaves and slave owners. Mišulin insisted that above all it was the slave rebellion 
organized by Spartacus that led to the fall of the Roman Republic and to the 
consequent birth of the Imperial regime. 
From the late 1930s, Professors Mišulin, Kovalev and Maškin began to for-
mulate and give justification to a comprehensive theory of the ‘slave revolution’ 
in ancient Rome (Kuziŝin, 1980, p. 340). This theory was developed under the 
influence of Stalin’s statement that the slave revolution eliminated the class of 
slave owners and abolished the slave form of exploitation of working people 
(Tolz, 2014, p. 80). In accordance with Stalin’s remark, the professors initiated a 
doctrine that determined the whole development of ancient Rome in terms of a 
class struggle between slaves and slave owners. But since the Sicilian revolts and 
the rebellion of Spartacus took place many centuries before the fall of Rome, in 
their theory the professors introduced an idea of a permanent ‘revolution of 
slaves’, which lasted from the second century BC to the fifth century AD 
(see, e.g. Kovalev, 1936; Maškin, 1950; Mišulin, 1936). 
This permanent revolution allegedly contained two culminating points 
that the authors of the theory identified, each of which occupied almost two 
centuries. The first took place in the second and first centuries BC and led to 
the fall of the Roman Republic. The second climax extended to the period 
from the third to the fifth century AD and resulted in the fall of the Empire 
and the demise of the slave system (Frolov, 1999, p. 437; Kuziŝin, 1980, 
p. 341). In order to substantiate this theory with facts, almost any social 
conflict in ancient Rome had to be interpreted as a slave uprising, and that is 
what the authors did. 
Furthermore, the slave revolution was interpreted as a mass movement that had 
allies among the peasantry and other disadvantaged segments of society, but, 
nonetheless, the slaves were depicted as an explicit class—and as the hegemon of the 
general revolutionary movement. The approach was evidently a projection of the 
official version of the Communist Revolution of 1917 in Russia to the history of 
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classical antiquity. The Stalinist regime presented the Revolution of 1917 likewise as 
an uprising of a movement of workers and peasants, to which other social groups 
joined. And yet, in a similar vein as the theory of the ‘revolution of slaves’, ultimately 
the hegemony of the working class within this uprising was not to be challenged. 
The concept of the ‘slave revolution’ appeared to be such an obvious vulgarization 
of ancient history that in the late 1940s timid attempts to revise it partially started to 
emerge. An example of such creeping revisionism was Alexander Dmitrev’s doctoral 
dissertation Social Movements in the Roman Empire in Connection with the Invasion 
of Barbarians, which he defended in 1950. Historians began to focus on the di-
versity of social conflicts in ancient Rome. The cautious revisions emphasized that in 
many cases the conflicts bluntly labelled as ‘slave revolts’ were movements in which 
the main role was played not by slaves but by other social groups, namely oppressed 
inhabitants of provinces or religious groups, coloni (see, e.g. Dmitrev, 1940, 
pp. 101–114; Dmitrev, 1946, pp. 92–100; Dmitrev 1948, pp. 66–78; Dmitrev 
1949, pp. 76–85; Dmitrev, 1950, pp. 66–80; Dmitrev, 1951, pp. 61–72; Dmitrev, 
1956, pp. 97–126). 
For this reason, the riots in Rome began to be interpreted not as slave but as 
popular movements, and that change of position gradually eroded the basic 
concept of ‘slave revolution’. 
The research on the problematic of social struggle in ancient Rome was de-
veloped hand in hand with studies on the essence of slave exploitation. It is thus 
not a coincidence that the question of the role of free peasants—who composed a 
relatively large social group in Roman society throughout its history—was a very 
difficult question for Soviet historians of antiquity. Some regarded free peasants 
as allies of the slave class, others as part of the slave owners class. By the same 
token, their economic significance fitted poorly to the model of Roman economy 
upheld by the historiography of the Stalinist period. 
In their works, Soviet historians considered the latifundia as the foundation of 
the Roman economy. The numerous slaves who worked on the plantations 
of any given latifundia were considered as all equally marginalized, deprived of 
their families and property while they lived in the workhouses of the ‘plantation’ 
(ergastula) (Kuziŝin, 1980, p. 343). Slaves were overexploited, as the owners 
tried to get the maximum result from them in the minimum amount of time. 
After the rapid death of a slave exhausted by overwork, he was replaced by a new 
one because in conditions of constant wars slaves were cheap. According to the 
predominant narrative of Stalinist historiography, the crisis of the slaveholding 
economy emerged immediately after the Roman Empire was no longer able to 
conduct further wars of conquest and had to adopt a defensive position. As a 
consequence, there was a transition from plantation slavery to the provision of 
land to slaves who were granted the right to retain part of the harvest received 
from the land. In a nutshell, as argued in the writings of the Soviet historians 
during the times of Stalinism, from that particular process the feudal relations 
originated (Maškin, 1950, pp. 630–631). 
In the Soviet historiography of the ancient world of the Stalinist years, 
slave labour was considered unproductive and low-skilled and impeded 
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technological progress. Attention was focused on the fact that slave labour in 
the latifundia ravaged small free peasants who could not stand the compe-
tition. At the same time, the low efficiency of slave labour, which generally 
led to the inefficiency of the ancient economy, was constantly emphasized. By 
concentrating on the negative aspects of the slave economy, especially on the 
inhumane overexploitation of slaves by their masters and the distortions of 
the economic structure of the society in general, but also by ignoring the 
historical variance and diversity of experiences in Roman society, Soviet 
historians depicted antiquity as a site for a constant and acute class struggle in 
which slave-owning relations were bound to perish. 
In general, it should be noted that the manner of writing by Soviet 
researchers during the years of Stalinism, of works on the history of the class 
struggle in antiquity on the one hand and works on the historical reconstruc-
tion of the ancient economy on the other, was as if these works had not been 
written by the same authors. Studies on the history of uprisings and social 
movements in the ancient world were distinguished by a deep study of his-
torical sources and can safely be labelled as genuine historical research. At the 
same time, Soviet monographs and articles on the problems of the ancient 
economy were more superficial. They were mainly theoretical in nature and 
were characterized by a weak study of the source base of the study. It is clear 
that the authors sought to adjust the material sources under a predetermined 
research scheme. 
The post-Stalinist development 
Stalin died in 1953. In 1956, the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union (CPSU) was held that condemned Stalin’s ‘cult of personality’ 
and political repressions that took place during his reign. At the end of the Party 
Congress, a resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the 
USSR was adopted called ‘On overcoming the cult of personality and its con-
sequences’, published in the newspaper Pravda, N 184, July 2, 1956. Above all 
for Soviet historians, this seemed a direct invitation to revise the historical con-
cepts established in the Stalin years. 
As a consequence, the research on the historical development of social 
structures started to focus on a thorough analysis of the material sources. The 
methodological paradigmatic change was coupled with an aversion to using 
abstract theoretical constructions that had no basis in the material of historical 
sources. A forerunner for the post-Stalinist view on the legal history of antiquity 
was Maria Serǵeenko, who had started her career already in the pre-
revolutionary period and managed to retain her scholarly style using an in- 
depth elaboration of primary sources in the 1930s (Gavrilov and Kazanskij, 
1993, pp. 316–328; Žmud’, 2013, pp. 101–102). Inter alia, Serǵeenko was a 
specialist of Roman agriculture (Serǵeenko, 1958) and translated into Russian a 
lot of works of Roman agronomists. These works were originally introduced as 
comprehensive guides for a proper cultivation of land and the correct kind of 
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agriculture (Serǵeenko, 1937; Serǵeenko and Protasova, 1950; Serǵeenko, 
1963; Serǵeenko, 1970). 
The rearrangements of organizational conditions carried out after Stalin’s 
death supported the comprehensive revision of the dogmatic historiography of 
the previous decades. In addition to the pre-existing university departments of 
ancient history in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Minsk and Sverdlovsk, departments 
devoted to the study of ancient history and the history of the Middle Ages were 
established in the universities of all major cities of the USSR (Kuziŝin, 1980, 
pp. 350–351). 
Officially, the appeal to a new comprehensive study of the ancient economy 
and the various aspects of slavery was justified by the fact that alongside of the 
rise of ‘social history’ there was an increased interest in these issues in 
‘Western’ historiography (see, e.g. White, 1970; Finley, 1968; Garnsey, 
1970). In a way, the wider international turn towards ‘the social’ in the study 
of antiquity, coupled with the ideological readjustment in the political at-
mosphere of the Soviet Union, furbished the Russian historiography’s base as a 
Marxist historiography. The circumstances obliged historians to turn primarily 
to the study of productive forces and economic relations as premises for his-
torical processes. 
Step by step, a total revision of the concept of the ancient slave-owning for-
mation established in the Stalin years occurred. Soviet researchers of the 1960s 
and 1970s like Lev Elnitsky and Elena Štaerman based their studies of the social, 
economic and legal aspects of slavery in ancient Rome on a scrupulous and 
source-focused historical research (Kuziŝin, 1980, p. 352). Without denying the 
very concept of the slave-owning mode of production, the scholars demonstrated 
the diversity of the ancient economy, in which non-economic coercion to work 
was combined with the use of the types of economic relations of the market 
economy. As a result, Professor Štaerman demonstrated that the concepts of ‘the 
estate of slaves’ on the one hand, and ‘the class of slaves’ on the other hand were 
not always the same. People who were slaves from the legal point of view could 
be divided into groups that belonged to different social classes from the point of 
view of Marxist analysis (Kuziŝin, 1980, p. 353). 
Furthermore, by analysing the economic historical material of the Roman pro-
vinces, it was shown in detail that alongside the slave-owning method of production, 
other socioeconomic structures successfully coexisted in the Roman Empire. 
Scholars have pointed out that the main sources of production of the Roman 
economy were not latifundia or large workshop-type manufactories but were farms 
and small craft workshops. In addition, the post-Stalinist historiography stressed the 
obvious fact that the standard of living and the level of exploitation of slaves em-
ployed in different types of enterprises varied significantly (Egorov, 1985; Elnickij, 
1964; Kuziŝin, 1966; Kuziŝin, 1973; Kuziŝin, 1976; Maâk, 1971; Parfenov, 1987; 
Štaerman, 1957; Štaerman 1964; Štaerman, 1971; Štaerman et al., 1977; Utčenko, 
1972; Utčenko, 1976). 
Generalizing from these new insights, Soviet historical science in the 1970s 
came to the conclusion that in the society of Ancient Rome throughout its 
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history, there were not two main social classes—slaves and slave owners—but 
three. The first class was the class of people who owned the means of production, 
though they were not engaged in productive work. The second class consisted of 
people who owned the means of production and at the same time they them-
selves took part in the production process. The third class was a class of producers 
deprived of the means of production (Frolov, 1999, p. 410). 
In essence, the historiography of ancient history in the late USSR, and in 
particular the historiography of the history of Ancient Rome, differed from 
modern Western literature on the issue only in its hypertrophied attention to the 
socioeconomic aspects of ancient history and its commitment to economic de-
terminism in explaining the phenomena of social life. 
Concluding remarks 
Although the development of the studies of ancient society in Soviet Russia went 
through different stages—each presented as revolutionary to its predecessor—the 
field retained all the while some traits that characterize socialist interpretations of 
legal history. First, the idea of the law’s inevitable ‘withering away’ in the 
communist society justified and necessitated analysing the past societies as to-
talities, in which law did not constitute a separate domain but rather a factor 
among other social structures that comprised the particularity of a given his-
torical situation within the greater narrative of world historical development. 
Second, the political elite showed a continuing interest in historical research. The 
influence of political provisions on historiography was most evident during the 
reign of Joseph Stalin, when scholars had no choice but to depict ancient history 
as a reflection of the contemporary, reductive view of social development. 
Soviet historiography represented a paragon of orthodox socialist historical 
research to the historical sciences around socialist East Central Europe. In ad-
dition, the domestic governments in the socialist bloc tried to imitate the way in 
which the USSR dealt with its scientific community and sphere of higher edu-
cation. Hence, a study of Soviet historiography tells a lot about the relation 
between the socialist regimes and the histories written within them but also 
about the inner dynamics of the scientific disciplines. In this sense, it is 
interesting—in that it reflects the nuanced phenomenon of socialist legal 
historiography—that within the allegedly thoroughly ‘politicized’ research, traits 
of older principles and scholarly virtues existed. In the end, the historicist 
viewpoint of the priority and hegemony of historical sources—a stance that in 
many cases derived directly from some kind of a connection to the pre- 
revolutionary discourse of historiography—prevailed over the sociological 
experimentalism of Pokrovskij school and Stalinist dogmatism. 
With respect to the conception of Roman law and society, by the time of the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, Soviet historiography finally abandoned the con-
cept of the slave revolution as a factor that predetermined the transition from 
antiquity to the feudalism of the Middle Ages. Today, there is no fundamental, 
ideologically constituted schism on the understanding of ancient history. 
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Instead, there is a wide consensus that the primary unit of the social structure of 
Roman society throughout its history remained the community as a self-
governing association of free people. But we should not forget that this modern 
concept was already proclaimed in a joint report by Soviet historians of classical 
antiquity E. Golubcova, V. Kuziŝin and E. Štaerman on the topic ‘Types of 
communities in the ancient world’ at the XIV International Congress of 
Historical Sciences in San Francisco in 1975 (Kuziŝin, 1980, p. 355–356). 
Notes 
1 Anton Rudokvas is full professor at the Saint Petersburg State University; Ville 
Erkkilä is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Helsinki.  
2 See, e.g. Bucholc in this volume.  
3 The title in Russian: ‘Agrarnaâ istoriâ Drevnego Mira’. 
4 Na fronte nauki: V Sovnarkome Sojuza SSR i ZK VKP (b). Partizdat ZK VKP (b) 
(On the science front: In the Soviet Union’s Council of People’s Commissars and 
the Central Committee of the all-Union Communist Party) (1936), Moscow: 
Publishing house of the Central Committee of the all-Union Communist Party.  
5 ‘Na fronte nauki: V Sovnarkome Sojuza SSR i ZK VKP (b) (On the science front: In the 
Soviet Union's Council of people's Commissars and the Central Committee of the all- 
Union Communist Party.)’ in Bor’ba klassov (Class struggle), 2, (February), 1936, p. 4.  
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4 Strategies of covert resistance 
Teaching and studying legal history 
at the University of Tartu in the 
Soviet era 
Marju Luts-Sootak   
Introduction 
In the Soviet era (in 1940–1941 and 1944–1991), when the official name of the 
University of Tartu was ‘Tartu State University’, its Law Faculty was the only 
faculty of law in Estonia. The university counts its history from its establishment 
in 1632 during the Swedish era in Estonia. Nevertheless, it was not able to 
function uninterrupted. During the Great Northern War, the university was first 
evacuated to the harbour town Pärnu and from there on to the Swedish mo-
therland. The Baltic provinces, which from 1710 to 1917 belonged to the 
Russian Empire, were thus left without a university. Since the 13th century, 
the local upper classes—the nobility and burghers—had been primarily German 
speaking, and the university, when it was finally reopened in Tartu in 1802, 
functioned for the following 90 years as a German university in the Russian 
Empire. In 1892, the university was Russified and remained Russian speaking 
until the end of the Tsarist state. 
Although the town of Tartu is situated in the middle of ancient Estonian ter-
ritory and ethnic Estonians have always been an absolute numerical majority there 
(about 95%), they were still at the beginning of the 19th century, almost without 
exception, serfs who had no contact with the university or higher education. It 
was only after the end of the First World War and the establishment of the 
Republic of Estonia that the University of Tartu was opened on December 1, 
1919—now, for the first time in its history, as an Estonian-speaking university. Its 
status as the national university of the young Estonian state was also expressed in 
its official name: the University of Tartu of the Republic of Estonia. Since then, 
the official teaching language of the university, the Law Faculty included, has 
been Estonian. This is also how it remained—for the entire Soviet period, the 
university functioned in Estonian. In addition to the ordinary courses, there were 
also distance-learning courses, and for this form of studies, there was also teaching 
in Russian for a small group of students (approximately 20 every year). However, 
the main teaching language was Estonian. As a Finno-Ugric language, Estonian 
was somewhat hard to learn for other nationalities, and Estonians themselves were 
not very numerous (about one million altogether). This meant that the everyday 
language of teaching and university administration remained incomprehensible 
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for Soviet ‘functionaries’ from elsewhere. Already the factor of this difficult-to- 
understand language made it hard for the Soviet central administration to 
control fully Estonian legal scholarship and education. 
Everything that Sanita Osipova writes in this volume about Latvian legal 
history before and after World War II is in general terms also true about 
Estonia and the University of Tartu. Estonian national history and legal his-
tory writing began first in the interwar period with the Republic of Estonia, 
turning a formerly derided underclass—indigenous Estonians—into a subject 
of history and thereby opposing itself to earlier Baltic German history writing 
that had focused on the societal elites and the corresponding institutions. 
Soviet history writing sharpened this opposition even further, since now 
history had to be presented as a class struggle. Paradoxically, at the same time, 
this made it possible to continue the national history writing tradition that 
had been formed before the war, since Estonians had been an exploited un-
derclass from the Middle Ages onwards and were hence a legitimate subject 
for a Marxist-Leninist treatment of history. It was only during the interwar era 
of the 20th century, in their own democratic republic, that the Estonian 
people had differentiated into different social classes. It was exactly this 
‘bourgeois republic’ of the interwar period that was particularly condemned 
and in some ways even more ‘forbidden’ than earlier periods of history. But 
even the Soviet system included inconsistencies and windows of opportunity 
that allowed legal history in particular to develop into a somewhat more 
independent, in a certain sense even more dissident, discipline compared to 
the rest of the mainstream of legal studies. 
In the following, I will take a look at the structural elements that allowed legal 
history to shake the general aims and ideology of the Soviet system. After that, I 
will characterise the most important academics who taught legal history at Tartu 
State University. More specifically, I will consider the ways and means of covert 
resistance employed by academics that enabled them to diverge from official 
party-controlled views. 
The general framework of mandatory subjects in legal history 
Lawyers have always been more closely associated with state power than 
natural scientists or, for example, historians. Compared to other colleagues in 
the faculty of law, it was the legal historians who consistently had the best 
opportunities to diverge from the Soviet political mainstream. To a degree, 
this was already facilitated by the general academic framework provided in 
Moscow, i.e. by the curriculum itself. There were rather a lot of compulsory 
legal historical subjects, including general or world legal history, the legal 
history of the USSR and the legal history of the Estonian Soviet Socialist 
Republic, or SSR. 
The general legal history module could at different times be called The History 
of the State and Law or General History of the State and Law or The History of the 
State and Law of Foreign Countries, but the model was the same throughout the 
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Soviet era. More recent attempts to write the legal history of the whole of the 
world either historicise as comparative works (e.g., Glenn, 2014) or only focus 
on the methodological aspects of this enterprise (Duve, 2018; see also the 
quotations). Unlike the Soviet textbooks, they do not aspire to cover the whole 
of the legal history of the world since the beginning of time. But the students 
over the whole of the Soviet Union also learned something about ancient 
Babylonia or Mesopotamia—not just about the Code of Hammurabi and 
Hammurabi as a ruler, but also about some other things. How many persons in a 
normal ‘Western’ law faculty would have known who the awilu, the mushkenu or 
the wardu were? These were, by the way, different classes in the social hierarchy 
of Babylonia. Not only about Babylonia but also about ancient Egypt, India, 
China, Greece and Rome, medieval Europe and modern America, Soviet stu-
dents acquired very specific types of knowledge in world legal 
history—knowledge about the upper and lower classes in the society and about 
the class struggle. But it should be stressed here that the General History of State 
and Law module also gave students the possibility of learning about the world 
outside of the closed borders of the Soviet Union. Newer legal history of foreign 
countries, not only that of the ancient or medieval world, was also a part of the 
curriculum. 
The textbooks ‘grew’ together with history itself. In the 1940s, the ‘most 
recent era’ covered the time period 1917–1947 (Gurvich and Chernilovski, 
1947), but in the 1980s, it also included ‘the formation of the socialist world 
system’ after World War II, the liberation of colonies in Asia and Africa and 
revolutions in the Latin American states (Chernilovski, 1983, pp. 570 sq.). The 
module, however, never covered all the states of the world. The selection from 
modern Europe, for instance, included the United Kingdom and the British 
Empire, France, Germany, Austria, Italy and in addition, from outside of Europe, 
the United States (Chernilovski, 1947; Chernilovski, 1983, pp. 214 sq.). In the 
period beginning with the Russian October Revolution, the coverage included 
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, China and Japan. The selection of 
smaller countries could vary between different textbooks, but the big ones were 
always included. 
Although teachers had to follow the general curriculum, the same as that for 
the Soviet Union as a whole, every lecturer had some freedom to design his or 
her own lectures. The course in world legal history was rich enough to provide 
many possibilities for cherry picking. In addition to classes and class struggle, 
there was also teaching in the fields of legal sources, the main institutions and 
legal phenomena. Although the then-current Soviet law did not recognise private 
property or free markets, it was still possible to talk about these things in legal 
history (Gurvich and Chernilovski, 1947, pp. 284 sq.; Chernilovski, 1983, 
pp. 531 sq.). A historical introduction to classic private law was also provided by 
a course in Roman civil law, treated in this volume by Anton Rudokvas and Ville 
Erkkila. In addition to covering private law or separate parts of it (property law, 
family law) for different historical periods, general legal history also included an 
overview of criminal law, court organisation and judicial process. 
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I have here only referred to the Russian language, the so-called all-union text-
books. There were no substantial, original textbooks in general legal history 
published in Estonian. However, already at the beginning of the Soviet period, 
two textbooks appeared that were relevant for the earliest period covered in this 
module: Stepan Ketchekjan’s textbook on the history of ancient Near East and 
Greek antiquity (Ketšekjan, 1946), and Ivan Pereterski’s textbook on the ancient 
Roman state and law (Pereterski, 1946). These two translated textbooks subse-
quently remained the only published study materials in Estonian that were relevant 
for the course. There were no reprints after 1946, so as late as in the second half of 
the 1980s, the first-year students of the Law Faculty still had to compete in the 
library for the few extant copies that had survived after four decades of use. The 
textbooks covered only a small part of the course, namely, the earliest period. 
Concerning the period of the so-called ‘general crisis of capitalism’, i.e., the 20th 
century, some study materials in Estonian were published from the end of the 
1950s until the mid-1960s by Jüri Jegorov (Jegorov, 1959; 1960/1966; 1961), 
whose activities will be treated in more detail below in the section on personalities. 
Everything else was studied from the notes made in lectures and seminars. 
Although there must have been some individual exceptions, the ethnically 
Estonian students generally did not study from Russian-language textbooks. This 
was not just a question of willingness or unwillingness. In spite of compulsory 
Russian classes from the second school year onwards, the Russian skills of 
Estonians were so lacking that they could not manage with textbooks in Russian. 
The other big compulsory module in legal history was The History of the State 
and Law of the USSR, i.e., of the Soviet Union. This subject not only included 
the period beginning with the foundation of the USSR in 1922, or with the 
Russian socialist October Revolution of 1917, but also encompassed the whole 
of the legal history of the then-Soviet territory throughout the ages. Thus, the 
first point in the programme was ‘Slave states on USSR territory’. This did not 
refer to the secret slave farms in Central Asia in the 1980s, exposed in the wake of 
Gorbachev’s ‘perestroika and glasnost’, nor did it refer to the gulags. In the legal 
history syllabus, this meant the slave states of antiquity. There had been a few 
Greek colonies on the Black Sea, and the Persian Urartu Empire had reached the 
Soviet Union in the borderlands of the Armenian, Georgian and Azerbaijan 
Soviet Socialist Republics. Historical materialism as one part of the Marxist 
ideology discussed how historical societal formations would inevitably follow one 
another, every subsequent formation being more progressive than the previous 
ones, but nevertheless still presupposing the existence of the previous formations. 
In this way, slavery became an inevitable prerequisite of socialism. In general, 
studying the history of the state and law was supposed to turn students into 
particularly adept builders of Communism: 
Our second main task in addition to education is turning our current 
students into highly qualified builders of Communism. […] In their 
professional education, the future lawyers must acquire the skills and abilities 
to use the state and law as well as possible as a means to build Communism. 
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Everything changes, including the state and law. It therefore follows that their 
purposeful use takes various forms at different times and in different places. To 
inculcate a deep understanding of this fact in the students, our treatment of 
the state and law needs to be concrete and historical. […] The demand for 
concreteness is one of the central demands of the dialectical method, and 
adherence to it is imperative in order to achieve objective truth. This avoids a 
descent into quixotic abstractionism and subjectivism. (Ibius, 1951, p. 5)  
In the 1980s, there was less talk of building Communism. The last one to have 
predicted its arrival by the year 1984 was Nikita Khrushchev. Communism failed 
to arrive and George Orwell’s book 1984 ended up being a more accurate pre-
diction than Khrushchev’s. However, the teaching of the history of the state and 
law, as of history altogether, remained in a certain way extremely ‘concrete’ up 
until the end of the Soviet period. Lecturers avoided interpretations of meanings 
in both their oral and written communication and limited themselves to pre-
senting a great number of facts. 
There was also one textbook of the history of the USSR that was translated 
into Estonian immediately after the war, again only on earlier history, although it 
did extend up to the reign of Peter the Great (Juškov, 1946). It was during the 
time of Peter the Great, amidst the Great Northern War, that Estonian territories 
were for the first time subjected to Russia, but earlier periods in the history of 
Estonia and the other Baltic countries were also taught in lectures. In the early 
Soviet period, Estonian legal history was covered in The History of the State and 
Law of the USSR, but later, an independent compulsory module was added. 
The History of the State and Law of the Estonian SSR covered Estonian legal 
history, as it were, from the beginning of time. One could not locate any ancient 
empires in the territory of Estonia. Therefore, the starting point was later, in the 
Middle Ages. For me, during my studies, this course was taught in the spring 
term of the 1984–1985 academic year by the, at that time, very young lecturer 
Peeter Järvelaid (b. 1957). The first lecture was about the social order of 
Estonians before their land was conquered in the Crusades of the 12th–13th 
century. This was a proper Soviet-style topic and the fact that ‘prior to the 
conquest the Estonians did not have any state apparatus whereby the will of the 
ruling class would be formulated in written form as law’ was also a very ‘Soviet’ 
style of speaking. After a few lectures, Järvelaid got onto the subject of the 
Swedish period in Estonia (1561/1629–1710) and the lectures then turned into 
an amazing flood of knowledge, welded together in an adventurous way. For 
instance, one lecture was titled ‘Hugo Grotius and Old Livonia’. Hugo Grotius 
(1583–1645), as one of the most important authors for the foundation of 
modern international law, is familiar throughout Europe. ‘Old Livonia’ was the 
collective noun used for the feudal polities established after the conquest of the 
territories of current Estonia and Latvia during the Crusades of the 12th–13th 
century. This unstable confederation of feudal principalities collapsed in the 
Livonian War (1558–1561), destroyed by the various great powers of the era. 
Northern Estonian territories became a part of the kingdom of Sweden, 
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Southern Estonia and Northern Latvia went to Poland as Livonia and the feudal 
Duchy of Courland in the south of Latvia became a vassal of the Polish- 
Lithuanian state. In any case, it was obvious that Grotius could not have had any 
real connection to the Old Livonia, which had already collapsed before Grotius 
was born. But thanks to Järvelaid’s lecture, we learned that Grotius had existed, 
he had become the pensionary of Rotterdam, he had written a book De jure belli 
ac pacis (On the law of war and peace) and that this book had been borrowed six 
times from the library of Tartu University, founded by Swedish King Gustavus 
Adolphus in 1632. Moreover, De jure naturae et gentium by Samuel Pufendorf 
(1632–1694) was borrowed 11 times between 1699 and 1710, when during the 
times of the Great Northern War the university was moved to the coastal town of 
Pärnu. All these data are taken from my own lecture notes. However, I cannot 
find anything there about the lecturer ordering or asking us to read the textbook 
of the history of the state and law in Estonia (Jegorov, 1981), the same author’s 
previous study materials on the Old Livonian Diet (Jegorov, 1966), the history 
of Livonian and Estonian towns and town law until the Russian imperial town 
law reform in 1870 (Jegorov, 1980), police institutions on Estonian territory 
since the beginning of the 19th century until the end of the Tsarist state 
(Jegorov, 1972), the court institutions of the same period (Jegorov, 1978) or the 
developments after the 1917 February Revolution in Estonia (Jegorov, 1969). It 
is possible that Järvelaid did not trust our language skills—both the textbook and 
the study materials, published as brochures, were all in Russian. But at the same 
time, our compulsory readings also did not include books in Estonian on the 
political system in the interwar era of the Republic of Estonia (Vihalem, 1960; 
1963a; 1963b; 1971), which still in the 1970s had been a part of the mandatory 
literature (Vihalem, 1976). The teaching of the history of the state and law of 
Estonian SSR in the form of this chaotic stream of knowledge, rather than ac-
cording to some structured plan or accepted programme, says something not just 
about the lecturer but also about that time. The era of Gorbachev had already 
started in the Soviet Union, and even in university lectures it was possible to 
freely discuss the personalities and historical events that could not have been 
done under the previous understanding of history, directed and constrained as it 
was by Marxist-Leninist ideas and ‘party’ policies. 
What we can say about the general framework of the curriculum is that its very 
broad remit made it possible to bring into the lectures a very diverse set of topics, 
but it also made it possible to exclude many others. It should also be mentioned 
here that in Estonia, the presence of the state security apparatus, also in academic 
circles, was at least after the death of Stalin never quite as heavy and nasty as, for 
instance, in the German Democratic Republic. 
Individual strategies of survival and resistance 
The first ever Estonian with a doctorate in legal history was Leo Leesment 
(1902–1986). His master’s dissertation, defended in 1926, concerned Old Livonian 
legal history (Leesment, 1926), and he continued to work in the same area in his 
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doctoral dissertation on medieval criminal law, defended in 1930 (Leesment, 
1931). Nevertheless, he could not immediately become the Professor of Legal 
History since this position was already taken by Jüri Uluots (1890–1945). Uluots 
was one of the first academics employed by the University of Tartu of the Republic 
of Estonia; an active politician, he was involved in the reform preparations of both 
Estonian civil and state law. A large part of his time was devoted to building up the 
Estonian state and legal order, and Leesment, a docent of civil law, had taught a fair 
bit of legal history already before the Soviet era. In 1939, Uluots became the Prime 
Minister of the Republic of Estonia, making Leesment the foremost academic 
teaching legal history. He was also tasked with teaching the history of Roman law. 
The systematic course in Roman law was taught by the Professor of Roman law 
Ernst Ein (1898–1956) (Siimets-Gross, 2004; pp. 116 sq.). During the first Soviet 
year, the courses were changed around. Uluots would have had no business at the 
Soviet university in any case, and he succeeded in hiding himself from the Soviet 
occupation in June 1940 until the German occupation in July 1941. Leesment 
taught the history of the state and law of the USSR, using a curriculum translated 
from Russian (Leesment, 1940–1949, p. 56). Ein taught (general) history of the 
state and law (Ein, 1940), until he was dismissed from the university in early 1941. 
In the 1930s, Ein had clearly expressed his sympathy for the Italian Fascist regime 
and Mussolini. In spite of support from university leadership, the top party officials 
of the Estonian SSR nevertheless considered it impossible for him to continue 
working for a Soviet university. When the University of Tartu was reopened after 
the war, now again under Soviet rule, Leesment was the only one of the three 
former professors still in Tartu. Both Uluots and Ein had emigrated in 1944 and 
Uluots had died of cancer in Stockholm on January 9, 1945. 
After the war, Leo Leesment was responsible for the teaching of all courses in 
legal history—the general history of the state and law, as well as the history of the 
state and law of the USSR. As a specialist editor, Leesment also participated in 
the translation of legal history textbooks from Russian. Kechekjan, one of the 
most important legal historians in the USSR, personally thanked him for his 
efforts and sent him a copy of his methodological instructions meant for distance 
education students for independent study of the general history of the state and 
law (Kechekjan, 1946). Similar manuals would later regularly also be published at 
the University of Tartu. In addition to literature translated from Russian, there 
were also Leesment’s own lecture notes. The manuscript collections of the library 
of the University of Tartu hold two typewritten copies, the second one bearing a 
note that this is the second edition (Leesment, 1945–46; 1947). The typescript 
was not only meant for the lecturer himself since according to a note of the 
‘Tartu State University printing office’ from April 9, 1947, it had been re-
produced in 150 copies (Leesment, 1947, p. 42). This must have been plenty for 
the students of the time: in 1945, the Faculty of Law had 11 graduates, in 1946 
it had 9, in 1947 only 7 and in 1948, it had none. An increase came later: there 
were 27 graduates in 1949 and 1950, 49 in 1951, 71 in 1952, 65 in 1953, 56 in 
1954 and 52 in 1955 (Graduates, 1989, pp. 29 sq.). Looking at the source 
citations in Leesment’s lecture notes, it is notable that in addition to Jushkov’s 
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textbook and the classics of Marxism-Leninism, he is also referring to his own 
earlier writings. It is possible that during the years immediately after the war, the 
reference works, journals, monographs and textbooks published in the Republic 
of Estonia in the interwar era could still be accessed by students. Later, they were 
for the most part destroyed and the few surviving copies locked in the special 
stacks of the library, where they could be read only by special permission. 
Leesment’s position as an academic at the Tartu State University was uncertain 
from the beginning. At the University of Tartu of the Republic of Estonia, he had 
eventually been appointed the Professor of Civil Law. During the 1940–1941 
academic year of the Soviet university, he was only allowed to teach as a docent. 
During the German occupation, he had been Professor Extraordinarius; in 
September–October of 1944 he worked at the Pärnu town museum and could 
thereafter return to the university as a docent. He was once again professor from 
October 1945 until June 1946, but was then again demoted to docent when the 
pre-war academic degrees were re-evaluated (Leesment, 1942–48, p. 3). 
Already before the opening meeting of the new collective security organisation, 
the United Nations, it became clear that the USSR would not be successful in 
bringing in every single Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) into the United Nations 
with a separate and independent right to vote (Tannberg, 2015). There was 
therefore no reason to tolerate their autonomy any further and, following the 
doctrine of party centralism, Soviet ideology had to be introduced to the fullest 
extent even to the most recent SSRs (Tannberg, 2010). In 1946 Russia had already 
started a campaign against the ‘formalism’ and ‘services rendered to bourgeois 
interests’ that were supposedly characteristic of the creative ‘intelligentsia’ (Tromly, 
2014, pp. 81 sq. and passim; Roberts, 2006, pp. 329 sq.). The party leadership of 
the Estonian SSR tried to demonstrate its loyalty to Moscow by undertaking a 
grandiose project to exterminate the bourgeois remnants from the Soviet Estonian 
society, cultural life and educational system. In summer 1949, it was the turn of the 
University of Tartu. By academic and party unit, meetings were held to find out 
and eradicate instances of so-called bourgeois nationalism (Raid, 1995, pp. 61 sq.). 
Together with some other colleagues, Leesment was accused of formalism and 
objectivism. The course in the history of the state and law of the USSR was also 
supposedly out of balance, with too much focus on earlier and too little teaching 
in newer, Soviet legal history. The whole faculty was blamed for the fact that not 
a single academic had engaged in public criticism of his or her own earlier works, 
published before the Soviet period. The Secretary of the Tartu City Committee 
of the Communist Party, who participated in the meeting, classified Leesment, 
together with Elmar Ilus (1898–1981), the previous civil law and current Roman 
law professor, as those academics who did not sincerely believe in Soviet rule and 
Communism and had engaged with Soviet society only mechanically, seeing it as 
an inevitable necessity. These accusations can be taken seriously: in his lectures, 
Leesment indeed taught primarily earlier legal history, less the capitalist period 
and no socialist legal history at all. We have already mentioned that he referred 
his students to his earlier writings, rather than criticising them, and his teaching 
style focused on conveying facts was indeed formalistic and objective—which we 
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might just as well call an attempt to preserve at least some kind of autonomy for 
legal history as an academic subject against the onslaught of Soviet ideology. The 
party meetings continued, and in 1950, both Ilus and Leesment left the uni-
versity ‘by their own request’. Leesment’s fate turned out to be particularly 
harsh. In 1951, he was arrested and deported to Siberia, sentenced to 25 years in 
a forced labour camp and a further 5 years of exile in the same region. 
After Leesment’s arrest and a few intermediary teachers, the teaching of legal 
history was taken over by Paul Vihalem (1910–1985), who soon also became the 
head of the Department of the Theory and History of the State and Law. 
Vihalem’s background was in labour law, and he had not been previously involved 
in legal history research or teaching in the pre-war period. In 1941–1946, Vihalem 
was a member of the government of Estonian SSR as a People’s Commissar of 
Labour. At the same time, until 1950, he worked as an academic in the Faculty of 
Economics, which at the beginning of the Soviet era had been split off from the 
University of Tartu Faculty of Law and attached to the Polytechnic Institute in the 
Estonian capital Tallinn. During the war, Vihalem had been active in the Soviet 
home front as a high Soviet functionary. Contrary to many other People’s 
Commissars from the early Soviet period, Vihalem was spared from the above- 
mentioned cleansing campaign against bourgeois nationalists. However, neither 
was he readmitted into the top ranks of Soviet functionaries in Estonia. Perhaps 
the fact that his brother had emigrated to Sweden held him back. However, at the 
University Vihalem had in certain ways a very strong position. The sources 
nevertheless do not confirm the claim, found in Estonian history writing (Lust, 
2010, p. 851), that Vihalem had been one of the main exposers of bourgeois 
nationalists at the University of Tartu’s Faculty of Law. Vihalem returned to the 
Faculty of Law only after the bourgeois nationalists had already been driven out. 
His doctoral dissertation, defended as a manuscript in 1952 in Moscow and titled 
Bourgeois Nationalists as Forgers of the History of the Emergence of the Bourgeois 
Estonian State, was written in Russian (Vihalem, 1950). The library of the 
University of Tartu also preserves the Estonian manuscripts of the first and second 
draft of this work (Vihalem, 1945; 1946a). The second draft in particular is an 
exceptionally thorough piece of academic work, and even at this stage it was very 
accurately referenced and made effective use of sources from both earlier and more 
recent Estonian history. It was Jüri Uluots who had come forward with a theory of 
some persistence of the Estonian state or the Estonian national continuity from the 
13th century Crusades until the declaration of Estonian independence during the 
First World War. It was this theory that Vihalem now criticised, deriving from it a 
justification for the Estonian nationalists’ collaboration with German occupation 
authorities, something that Uluots’ original concept certainly had not included. 
Notably, there was only one ‘bourgeois nationalist’ targeted by Vihalem’s criti-
cism, namely Uluots, though having escaped from Estonia in 1944 and having 
passed away in 1945, Uluots was beyond being hurt by any ideological accusa-
tions. At least in his Estonian manuscripts, Vihalem does not mention any other 
colleague still living, much less still living in Estonia and working at the university, 
whose earlier views could be classified as ‘forgeries of bourgeois nationalism’. 
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Vihalem used partially the same materials in an article published in the journal 
Estonian Bolshevik (Vihalem, 1946b). In this article, an earlier publication by 
Leesment concerning the models and sources of Baltic Private Law codification is 
also characterised as a ‘forgery of history’. Nevertheless, Vihalem quoted it to 
prove a point about the old-fashioned character of Baltic Private Law Act, which 
was also the point that Leesment was making (Leesment, 1928, p. 254). The same 
view of the Baltic Private Law Act is also prevalent today (Luts, 2000; Luts- 
Sootak, 2019). 
According to the reminiscences of Vihalem’s junior colleague Jüri Jegorov 
(born 1922), who worked at the Faculty of Law from 1947, Vihalem did not 
participate in the university’s witch hunt for ‘bourgeois nationalists’. Of all the 
academics in the faculty, Vihalem had the longest tenure as a member of the 
Communist Party—he was one of the ‘June Communists’ who had joined the party 
in 1940, immediately after the occupation of Estonia by Soviet troops on June 16. 
Nevertheless, many of the communists who had belonged to the leadership of the 
Estonian SSR and the Estonian Communist (Bolshevist) Party in 1940–41 and in 
the immediate post-war period were persecuted and repressed in the early 1950s, 
including several former People’s Commissars. Among other things, they were ac-
cused of bourgeois nationalism, even though it was they who had dismantled the 
Estonian ‘bourgeois’ nation state. It is possible that it was fear of greater repressions 
than being dismissed as the head of the Department of Soviet Law at the 
Polytechnic Institute and at the Section of Academy of Sciences in Tallinn that made 
Vihalem leave the capital in 1951 and retreat to the university town of Tartu. 
Jegorov claims that Vihalem was indeed scared of the party-incited witch hunt and 
the party activists of the time, who in the Law Faculty were concentrated in the 
Department of Civil Law and Process. There was also a reason to be wary of students 
since some of them were extremely active in the party. Several students had played 
an important role in bringing about Leesment’s dismissal. 
Lavrentiy Beria, who became the next leader of the Communist Party of the 
USSR after Stalin’s death, planned to put in place new ‘national governments’ in 
Soviet union republics, even if they were loyal to Soviet rule (Tannberg, 2018). 
Beria did not get further than the planning stage, but the ‘thaw’, mainly associated 
with the name of Khruschev, had nevertheless begun in the Soviet Empire. Even 
earlier, in Stalin’s times, students felt that the University of Tartu had been no-
where near as ‘Soviet’ as, for example, the Latvian State University in Riga 
(Vals, 1952). In his overview of the 1950 conference of the Scientific Association 
of Students, the acting secretary of the association’s Tartu branch, physics student 
Jaan Einasto, criticised the ideological passivity of the Tartu students compared to 
their guests from Leningrad and Riga: 
Although the theoretical and ideological quality of the treatment of topics 
has markedly improved, we still encounter significant deficiencies. 
Occasionally, the treatment of the subject at hand is ideologically defective, 
the discourse lacks a combative, Bolshevik attitude (humanities sections). 
This is especially notable if one compares the presentations of Tartu students 
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in the history section to those of the guests. In the case of the latter, the 
ideological direction and justification of the presentation are accorded much 
attention. […] 
Comrade I. Jonane demonstrated an exemplary treatment of her topic in the 
presentation ‘Bourgeois Nationalists—the Fiercest Enemies of the Latvian 
People’. Whilst Tartu student comrade E. Kask remained superficial in the 
treatment of the topic in her analogous presentation, comrade Jonane 
presented a deep analysis also of the role and impact of bourgeois nationalists 
in the Latvian State University, exposing the vile means by which the 
remnants of reactionism attempt to conceal themselves in order to continue 
carrying out their dirty anti-Soviet ‘work’. It was also notable that the Tartu 
students carefully avoided criticising the academics of their own university. In 
the section of legal studies, for example, comrade Mölder sharply criticised 
objectivist and cosmopolitan errors in the central Soviet juridical literature, 
but tacitly bypassed the situation in our University. (Einasto 1950)  
It seems that Tartu nevertheless retained an academic spirit that was different 
from Leningrad and Riga. A curious example of the retention of interwar era 
Estonian history in scholarly research and public discourse is provided, again, by 
Paul Vihalem. His 735-page monograph on the establishment of the Republic of 
Estonia and its first couple of years of existence, published in 1960, is the most 
voluminous work by any Soviet Estonian legal scholar (Vihalem, 1960). Vihalem 
furthermore published more books than any other member of the faculty in the 
Soviet period. Both his 1960 magnum opus and the following shorter studies 
bear extremely ‘Soviet’ titles: The Estonian Bourgeoisie in the Service of the 
Imperialists, White Terror in Estonia, Elections in Bourgeois Estonia and The 
Transition of Estonian Bourgeoisie into the Service of German Fascism. At the 
same time, all these books were very ‘Estonian’. The fact that Vihalem was 
writing about the Republic of Estonia differentiated him from many other au-
thors. While the books were written following the key dogmas of the Soviet 
ideology, his method was a very positivistic one, including many facts, intensive 
use of primary sources and appropriate quotations. At a time when ordinary 
scholars or common people did not have the access to literature from the time of 
‘Bourgeois Estonia’, such books provided much information. Still in early 2019, 
when the Tartu Professor of Medieval History, Anti Selart, born in 1973, en-
countered me in the University library carrying around Vihalem’s weighty 
monograph, he immediately said: ‘That’s a good book—lots of facts!’ This was 
exactly what made Vihalem’s writings valuable: a lot of facts, together with re-
ferences to primary sources. A couple of years ago, Vihalem’s junior colleague 
Jüri Jegorov told me how Vihalem and he had discussed whether to include in 
the book a quotation from the Baltic Entente Treaty (12.9.1934). The Baltic 
Entente was not a suitably ‘Soviet’ topic and the direct quotation from the 
Estonian State Gazette from the interwar era was an unusual thing to have. There 
is furthermore a clear difference between academic writings and works addressed 
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for a broader readership. Works especially meant for a scholarly audience 
(Vihalem, 1960; 1961; 1963b) contained more ‘forbidden’ references, while a 
popular scientific brochure contained almost no citations at all and its biblio-
graphy only listed works published in the Soviet period (Vihalem, 1963a, passim 
and pp. 173 sq.). The volume The Transition of Estonian Bourgeoisie into the 
Service of German Fascism was published in two versions. The first was published 
by the university publishing house and was meant primarily for use inside aca-
demia (Vihalem, 1963b). The version published by a large state publishing house 
does not refer to the previous version and omits its references to foreign litera-
ture, although preserving the citations of primary sources (Vihalem, 1971). 
The fact that Vihalem referred quite frequently to Western literature, and even 
Estonian émigrés living in the West, is significant in the Soviet context. All such 
literary and scholarly riches were locked away in the library’s special stacks and it 
was unthinkable for an ordinary scholar to include them in footnotes. But Paul 
Vihalem was not an ‘ordinary’ Soviet scholar; he was one of about 1,000 persons 
in the Estonian SSR who had been awarded the Order of Lenin. In Tartu hu-
manities and social sciences, he was the only one to have received such a high 
Soviet decoration. He therefore had more freedom of speech than other people, 
even other professors. 
It is not easy to sum up and evaluate Vihalem’s activities. In an Estonian con-
text, he was certainly a hardcore Communist. But at the same time, he was an 
Estonian patriot and did a lot for the research of Estonian history, also by su-
pervising several candidate dissertations in the legal and political history of Estonia: 
on the emancipation of Estonian peasants from serfdom and the development of 
the institutions of self-government in the countryside in the 19th century (Traat, 
1955), on the relations between the state and the church in the interwar period 
(Sillaste, 1974), on the foreign relations of the Republic of Estonia in the same 
period (Jaanson, 1975) and on the rise of the authoritarian regime in Estonia in 
the 1930s (Kiris, 1972). I am not sure the three last topics would have been 
‘dissertable’, to use a Soviet expression, if their supervisor had not been the June 
Communist and Order of Lenin laureate Paul Vihalem. Dissertations about the 
constitution of Estonian SSR (Kärtner, 1954) and the transition of state power in 
the first Soviet year in Estonia (Truuväli, 1966) would, on the other hand, have 
been ‘dissertable’ even with some other supervisor. 
In 1956, after Stalin’s death, Leesment was freed from the prison camp and 
could return to Tartu. For about a year, he found it impossible to find work and 
made a living as a translator, translating almost anything, including reports of the 
state of the canteen, summaries of student dissertations and a speech by the 
rector of the university (Rand, 2003, p. 120). After that, he was able to find 
employment only in the university library, initially merely as a bibliographer, but 
from 1957 onward as the head of the library’s manuscripts and rare books de-
partment. He held onto this job until he retired in 1965, but spent even later 
much time with his colleagues in the library, and has been remembered by them 
as a highly erudite and very helpful old gentleman. The later Professor of General 
History, Helmut Piirimäe (1936–2017) recalled his contacts with Leesment that 
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had already begun in Piirimäe’s student years and continued until the end of 
Leesment’s life: 
In conversations with the revered scholar who had returned from the 
Siberian prison camp, I was struck by his astonishing optimism. He did talk 
about the horrors of the prison camp, but his main emphasis was on how 
wonderful the people had been who he had met there, and especially on 
which languages he was able to learn. As I remember, one of them was 
Dutch. (Piirimäe, 2007, p. 138)  
Chiefly thanks to being invited by Jüri Jegorov, Leesment lectured on some topics in 
general and on the Soviet the history of state and law before his retirement and 
became a regular participant in the university’s teaching activities after his retirement. 
The Soviet ‘thaw’ was not the only reason—every Soviet pensioner enjoyed the right 
to work for two months every year with full salary and pension. Leesment used this 
right to teach at the university. In addition to his activities in legal history, he helped 
to establish the very strong and later famous circle in Oriental studies and partici-
pated actively in the equally famous research in Scandinavian history. Leesment had 
always been interested in foreign languages, knew many of them and had already 
before the war written several articles on Swedish, Austrian and even Chinese law. 
From the 1960s onwards, Leesment published a large number of articles on a 
great variety of topics from a wide range of different fields. His last longer piece 
of work was the manuscript of a textbook in the history of Baltic state and law 
(Leesment, 1949). The numerous articles published after his return from Siberia 
were generally short. However, it is impossible to agree with the claim that in 
these writings, Leesment was satisfied with ‘merely revisiting old topics’ 
(Järvelaid, 1992, p. 153). On the contrary, for the most part Leesment tended to 
take up questions that he had not given a more detailed treatment in his earlier 
work. Often, his writings were inspired by some curious fact, interesting source 
or association. They made their way to Estonian lawyers through the only law 
journal of the Soviet era, ‘Soviet Law’ (Nõukogude Õigus) published 1969–1989 
six times a year. This journal included a separate section, ‘A glance at history’, 
that very often contained Leesment’s articles. In the early 1950s they would have 
doubtlessly be branded as ‘formalism’ and ‘objectivism’, but in the 1970s and 
1980s, scholarship was freer even in the Soviet Union and the Communist Party 
and state security much more indifferent towards the spoken and written word. 
Leesment’s short articles had an even more far-reaching role in forming the field 
of knowledge about legal history in Estonia. Their number was remarkable. 
According to a list compiled by himself, he had published 215 articles between 
his return from Siberia in 1956 and June 1981 (Leesment, 1981); and from the 
following period, I found 9 more in the Estonian article database. This would of 
course need more thorough research, but on first sight it would seem that, given 
the number of his publications, Leesment was the most prolific author in the 
history of Estonian legal scholarship—even before the period 1956 to 1981, he 
managed to publish more than a hundred publications. 
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I have several times mentioned Jüri Jegorov, who taught at the University of 
Tartu a total of a hundred academic terms from 1947 to 1996. In 2019, he turned 
97, and for his age, he is in an extraordinarily good shape, both mentally and 
physically. Thanks to what he remembers, the events that he can draw attention to 
and the background processes that he can explain, we have begun to understand 
Soviet era academic and university life so much better. Born in 1922, he graduated 
from high school in the summer of 1941 and was immediately conscripted into the 
Red Army. He was wounded at the front at Leningrad and was therefore given an 
opportunity to study. His first choice was the Faculty of Foreign Languages at the 
Leningrad State University, but he left it after a few months and continued his 
studies at the Higher School of Economics. After the Atlantic Charter was agreed 
between the United Kingdom and the United States in January 1941, the USSR 
began its own preparations for the new United Nations (UN). As already said, 
Stalin wanted to secure as many votes as possible at the UN General Assembly and 
therefore planned to include in the organisation either all or at least more devel-
oped republics of the Soviet Union, each with a separate vote (Russell, 1958, 
pp. 359, 361 sq., 433 sq., 533 sq., 596 sq.). This meant that a few diplomats from 
each republic needed to be trained for this purpose. Jegorov happened to be one 
of the two Estonians who were appointed to study at the Higher School of 
Diplomacy by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of USSR. Jegorov studied there 
during the years 1942–1946, when the teaching staff at this academy had been 
recruited to be as strong as it could still possibly be after the purges that had 
been carried out in the Soviet Union of the ‘intelligentsia’ and the academic elites 
in the 1930s. After Stalin’s plan of the broadest possible takeover of the UN had 
failed, the newly educated diplomats were redirected to be employed in the regular 
foreign service. For family reasons, Jegorov nevertheless wanted to return to 
Estonia. Both his father and mother were deaf and needed his help. His father, 
Andrei Jegorov (1878–1954), was an artist who had studied in St Petersburg 
under Ilya Repin and other famous Russian painters; before the war he had 
mingled with the political elites of the Republic of Estonia and foreign diplomats. 
Jüri Jegorov’s sister had married a nuclear physicist and was therefore only allowed 
to live in a closed Russian military city. Thanks to Jegorov’s good relations with 
Juhan Vaabel (1899–1971), a scholar of financial law and a member of the 
Academy of Sciences of the Estonian SSR, as well as thanks to the urgent plea by 
the rector of the University of Tartu stating that the university desperately needed 
a teacher of international law, Jegorov became an academic at Tartu State 
University. The rector had been somewhat disingenuous: the actual need for an 
international law scholar was hardly great. Roughly at the same time, another 
academic was appointed in the same field: Abner Uustal (1915–1985), who was 
later promoted to professor of the same subject (Mälksoo, 2006, pp. 483 sq.). 
Jegorov with his training as a diplomat, something that was extremely rare 
among Estonians, was from the beginning left somewhat aside and he also 
himself preferred to keep away from the limelight. His views of the lectures of the 
colleagues who had been classified as bourgeois nationalists were rather com-
plimentary and supportive of the denounced academics. Instead, he criticised 
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‘socially active’ students (i.e., those active in the party), who had supposedly 
busied themselves ‘with their own’ things instead of paying attention in the 
political education classes (Raid, 1995, pp. 162 sq.), and a colleague who had 
levelled accusations against others (Lust, 2010, p. 850). 
During his first years of working in Tartu, Jegorov taught the ‘History of 
International Relations’ course not just to the students in the Faculty of Law but 
also to history students. The meticulous lecture notes of Olaf-Mihkel Klaassen 
(1929–2012), later the Professor of Oriental History at Tartu, give us an insight 
into the content of Jegorov’s lectures (Jegorov, 1948–49). At the same time, 
Jegorov cooperated closely with the staff of the Faculty of Medicine. The doctors 
had been accused of lacking political education and of too little dissemination of 
party ideology. For that reason, Jegorov periodically gave lectures to the mem-
bers of the Faculty of Medicine, but he says he did it in a quiet voice so as not to 
wake them: the doctors worked hard and were all permanently tired. 
In 1950 Jegorov defended in Moscow his candidate dissertation in law. The topic 
was very ‘Soviet’ both in content and appearance, but the sources that he used were 
very ‘Baltic’. The topic was The ‘Neutrality’ of the Scandinavian and Baltic 
Countries—as one of the means of unleashing World War II and facilitating German 
aggression (based on materials from the pre-war and wartime) (Jegorov, 1949). 
Somewhat later, the question arose whether Jegorov was qualified to work at the 
Faculty of Law, since ‘he does not possess a specific qualification in law’ (Raid, 
1995, p. 192). As already said, Jegorov nevertheless continued up until the 1990s. 
From 1961, he was docent in the History of the State and Law. The fire that 
engulfed the main building of the university in December 1965 also destroyed the 
draft and materials of Jegorov’s doctoral dissertation. He never fully recovered from 
this setback and his doctorate remained unfinished. 
In order to survive in the Soviet system and to have as little as possible to do 
with the party policy and the so-called ‘social assignments’, Jegorov developed 
some of his own strategies. The Law Faculty was in the main building of the 
university, where the rectorate and the Communist Party also had their offices. 
Jegorov avoided the main building as much as possible. For this purpose, he had a 
workplace in the so-called permanent agitation point for the elections of Soviets, 
far away from the Law Faculty, in the basement of the Life Sciences building. 
Jegorov was the young colleague with whom Vihalem discussed the presentation 
of the Baltic Entente in his book. In Jegorov’s own publications, one can also find 
long lists of so-called ‘bourgeois authors’ who had allegedly ‘falsified’ history. But 
it was also possible to read these lists as lists of recommended readings. Up until 
the second half of the 1980s, Jegorov ordered his students to use old legal history 
textbooks that had been translated into Estonian immediately after the war—at the 
time rare even in libraries, not to mention bookshops. The authors—Stepan 
Kechekjan (1890–1967) and Ivan Pereterski (1889–1965)—had received their 
education and become active as scholars already during the last years of the Tsarist 
state, when Russian legal scholarship was at the peak of its ‘Western’ orientation. 
Kechekjan’s master’s dissertation from 1914 had been on the ethical worldview of 
Baruch Spinoza. Pereterski was the best Soviet specialist on Roman law and 
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international private law; he had translated some parts of Justinian’s Digest into 
Russian. Their textbooks, translated into Estonian immediately after the war, had 
been edited by doctors and professors of law from the time of Estonian in-
dependence, namely Leesment and Ilus. We therefore see how Jegorov kept the 
best textbooks that were available in Estonian in the Soviet times in teaching use 
for a whole 50 years, approximately the entire Soviet time. And another small 
thing. One arbitrarily picked excerpt from the big Codification of the Baltic Private 
Law Act from 1864 lacked any relevant connection to the subject of town ad-
ministration, but one can find it as an appendix to Jegorov’s compendium on the 
Old Livonian Diet (Jegorov, 1966, appendix I). The private law was a matter of 
‘bourgeois’ society and therefore had to be covered under the protective coat of 
medieval institutions. 
It would be possible to continue the list of small tricks employed by Jegorov in his 
publication and teaching strategies. The older generation of Estonian lawyers still 
alive can tell many anecdotes about him and the things he had said, but this should 
suffice for the purposes of this article. Jegorov managed to survive the Soviet period 
without engaging in too much cooperation with the Communist Party and other 
Soviet institutions. In comparison to many others of his contemporary colleagues, 
his contribution to the ‘party-oriented transformation’ of the study of law was very 
modest indeed. 
Concluding remarks 
This article is the first attempt to present an overview of the practice of teaching and 
research in legal history in the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic (1940–41 and 
1944–91). I have particularly focused on the so-called covert resistance to Soviet 
regime and ideology. It appears that one of the most significant expressions of this 
resistance was the authors’ practice of including in their publications references to 
primary sources as well as to publications by Western authors and Estonian emi-
grants. Unfortunately, this form of covert resistance had its inherent limitations: the 
readers were for the most part not clever enough to discover all these secret signs, 
and the literature that was criticised—but nevertheless quoted—was mostly not, or 
at least not freely, available in Soviet Estonia. It was not only students who failed to 
pick up such hints, but also younger academics who did not have personal mem-
ories of the interwar-era Republic of Estonia. 
Vihalem published himself and also supervised several candidate dissertations 
by lawyers and historians on Estonian history. Leesment encouraged in particular 
Järvelaid, who was the Professor of Estonian Legal History at the University of 
Tartu in 1992–1997. After Järvelaid left Tartu, the department lacked a professor 
for a few years until I had the honour of being appointed the Professor of Legal 
History in 2003. Since then, legal historians in Tartu have developed a parti-
cularly warm and friendly relationship with Jegorov, who has shared with us his 
memories and observations of the Soviet era. He does not want to publish 
memoirs, since he is afraid of accidentally hurting someone, and says that the 
Soviet period had already done enough of that in Estonian history. 
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Finally, I wish to thank the historian of science Erki Tammiksaar (b. 1969), 
who kindly allowed me to read his still unpublished manuscript on the history of 
the University of Tartu in the last 100 years. In this way, it was possible to come 
across a number of sources that had not been used in previous research. 
References 
Duve, T. (2018) ʻGlobal Legal History: A Methodological Approach’, in Oxford 
Handbooks Online. www.oxfordhandbooks.com (accessed 9.1.2020). DOI: 10. 
2139/ssrn.2781104. 
Ein, E. (1940) Riigi ja õiguse ajalugu: loengud Tartu Riiklikus Ülikoolis. Üliõpilaskonspekt 
E. Eini loengute järgi (History of State and Law: Lectures at Tartu State University. 
Notes by an anonymous student following the lectures of E. Ein; in Estonian), Tartu: 
Tartu University Library, collection of manuscripts, stock 55 list 2 unit 197. 
Einasto, J. (1950) ʻKogemustest tuleb õppida’ (One should learn from experience), 
Tartu Riiklik Ülikool, April 14, 13, 1. 
Chernilovski, Z. M. (ed) (1947) Всеобщая история госудаства и права. Часть III: 
От английской революции до Великой Октябрьской революции (General history 
of the state and law. Part III: From the Glorious Revolution until the Great October 
Revolution), Moscow: Juridicheskoje Izdatel’stvo Ministerstva Justitsij SSSR. 
Chernilovski, Z. M. (1983) Всеобщая история госудаства и права (История 
госудаства и права зарубежных стран) (The general history of the state and law 
(History of the state and law of foreign countries)), 2. ed., Moscow: Vyschaja Skhola. 
Glenn, H. P. (2014) Legal Traditions of the World: Sustainable Diversity in Law, 5. ed., 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/he/9780199669837.001.0001. 
Graduates (1989) Tartu ülikooli õigusteaduskonna lõpetanute ja õigusteadust 
õpetanute nimekiri 1919–1989 (The list of graduates and teachers of the Law Faculty 
of University of Tartu, 1919–1989), Tartu: Tartu Ülikool, Eesti Akadeemiline 
Õigusteaduse Selts. 
Gurvich, G. S. and Chernilovski, Z. M. (eds) (1947) Всеобщая история госудаства 
и права. Часть IV: Новейшее время (1917–1947) (The general history of the state 
and law. Part IV: The most recent times (1917–1947)), Moscow: Juridicheskoje 
Izdatel’stvo Ministerstva Justitsij SSSR. 
Ibius, O. (1951) Õppetöö parteilisus nõukogude õigusteaduse õpetamisel. Van.-õp. Otu 
Ibiuse ettakenne TRÜ õigusteaduskonna õppejõudude koosolekul 1. juunil 1951 (The 
party line in the teaching of Soviet jurisprudence. A speech by senior teacher Otu Ibius 
at the meeting of the teaching staff of the Law Faculty of TSU on June 1, 1951), 
Tartu: Tartu University Library, collection of manuscripts, stock 127 unit 189. 
Jaanson, K. (1975) Kodanliku Eesti ja Skandinaaviamaade suhted aastail 1917–1925 
(The Relations between Bourgeois Estonia and the Scandinavian Countries 
in 1917–1925), manuscript in the Tartu University library, Collection of 
Dissertations, Tartu: Tartu Riiklik Ülikool. 
Jegorov, J. (1948–49) Rahvusvaheliste suhete ajalugu: loengud Tartu ülikoolis (The 
history of international relations: lectures at University of Tartu), notes by law 
student Olaf-Mihkel Klaassen, Tartu: Tartu University Library, Collection of 
Manuscripts, stock 99 unit 26. 
Jegorov, J. (1949) «Нейтралитет» скандинавских и прибалтийских стран—как 
одно из средств развязывания Второй мировой войны и содействия германской 
94 Marju Luts-Sootak 
агрессии (по материалам предвоенного и военного времени) (The ‘Neutrality’ of 
the Scandinavian and Baltic Countries—as one of the means of unleashing World 
War II and facilitating German aggression (based on materials from the pre-war 
and wartime)), autoreferat of Candidate dissertation, Tartu: Ministry of Higher 
Education of the USSR, Tartu State University. 
Jegorov, J. (1959) Riigi ja õiguse ajalugu. 1. osa: Kapitalismi ajajärk (The history of 
the state and law. Part 1: The period of capitalism), Tartu: Tartu Riiklik Ülikool. 
Jegorov, J. (1960) Riigi ja õiguse ajalugu. 4. osa (The history of the state and law. Part 4), 
Tartu: Tartu Riiklik Ülikool. 
Jegorov, J. (1961) Riigi ja õiguse ajalugu. 2. osa: Kapitalismi ajajärk (The history of 
the state and law. Part 2: The period of capitalism), Tartu: Tartu Riiklik Ülikool. 
Jegorov, J. (1966) Вопросы истории госудаства и права Эстонской ССР до 
октябрской революции: Лифляндский ландтаг (Questions of the history of the state 
and law of the Estonian SSR: The Livonian Diet), Tartu: Tartu Riiklik Ülikool. 
Jegorov, J. (1969) Вопросы истории госудаства и права Эстонской ССР до 
октябрской революции. II (Questions of the history of the state and law of the Estonian 
SSR. Vol. II), Tartu: Tartu Riiklik Ülikool. 
Jegorov, J. (1972) Вопросы истории госудаства и права Эстонской ССР до октябрской 
революции. III: Полицейские органы в Эстонии в XIX столети - октябрь 1917 
(Questions of the history of the state and law of the Estonian SSR. III: Institutions of police 
in Estonia in the 19th century—October 1917), Tartu: Tartu Riiklik Ülikool. 
Jegorov, J. (1978) Вопросы истории госудаства и права Эстонской ССР до 
октябрской революции. IV: Судебные органы в Эстонии в XIX столети - октябрь 
1917 (Questions of the history of the state and law of the Estonian SSR. IV: Institutions 
of justice in Estonia in 19th Century—October 1917), Tartu: Tartu Riiklik Ülikool. 
Jegorov, J. (1980) Вопросы истории госудаства и права Эстонской ССР до 
октябрской революции. V: Городское управление в Лифляндии и Эстляндии до 
применения буржуазной городской реформы 1870 г. (Questions of the history of the 
state and law of the Estonian SSR. V: , Tartu: Tartu Riiklik Ülikool. 
Jegorov, J. (1981) История госудаства и права Эстонской ССР. Дооктябрский 
период (XIII век—окт. 1917 г.) (The history of the state and law of the Estonian 
SSR. The pre-October period (13th century—October 1917), Tallinn: Valgus. 
Juškov, S. V. (1946) NSVL riigi ja õiguse ajalugu. 1. osa 1. vihik: Vanimast ajast kuni 
Peeter Suureni (The history of the state and law of the Union of SSR. Part 1, issue 1: 
From the oldest time until Peter the Great), Tartu: Teaduslik Kirjastus. 
Järvelaid, P. (1992) ʻLeo Leesment (1902–1986)—90’, Eesti Jurist, 2, 152–153. 
Kechekjan, S. F. (1946) Letter to Leo Leesment, Moscow, 24.6.1946 (in Russian), 
Tartu: Tartu University Library, Collection of Manuscripts, stock 93 unit 141. 
Ketšekjan, S. F. (1946) Üldine riigi ja õiguse ajalugu I: Vanaaeg, I vihik: Vana-Ida 
ja Vana-Kreeka (General history of state and law I: The ancient times, I issue: 
Ancient Orient and Ancient Greece), Tartu: Teaduslik Kirjastus. 
Kiris, A. (1972) ‘Põhiseaduse kriis’ ja täidesaatva võimu tugevdamine kodanliku Eesti 
1933. aasta konstitutsioonis (The ‘Constitutional Crisis’ and the Strengthening of the 
Executive Branch in the 1933 Constitution of Bourgeois Estonia), manuscript in the 
Tartu University library, Collection of Dissertations, Tartu: Tartu Riiklik Ülikool. 
Kärtner, H. (1954) Eesti NSV konstitutsiooni areng (The development of the 
Constitution of the Estonian SSR), manuscript in the Tartu University library, 
Collection of Dissertations, Tartu: Tartu Riiklik Ülikool. 
Strategies of covert resistance 95 
Leesment, L. (1926) Der Livländische Rechtsspiegel und seine Abweichungen vom 
Sachsenspiegel, Tartu: Tartu Ülikool, manuscript in the Tartu University Library, 
Collection of Dissertations,. 
Leesment, L. (1928) ‘Märkmeid Balti Eraõiguse allikaist (Notes on the sources of 
Baltic Private Law Act)’, Õigus, 8, 254–258. 
Leesment, L. (1931) Die Verbrechen des Diebstahls und des Raubes nach den Rechten 
Livlands im Mittelalter, Tartu: K. Mattiesens Buchdruckerei. 
Leesment, L. (1940–49) NSVL rahvaste riigi ja õiguse ajalugu. Loengud Tartu 
ülikoolis koos peetud loengute tunnikavade ja osavõtjate nimekirjadega (The history of 
the state and law of the peoples of the USSR. Lectures with time schedules and lists of 
participants; in Estonian), October 1, 1940–1949, Tartu: Tartu University Library, 
Collection of Manuscripts, stock 93 unit 99. 
Leesment, L. (1942–48) Lisa 1937 Curriculum Vitae’le (Appendix to the Curriculum 
Vitae from 1937), Tartu: Tartu University Library, Collection of Manuscripts, 
stock 93 unit 1. 
Leesment, L. (1945–46) NSVL riigi ja õiguse ajalugu. Loengute konspekt (The history 
of the state and law of the USSR. Lectures), Tartu: Tartu University Library, 
Collection of Manuscripts, stock 93 unit 100. 
Leesment, L. (1947) NSVL riigi ja õiguse ajalugu. Loengute konspekt. II väljaanne 
(The history of the state and law of the USSR. Lectures. 2nd edition), Tartu: Tartu 
University Library, Collection of Manuscripts, stock 93 unit 101. 
Leesment, L. (1949) Materjale Baltimaade riigi ja õiguse ajaloole (Lühike Eesti riigi 
ja õiguse ajalugu) (Materials to the history of the state and law of the Baltic countries 
(A short history of the Estonian state and law)), Tartu: Tartu University Library, 
Collection of Manuscripts, stock 93 unit 58. 
Leesment, L. (1981) Leo Leesmenti tööde nimestik (The list of works of Leo Leesment), 19. June 
1981, Tartu: Tartu University Library, Collection of Manuscripts, stock 93 unit 46. 
Lust, K. (2010) ʻ“Terava kriitika ja enesekriitika korras…”. Allumisest ja vastupanust 
Tartu ülikooli sovietiseerimisele õigusteaduskonna näitel (1944–1953) (‘As rig-
orous criticism and self-criticism…’. On the subjugation and resistance to the 
Sovietisation of Tartu University using the example of the Faculty of Law 
(1944–1953))’, Akadeemia, 10, 841–875. 
Luts, M. (2000) ʻPrivate Law of the Baltic Provinces as a Patriotic Act’, Juridica 
International: Law Review of Tartu University, vol. V, 157–167. 
Luts-Sootak, M. (2019) ʻZur Verortung des Baltischen Privatrechts (1864/65) unter 
den europäischen Privatrechtskodifikationen’, in Hamza, G., Hlavačka, M. and 
Takii, K. (eds) Rechtstransfer in der Geschichte. Internationale Festschrift für 
Wilhelm Brauneder zum 75. Geburtstag, Berlin: Peter Lang 2019, 219–243. 
Mälksoo, L. (2006) ʻThe Science of International Law and the Concept of Politics: 
the Arguments and Lives of the International Law Professors at the University of 
Dorpat/Iurþev/Tartu 1855–1985’, The British Year Book of International Law 
2005, Oxford: Clarendon Press 2006, 383–501. DOI: 10.1093/bybil/76.1.383. 
Pereterski, I. S. (1946) Üldine riigi ja õiguse ajalugu I: Vanaaeg, II vihik: Vana- 
Rooma (The general history of state and law I: Ancient times, II issue: Ancient 
Rome), Tartu: Teaduslik Kirjastus. 
Piirimäe, H. (2007) ʻLeo Leesment—Tartu Ülikooli õigusteaduse professor ja or-
ientalist (Leo Leesment—Professor of Jurisprudence and the orientalist at Tartu 
University)’, Tuna, no. 2, 137–138. 
96 Marju Luts-Sootak 
Raid, L. (1995) Vaevatee. Tartu Ülikool kommunistlikus parteipoliitikas aastail 
1940–1952 (The way of pain. University of Tartu in the policy of the Communist 
Party in the years 1940–1952), Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus. 
Rand, M. (2003) ʻLeo Leesment 100’, Tartu Ülikooli Raamatukogu aastaraamat 
2002, Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Raamatukogu, 120–121. 
Roberts, G. (2006) Stalin’s Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953, New 
Haven, London: Yale University Press. 
Russell, R.B. (1958) A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United 
States 1940–1945, Washington: The Brookings Institution. 
Siimets-Gross, H. (2004) ʻLeo Leesment ja Rooma õigus (Leo Leesment and Roman 
law; with German summary ʻLeo Leesment und römische Recht’, 124–125)’, 
Annales Litterarum Societatis Estonicae 2002, Tartu: Õpetatud Eesti Selts, 114–125. 
Sillaste, H. (1974) Luteri usu kiriku ja riigi vahekorra õiguslik reguleerimine kodanlikus 
Eestis (The Legal Regulation of the Relationship between the Lutheran Church and the 
State in Bourgeois Estonia), manuscript in the Tartu University library, Collection of 
Dissertations, co-supervisor Lembit Raid, Tartu: Tartu Riiklik Ülikool. 
Tannberg, T. (2010) Политика Москвы в республиках Балтии в послевоенные годы 
(1944–1956): Иследования и документы (The politics of Moscow in the Baltic Republic 
in the years after the war (1944–1956): Studies and documents), Moscow: Rosspen. 
Tannberg, T. (2015) ʻThe First Diplomats of Soviet Estonia on the Eve of the Cold War: 
The Creation of the Estonian SSR People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in 1944’, 
in Tannberg, T. (ed) Behind the Iron Curtain: Soviet Estonia in the Era of the Cold 
War, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 15−34. DOI: 10.3726/978-3-653-06082-9/4. 
Tannberg, T. (2018) ʻAfter Stalin: The Kremlin’s “New Nationalities Policy” and 
Estonia in 1953’, in Fleischman, L. and Weiner, A. (eds.) War, Revolution and 
Governance. The Baltic Countries in the Twentieth Century, Boston: Academic 
Studies Press, 207–238. DOI: 10.1515/9781618116215-012. 
Traat, A. (1955) Talurahva õiguslik olukord Liivimaal feodalismi lagunemise perioodil 
(The Legal Situation of the Peasantry in Livonia during the Period of the 
Disintegration of Feudalism), Tartu: Tartu Riiklik Ülikool, manuscript in the Tartu 
University library, Collection of Dissertations. 
Tromly, B. (2014) Making the Soviet Intelligentsia: Universities and Intellectual Life 
Under Stalin and Khrushchev, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. DOI: 10. 
1017/CBO9781139381239. 
Truuväli, E.-J. (1966) Kodanliku riigiaparaadi purustamine ning sotsialistliku riigia-
paraadi loomine Eestis 1940/1941.a. (The Demolition of the Bourgeois State Apparatus 
and the Creation of the Socialist State Apparatus in Estonia in 1940/1941), Tartu: Tartu 
Riiklik Ülikoo, manuscript in the Tartu University library, Collection of Dissertations. 
Vals, H. (1952) ʻVennasülikooli külastamas (Visiting the sister university)’, Tartu 
Riiklik Ülikool, May 31st, 18, 1. 
Vihalem, P. (1945) Eesti kodanliku õigusteaduse reaktsioonilisest ja natsionalistlikust 
ilmest. Teine mustand (On the reactionary and nationalistic face of Estonian bourgeois 
legal scholarship), December 1945, Tallinn: manuscript in Tartu University Library, 
Collection of Manuscripts, signature Mscr. 1466. 
Vihalem, P. (1946a) Eesti kodanliku õigusteaduse reaktsioonilisest ja natsionalistlikust 
ilmest. Teine mustand (On the reactionary and nationalistic face of Estonian 
bourgeois legal scholarship), June 1946, Tallinn: manuscript in Tartu University 
Library, Collection of Manuscripts, signature Mscr. 1467. 
Strategies of covert resistance 97 
Vihalem, P. (1946b) ʻKuidas Jüri Uluots ja teised kodanlikud natsionalistid võltsisid 
eesti rahva ajalugu (How Jüri Uluots and the other bourgeois nationalists falsified 
the history of Estonian people)’, Eesti Bolševik, 1, 6–16. 
Vihalem, P. (1950) Буржуазные националисты как фальсификаторы истории 
возникновения буржуазного эстонского государства (Bourgeois Nationalists as 
Falsifiers of the History of the Emergence of the Bourgeois Estonian State), Moscow: 
Institute of Law by USSR Academy of Sciences. 
Vihalem, P. (1960) Eesti kodanlus imperialistide teenistuses (1917–1920) (The Estonian 
Bourgeoisie in the Service of the Imperialists (1917–1920)), Tallinn: Eesti Riiklik Kirjastus. 
Vihalem, P. (1961) Valge terror Eestis 1918–19 (White Terror in Estonia 1918–19), 
Tartu: Tartu Riiklik Ülikool. 
Vihalem, P. (1963a) Valimised kodanlikus Eestis (Elections in Bourgeois Estonia), 
1963, Tallinn: Eesti Riiklik Kirjastus. 
Vihalem, P. (1963b) Eesti kodanluse üleminek saksa fašismi teenistusse (The Transition of 
Estonian Bourgeoisie into the Service of German Fascism), Tartu: Tartu Riiklik Ülikool. 
Vihalem, P. (1971) Eesti kodanluse üleminek saksa fašismi teenistusse (The Transition 
of Estonian Bourgeoisie into the Service of German Fascism), Tallinn: Eesti Raamat. 
Vihalem, P. (1976) Tööjuhend õigusteaduskonna III kursuse kaugõppijatele Eesti NSV 
riigi ja õiguse ajaloo õppimiseks 1976/77 ja 1977/78. õppeaastateks (Guidelines for 
distance learning of the History of the State and Law of Estonian SSR for year three 
students at the Law Faculty in the academic years 1976/77 and 1977/78), Tartu: 
Tartu Riiklik Ülikool.  
	5 The Western legal tradition  
and Soviet Russia 
The genesis of H. J. Berman’s  
Law and Revolution 
Adolfo Giuliani   
Introduction 
The Western legal tradition (henceforth WLT), a central presence in legal his-
toriography following the immensely popular two volumes published by the 
Harvard legal historian Harold J. Berman Law and Revolution I: The Formation 
of the Western Legal Tradition (1983) and Law and Revolution II: The Impact of 
the Protestant Reformations on the Western Legal Tradition (2003), is in search 
of a precise definition. 
This chapter traces the origin of this idea to the Cold War era. It shows that it 
was conceived by Berman in his 1950 book on Justice in Russia, a work in which 
he wanted to explain to a Western audience what lay beyond the Iron Curtain. 
To this purpose, he constructed an account in which he placed the West and 
Soviet Russia in opposition and concluded that they were made of the features 
that were missing in each other. A chapter in that book is the blueprint for his 
two well-known volumes on Law and Revolution published in 1983 and 2003 
(and for a third volume left unfinished). 
The WLT grew from another legacy received from the Cold War era: human 
rights history. Recent scholarship tells us that this theme attracted scholarly at-
tention beginning from the 1970s following contemporary concerns with human 
rights in Eastern European countries. This chapter shows how this theme was 
absorbed by WLT by hijacking a core component of continental legal science 
(subjectives Recht), then re-engineered by political theorists into the major 
identitary element of the WLT in an eternity history rooted in medieval 
canon law. 
Harold J. Berman and the construction of the Western 
legal tradition 
When legal scholars speak of the WLT, we swiftly understand what they mean. 
This expression belongs to common parlance and is a useful and quick shorthand 
to summarise a host of ideas immediately labelled with a precise identity. It only 
works, however, at a general level. As soon as we begin to see it more closely 
and wonder for instance about its content and geographic boundaries, we realise 
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we are facing difficult questions, and we soon understand that this successful 
phrase is relying more on an instinctive or even emotional appeal than on a 
rational basis. 
The only way to dispel the uncertainty over the WLT is to analyse it historically 
and tackle the questions which a historian would typically ask: where does this 
expression come from, who introduced it, for what purposes, who were her 
audience, and what did she want to do by using this expression? These are the 
questions this chapter aims to answer. This is not difficult, as the author who 
introduced this expression and, by placing it at the heart of one of the most 
successful legal-historical accounts published in the 20th century, gave it the 
broadest dissemination, is well known: the American legal historian Harold J. 
Berman (1918–2007). Berman offered a grandiose account of the growth of a 
WLT in his two monumental volumes, Law and Revolution I: The Formation of 
the Western Legal Tradition (1983) and Law and Revolution II: The Impact of the 
Protestant Reformations on the Western Legal Tradition (2003). Less known is 
the overall project, left unfinished, and even less its original purpose. In spite of 
the attention it attracted, it has been left unnoticed that this overwhelming 
project was first conceived as part of his book Justice in Russia: An Interpretation 
of Soviet Law, published in 1950. 
This chapter goes back to this project’s formative stage, offering an essay in 
the history of legal history. At its heart is a question about the historical 
consciousness of legal history because one of the features of this discipline is 
that of having forgotten how deeply the categories with which legal histor-
ians think and write about the legal past are embedded in ideas rooted in the 
20th century. 
My purpose in what follows will be to explain the rise of the WLT focusing on 
three points: (1) to show how Berman’s idea of a WLT arises from his 1950 book 
Justice in Russia and that the idea is a mirror-image of another projection: the legal 
tradition of Soviet Russia; (2) to show the philosophical premise upon which his 
historical project is based, to be found in his university mentor Eugen Rosenstock- 
Huessy; and (3) to demonstrate the question of human rights history is the main 
building block of the WLT and, further, that in building that account, the idea of 
the ‘Eastern tradition’ without human rights served as a convenient context. 
Harold J. Berman’s Justice in Russia (1950) 
The American legal historian Harold J. Berman is unquestionably one of the 
major contributors to 20th century legal history. His two massive volumes, Law 
and Revolution I (1983) and Law and Revolution II (2003), redirected this 
discipline with his compelling thesis about legal evolution. He suggested that 
“the Western legal tradition was born out of a ‘revolution’ and thereafter, during 
the course of many centuries, has been periodically interrupted and transformed 
by revolutions” (Berman, 1983, p. 1). 
This thesis is fleshed out in a rich account branched out in many fields and 
developed in significant detail through a long temporal arch. Its influence has 
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been considerable; it has received appraisals and fostered countless debates 
(Duve, 2013). It is true that matters of detail have attracted the attention of his 
critics, but its chief contribution is not in particular aspects of the many fields 
touched upon, mostly drawn from secondary sources, but in the broad evolu-
tionary hypothesis that as a vestment clothes his narrative. The powerful message 
brought forward by his evolutionary account is an auto-representation of the 
Western identity. 
We would not understand his project, however, without knowing its origin. 
It was in fact conceived in his book Justice in Russia (1950) and presented in 
a chapter (Ch. 6: ‘The Western Legal Tradition’) in which we find the major 
thesis of a legal evolution through successive revolutions. This is the blueprint 
of his lifelong project, which he then developed in Law and Revolution I 
(Berman, 1983) focused on the Papal Revolution; then carried forward in his 
Law and Revolution II (Berman, 2003) on the German and English Revolution; 
and was meant to be continued, as we learn from John Witte, in a further volume 
on the American, French and Russian revolutions, which, however, remained 
unfinished as a result of his untimely death (Witte, 2014, p. 146). The overall 
project is summarised in the following table that ends the chapter (Berman, 
1950”, p. 121). 
Berman’s Justice in Russia: An Interpretation of Soviet Law (1st ed. 1950; 2nd ed. 
1963: Justice in USSR: An Interpretation of Soviet Law) was written to offer a key to 
make sense of Soviet Russia. During the Iron Curtain era, Soviet Russia was beyond 
the reach of Westerners: mysterious, distant as an ancient civilisation, and felt to be 
in dramatic opposition to the West. More than a doctrinal analysis of the laws and 
institutions of the Soviet system, Berman’s purpose was to illustrate Russian life as 
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reflected in legal materials. The work was about ‘justice’ in Russia, purposefully ad-
dressed to explaining the sense of right and wrong and the broad principles that 
structured Soviet society. 
If the purpose is to understand Soviet life, Berman tells us, we need legal 
history. It would be misleading, he continues, to focus on socialist theory only: 
we should turn to the intellectual forces that, more powerfully than theories, 
shape human societies, their laws and institutions. The key to explain that legal 
world is in a historical account of the legal past. He also adds that Soviet legal 
scholars have been conscious of their Russian heritage: they were aware not only 
of Marx and Engels, Lenin and Stalin, but for the purposes of continuity and 
stability they also turned to pre-Revolutionary Russia (Berman, 1950, Ch. 4, 
Marxism and the Russian Heritage). Soviet leaders therefore broadened legal 
education to include Russian legal history and Latin to understand Roman law, 
in which Russia imagined her roots. Westerners, however, have no hope of un-
derstanding Russian legal history in its own terms; they must first turn to their 
own Western legal tradition because of ‘the polarity that has existed between 
Russian history and Western legal history for almost a thousand years’ (Berman, 
1950, p. 110). The Russian tradition was autonomous, unrelated to the common 
tradition that united the various systems of the West. 
The major interest for us in his Justice in Russia is Chapter 6 on the WLT. 
Those who are familiar with his later big volumes will be surprised by the daz-
zling speed with which Berman deals with his topic. They may also notice some 
rather unexpected statements, such as the notion that the German Reformation 
(the second revolution according to Berman’s plan) occurs at the same time as 
the reception of Roman law (bringing it forward a century), though this sug-
gestion is then corrected in the later volumes. Another feature is the inclination 
for macro-structures. We learn that the Western legal tradition is set in motion by 
[…] three leading principles: the principle of Reason, the principle of 
Conscience, and the principle of Precedents […] and the ideas associated 
with them of the supremacy and completeness of law, the equality of law, 
and the growth of law […] [which] remain the foundation of the legal 
system of every Western people.  
To this, Berman quickly adds: 
It is more than mere coincidence that only now, with the collapse of the 
European system of national states and the rise to power of Russia […] we 
are able to rediscover the unity and continuity of the Western legal 
tradition which modern nationalisms have for so long observed. (Berman, 
1950, p. 121)  
The main purpose was not to define a legal tradition perceptible as Western but 
to make sense of the political world that lay on the other side of the Iron Curtain. 
In Berman’s account, the West and Soviet Russia are in diametrical opposition 
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and hence define each other. Thus, those features that produced Western legal 
evolution are those Russia lacked, and their absence explained the special features 
of Soviet law. 
It would be misleading to look at Berman’s book without keeping in mind 
how powerfully the divide between the West and the East lurked in the back-
ground. Berman’s thesis about the WLT arose from a storage of memories 
whose dominant note was fear—fear about the polarity between Soviet Russia 
and the West, about nuclear destruction, about further military expansion to-
wards the West and the expansion of Communism in the West. Berman tells us 
of Lenin’s theory of a ‘contest of two systems’: ‘in which West and East could 
survive alongside, but without ceasing to determine the class struggle’ (Charter 
77, 1977, p. 119). Such fears materialised in the image of an Iron Curtain, an 
image that gave free rein to imagined threats and to an opposition in which 
Eastern Europe was invented as an intellectually and culturally separate land 
(Judt, 1990). 
Berman’s book tells us that East and West were also separated juristically in 
that they belonged to different legal traditions. In this sense, the Iron Curtain 
influenced the formation of the WLT. It gave rise to a narrative written in re-
action to a very different post-war world in which Westerners saw Easterners as 
their opposite and designed a Western legal identity in contrast to the Eastern. 
This Western identity arose from the acceptance of some fundamental principles 
that were supposedly lacking in Soviet Russia—among which were the rule of 
law, human rights and private property. These principles acquired an unques-
tionable authority by being carried over from generation to generation by 
tradition, which leads us to a natural question, what do we mean by ‘tradition’? 
Rosenstock-Huessy: An outsider ahead of his time 
The essence of Berman’s project is in the two words ‘tradition’ and ‘revolution’ 
in his title Law and Revolution I. The Formation of the Western legal tradition 
(1983) and Law and Revolution II: The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on 
the Western Legal Tradition (2003). They mean first that legal rules must be 
understood as a tradition and, second, that they change in time according to a 
pattern punctuated by successive revolutions. 
This simple idea risks being misunderstood if one is not aware of its philo-
sophical basis, which is to be found in an important and original book, Out of 
Revolution: Autobiography of Western Man, first published in 1938 by Berman’s 
former university mentor Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy (1888–1973). This book 
dismissed the conventional academic historiography practised in Germany and 
generally followed in European universities (Iggers, 2012). This book indicated 
another and captivating approach towards the past consciously based on an 
original philosophical foundation. The aim was to revitalise the vital link of 
history and memory. 
Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy was a learned and highly original German scholar 
who emigrated to the United States in 1933. He first taught at Harvard and then 
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at Dartmouth, where Berman was among his students. He is remembered as a 
compelling teacher and pioneering mind who paid the price for his originality by 
being ignored by academia, as he notes in a sombre conclusive note to his Out of 
Revolution (1938). Today we know Rosenstock through Berman, who refers 
admiringly to him in the introduction to his own Law and Revolution I (1983) 
and in a substantial introduction to Rosenstock’s Out of Revolution. Out of 
Revolution was ahead of its time: first, because its interdisciplinary approach aimed 
at bringing to light the collective memory of the legal past explained through law, 
theology, natural sciences, linguistics and even cartography and numismatics. 
Second, its historical narrative goes backwards: because it is meant to explain the 
intellectual identity of his generation, it begins from the present time moving 
towards the past through successive revolutions, beginning from the Russian 
Revolution down to the French, English, German and Papal revolutions. Third, 
the connective theme of his book, tradition, at that time was unconventional. 
Those who read Out of Revolution: Autobiography of Western Man as a sharp turn 
away from conventional academic history were unquestionably correct. 
In Out of Revolution, Rosenstock-Huessy wanted to offer not only an account 
of European history but also a theory of history: he had a compelling view about 
how history should be understood and made (Rosenstock-Huessy, 1938, 
p. 692). There are two approaches to the past, he argued: one is history, un-
derstood as the academic discipline taught and practised in German universities, 
and the other is memory. This distinction is at the heart of his own attempt to 
capture a viable identity for his generation. It required two bold steps: first, to 
reject the philosophical basis (Cartesian rationalism) upon which the history he 
criticised rested and, second, to seek another approach to understand the past 
based on memory and tradition. 
In this context should be placed the rise of interest for legal tradition as an 
explanatory concept. While today this is one of the standard concepts of legal- 
historical research (Glenn, 2014), the idea of a legal tradition in its progress 
toward acceptance has meant another explanation of law creation that replaced 
the legislative-based idea of sources of law. They are two competing explanations 
of how legal rules come into being, and references to legal traditions surged 
when the sources of law started to be examined critically as an insufficient and 
doubtful explanation of law creation (Calasso, 1954; Jestaz, 2015). 
Rosenstock-Huessy’s major appeal is in a philosophy of history aimed at un-
derstanding and explaining the Western identity. What is the leading force in its 
evolution? How does one explain legal change? Rosenstock replies that the game 
changers are critical moments that impact the human world at its various levels 
(social, economic, legal), and a feature of European history is the number and 
intensity of those turning points. They are waves of changes that invested different 
countries at different times: Bolsheviks in Russia, Jacobins in France, Cromwell in 
England, Luther in Germany, popes in Italy. They are the generative forces that 
recurrently occur, forwarding evolution to the next step. 
Rosenstock-Huessy’s revolutions cannot be separated from his account of 
memory and tradition. In his going backwards from the present to the past, he 
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sees the linearity of time interrupted by crises that are harbingers of new forms of 
consciousness and new ways of thinking and living, then made perceptible in new 
institutions, language modifications, new conceptualisations of time and re-
presentation of space or of reasoning. Revolutions produce semantic shifts and 
new vocabularies. Humans modify and reformulate their language: they are 
name-giving animals who construct their world making use of language: ‘Our 
passions give life to the world, our collective passions constitute the history of 
mankind’ (Rosenstock-Huessy, 1938, p. 3). They arise from a storage of col-
lective memories, as it were. They re-semaniticise their environment, redirecting 
the impulses that govern the flow of information. At the same time, they create a 
web of interactions between present and past in a chain of responses and dia-
logues from which the European tradition is made. 
Along with tradition, the other interface between Rosenstock-Huessy and 
Berman is the reference to revolutions. In Berman, however, the sequence is 
turned upside down. While Rosenstock-Huessy moves backwards from the 
Soviet Revolution to the medieval Papal Revolution, Berman goes forward: his 
account of the WLT begins from the Papal Revolution of the period 
1050–1200. This phase is the one that has attracted the greatest attention by 
far. His thesis focuses on the ‘revolutionary’ impact of the period 1050–1200, 
which he presents as the time that produced the deepest transformations in the 
legal world. The bishops of Rome claimed control over the Church, and their 
newly acquired autonomy from secular powers transformed the legal world. It 
reformulated legal thinking, giving rise to coherent bodies of laws and legal 
studies whose major fruit was the learned legal science of canon and civil law. 
Berman’s thesis was original. Departing from the Romanists’ orthodoxy, and 
particularly from Koschaker, the focus shifted from Roman to canon law. It is 
therefore from religion and canon law that the WLT found its beginning. This 
argument then expanded by including the dissemination of canon law on a 
European scale that included English law (Helmholz, 1996). By turning to 
canon law, Berman broadened legal-historical studies to the interplay between 
the religious and secular component of the law, giving life to the most fruitful 
stream of research (Prodi, 2000; Decock, 2013; Gordley, 2006). Yet in the 
context of this volume, it is notable that Berman’s approach to legal history was 
initiated by a comparison with the East and the West. As Berman himself wrote 
in Justice in the USSR: 
Russian law, therefore, challenges us to rediscover the unity and continuity 
of the Western legal tradition […] to find the link between the political- 
legal and the moral-spiritual aspects of our own heritage. (Berman, 1963, 
pp. 268–269)  
The Western legal tradition and natural rights history 
The period between Berman’s early formulation of the Western legal tradition 
in his 1950 book Justice in Russia and the immensely successful 1983 volume 
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Law and Revolution saw the formula of WLT acquiring currency in a bipolar 
world locked in the strident rivalry between the Soviet bloc and Western 
countries. The WLT represented the West in its essential traits in a way that 
summarised both its identity and emblematically its success in the ideological 
battleground. Of the many themes that made up the WLT, the most compelling 
was that of human rights history, according to a formula that condensed the 
essence of Western identity in a way that transcended earlier references to rights 
tout court, natural rights and the rights of man. 
Samuel Moyn made a case to show how this was a powerful inspirational con-
cept that entered political language with a universal ring and was soon absorbed 
into political consciousness as a centrepiece of political language (Moyn, 2011). 
It spoke of a natural freedom possessed by individuals who were members of a 
moral community of universal nature irrespective of state boundaries. Whereas the 
Truman Doctrine (1947) addressed people with a choice ‘between alternative 
ways of life’—freedom or oppression, control, and terror—human rights presented 
a cosmopolitan vision of a universal humanity, the fruit of an immemorial in-
heritance grown into maturity at a time of stark political confrontation. In the 
latter stages of the Cold War, human rights became a veritable cult object. 
‘America did not invent human rights,’ asserted President Jimmy Carter in 1981, 
‘[i]n a very real sense, it is the other way round. Human rights invented America’ 
(Moyn, 2014, p. XIV). During the bipolar stalemate of the Cold War, human 
rights functioned to identify the moral community that Soviet Russia threatened. 
If in the West they were vital, their absence in the East signalled the perceived 
failure of the Soviet bloc (Moyn, 2014, p. XIX). This was one of the chief features 
that supposedly distinguished the West from Soviet Russia. If human rights made 
America, their absence made Soviet Russia. 
The heated political atmosphere coincided with Berman’s elaboration of his 
thesis about the WLT. As the bipolar mentality of the 1950s had led Berman to 
formulate this notion as a mirror image of the legal tradition of the Soviet Russia, 
his pioneering work inspired a multitude of studies that further derived from that 
fundamental distinction between the East and the West in their attempt to depict 
the past of the contemporary (and politically loaded) dilemmas. From the 1980s, 
the idea of WLT rose to become a prominent field in its own right. Like a 
magnet, it attracted diverse themes that were only briefly outlined in Berman’s 
book. Filling these slots, other scholars supplemented the original narrative with 
additional argumentative blocks, making the concept broader, more persuasive 
and electrifying. One of these expansions was natural rights history. 
What was almost entirely missing from the legal-historical scholarship of 1980s 
was some clarity about the origin of rights: in academic research, it was terra 
incognita.1 Yet this was about to change, and in the consequent debate on the 
natural rights history, the idea of WLT played a significant role by providing the 
strongest possible basis. Few arguments have more impact than a creation in 
immemorial time and an eternal history that has been with us forever. 
In 1988 a Festschrift was published to celebrate Harold J. Berman (The 
Weightier Matters of the Law: A Tribute to Harold Berman). It opened with an 
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essay ‘Villey, Ockham and the Origin of Individual Rights’ by the British- 
American legal historian Brian Tierney (1922–2019), which soon became the 
most cited article in the new field of rights history (Tierney, 1988). The real 
question, according to Tierney, was about ‘the origin of Western rights theories.’ 
By saying this, he manifested his preoccupation not with their essence, but with 
their genesis, which had to be reformulated. Rights were qualified by various 
adjectives (individual, subjective, natural, and modern), but the one that counted 
most was to be ‘Western’ (Tierney, 1988, p. 13). 
Although indicated with a vague denomination, the concept which Tierney’s 
article borrowed from Continental law was extremely precise—droit subjectif, 
diritto soggettivo, Subjectives Recht. In moving from the continent to the new 
Anglo-American home, it acquired some additional features. The first was to be 
presented as the winning argument that defeated the French Romanist and 
philosopher Michel Villey. No effort was spared by Tierney in his piece to an-
nihilate his adversary. As a result, covered by a veil of oblivion, Villey was then 
accurately cited in the ensuing deluge of studies only to remember his defeat in 
that memorable dialectical duel. But to be fair, Tierney and Villey were talking 
about different things: Tierney’s focus was the ‘origin of Western right theories’ 
(Tierney, 1988, p. 13), while Villey’s was the ‘origin of droit subjectif ’ (genèse du 
droit subjectif ), an expression untranslatable in English for the lack of a corre-
sponding concept. They were talking from different disciplines (political theory 
and law); for different purposes (Villey explaining a technical component of 
continental legal systems, Tierney building the core of the WLT); and in different 
languages (English and French). 
Michel Villey (1914–1988) belongs to the group of jurists who wanted to 
reformulate the 19th century intellectual legacy received from the theory-centred 
and hugely influential strand of German legal science, Pandectism. He sought to 
enlarge what he perceived to be a field impoverished by the demise of justice, 
which he believed to be intrinsic to legal science, but at the same time he shared 
the preoccupation of his generation to separate the legal from the interference of 
politics, religion and morality. At the heart of Pandectist systems bequeathed to 
20th century legal science, he saw a foundational idea: droit subjectif. 
The Roman law-based legal systems of continental Europe are designed to 
begin from a basic unit indicated as droit subjectif. This notion serves the fol-
lowing purposes. The first function is explanatory: it explains how individuals 
can create effects in law. Broadly speaking, why is a contract binding (and by 
analogy, a law, a sentence, an administrative act), and why does it create 
obligations? The droit subjectif doctrine answers by imagining an individual 
who exerts will. The main idea is that individuals possess an inner power that 
produces effects of juristic relevance. The second purpose is constructive: the 
creative power in the individual is the starting point for designing the legal 
system conceptually. This idea is deemed to belong to the essentials of con-
tinental legal science, and it has been minutely analysed by an immense mass 
of scholarship and brought to a considerable degree of sophistication by 
19th century Pandectism.2 
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Villey wanted to deactivate the bewitching power of droit subjectif by analysing 
it historically. He looked at the Pandectist constructions of Savigny, Puchta and 
Windscheid searching for their philosophical foundations. He noted that behind 
those constructions, whose source was usually attributed to Grotius, was a spe-
cific philosophy arising from medieval nominalism and suggested that the pri-
mary contributor was the logician William of Ockham. 
The fundamental objection posed by Villey was to denounce that these 
19th century constructions were the fruit of philosophical theories based on the 
view of an abstract individual. They produced systems of droits subjectifs (with its 
corollaries of absolute property, real rights and will theories) and created legal 
institutions whose starting point was an abstract individual, not the many com-
munities in which humans effectively lead their lives, from the family to the natural 
environment. Secondly, such theories, operating at such a level of abstraction, 
produced a sort of legal thinking that expelled justice from the scope of jur-
isprudence. Its ultimate fruits were lists of human rights, comforting declarations 
of good intentions but no more effective than noble and illusionary dreams.3 
In his article, Tierney wanted to take the first and important step in the di-
rection of natural rights history. However, instead of beginning with a clean slate, 
he thought to begin by launching an attack on Villey’s thesis about the origin of 
the droit subjectif. He was disturbed by the suggestion that droits subjectifs could 
be the fruit of the voluntarism and individualism brought about by the resurgence 
of nominalism between the 16th and 17th centuries.4 His article endeavoured to 
antedate the origin to the Papal Revolution of the 12th century, and here he 
leaned on Berman’s account of WLT. As Berman put it: 
Maitland called the twelfth century ‘a legal century.’ It was more than that: it 
was the legal century, the century in which the Western legal tradition was 
formed. (Berman, 1983, p. 120)  
One of the features of the 12th-century Renaissance, according to Berman, was that 
canon law writings ‘permeated the doctrines based on individual intentions and 
individual will in areas like the law of torts, the law of contract, the law of marriage’ 
(Tierney, 1988, p. 135). Prudence would have advised clarifying what the phrase 
‘doctrines based on individual intentions and individual will’ meant, but to Tierney 
that phase seemed the ideal seedbed to nurture the rise of rights doctrines: 
The doctrine of individual rights was not a late medieval aberration from an 
earlier tradition of objective right or of natural moral law. Still less was it a 
seventeenth-century invention of Suarez or Hobbes or Locke. Rather, it was 
a characteristic product of the great age of creative jurisprudence that, in the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries, established the foundations of the Western 
legal tradition. (Tierney, 1988, p. 31)  
Tierney’s attack on Villey’s theory (and on the idea that the origin of natural rights 
was Ockham’s philosophy) was fierce—and questionable.5 The major doubt about 
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the method followed by Tierney is his confidence in relying on a limited set of texts 
to demonstrate such a far-reaching theory as individual rights. Those texts are in 
fact a necessary but not sufficient condition. Texts are one element in a broader 
institutional architecture in which questions of philology, interpretation and 
hierarchical structure determine their effective application. Tierney was in fact 
correct in spotting the difference that divided him from Villey: 
[H]is [Villey’s] prior conviction [was] that major shifts in legal and political 
ideas could occur only after an appropriate pattern of thought had been 
created in the sphere of pure philosophy. (Tierney, 1988, p. 20).  
Legal science operates indeed by proceeding conceptually according to 
changeable philosophical models embedded in a plurality of philosophical di-
mensions. It would therefore be misleading to separate law from the dominant 
philosophies, for example to separate the pre-1650 period from Scholasticism, 
the following period from Rationalism, the 19th century from Kant, the 
20th century from linguistic philosophies, and the 21st century perhaps from 
the philosophy of information. 
Another observation is that the shift from droit subjectif to natural rights 
history in the 1980s signalled the regression of legal science’s boundaries. Droit 
subjectif, a topic originally at the heart of continental legal science, was captured 
by political theorists, translated into a cluster of denominations (individual, 
subjective, natural, modern, Western) and its origins reengineered into an 
eternity history that ironed out the recurrent shifts in philosophical, and hence 
legal, thinking. It is perhaps the case that another shift has occurred, by which 
the self-congratulatory account of a rise of the WLT in a direct line of devel-
opment that indicates both the mythical origin and the way ahead, has lost its 
original appeal. As we learn from recent scholarship, human rights history en-
tered political debates in the 1970s, and it arrived, as Moyn suggests, with ‘a 
recognizably utopian program: for the political standards it champions and the 
emotional passion it inspires’ (Moyn, 2011, p. 1). 
Conclusion: the WLT and the Cold War 
The Western legal tradition arises from the Cold War. Conceived by the Harvard 
legal historian Harold J. Berman in a chapter of his 1950 book on Justice in 
Russia, and then developed in his well-known 1983 and 2003 volumes (and in a 
third left unfinished), since then this idea has been a staple concept to make sense 
of the legal past. 
In his Justice in Russia, Berman wanted to explain to a Western audience what 
lay beyond the Iron Curtain. He constructed his idea of WLT in an account set 
out in opposition in which the West and Soviet Russia define each other in a 
mirror image. The WLT’s almost ubiquitous currency grew from another legacy 
from the Cold War era: human rights history. This chapter shows how the WLT 
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(droit subjectif ) reengineered by political theorists into the major identitary 
element of the WLT in an eternity history rooted in medieval canon law. 
Paradoxically, natural rights history was further used in depicting a future in 
which the world would be something that the East was not. 
The chapter addresses the question of the historical consciousness of legal his-
tory. One of the features of this discipline is that of having forgotten how deeply 
the language with which legal historians think and write about the legal past is 
embedded in ideas rooted in the 20th century. This chapter has attempted to look 
back at those times and to bring to light those ideals and hopes that legal scholars 
invested in the project of the WLT. It also recognises how much of that project 
was the fruit of the fear that marked the bipolar standoff of the Cold War, which 
today we can still glean from Harold J. Berman’s works written at that time. 
My purpose was not to offer an argument about the historical relativism of 
WLT’s identitary narrative. I rather believe that making explicit its formation and 
attempting to understand the role it served then is a necessary step to figuring 
out how it can be transcended. 
Notes 
1 In the 1970s, human rights history was a minor field without adherents or audience. 
To have an idea of the state of the art in this field we must turn to a bibliography ‘On 
the Nature and Foundations of Rights, 1947–77,’ published by the journal Political 
Theory in 1978. It was limited in size (comparable to the bibliography on Hobbes 
studies in the German language published during 1968–1981) and was only partially 
focused on human rights specifically (the requirement for a research field is agree-
ment on the subject matter). It is also worth mentioning that in British universities in 
the 1970s, human rights were taught as one among other rights traditions: one was 
Utilitarianism, centred on Bentham, who described rights as ‘nonsense upon stilts,’ 
while other rights traditions at that time included J. S. Mill, Isaiah Berlin and 
Michael Oakeshott (Gray, 2011). Universalism was not necessarily connected with 
rights. As Moyn wrote, ‘[a] universalism based on international rights could count as 
only one among others in world history’ (Moyn, 2011, p. 13).  
2 Briefly, a definition: the Pandectist Georg Friedrich Puchta (1798–1846) in his 
Lehrbuch der Pandekten defined ‘Recht in subjectiven Sinne’ as follows: ‘A right 
(according to a subjective meaning) is present if an object is given in the Power 
of a Person by the right (according to an objective meaning)’ (ein Recht (im 
subjectiven Sinne) ist vorhanden, wenn ein Gegenstand durch das Recht (in ob-
jectiven Sinne) in die Macht eitner Persongegeben ist.) (Puchta, 1838, p. 30). 
The adjective ‘subjective’ is a legacy of 18th century Scholastic Latin: ‘sub-
jective’ is the attribute to the subject and belongs to its essence, as explained in a 
standard logic textbook published by Isaac Watts in 1725 (Logick, II, ii, §. 8): 
‘Objective certainty, is when the proposition is certainly true in itself; and 
subjective, when we are certain of the truth of it. The one is in things, the other 
is in our minds.’  
3 As we have learned from recent scholarship, the recognition of humanity is not 
guaranteed by being inserted into lists of human rights (Moyn, 2011; Douzinas, 
2000, p. 372).  
4 ‘Seventeenth century thinkers […] were influenced not only by the circumstances 
of their own age but also by an earlier tradition of thought they had inherited’ 
(Tierney, 1989, p. 623). 
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5 The stringent voluntarism upon which Ockham framed his natural law was one of 
the intellectual forms used by 16th–17th century jurists in their thinking, and their 
source was Ockham (Vazquez, Suarez). Moreover, the linguistic philosophy that 
complemented that voluntarism to justify the binding power of human will was 
nominalism, and again their source was Ockham. It is also true that in some 
medieval texts we can read ‘ius’ and ‘habere ius,’ but they do not demonstrate a 
theory of right. ‘Ius’ is a slippery term. Still in late 16th century university teaching, 
students were taught the 36 meanings of the word ‘ius’ (Bolognetti, 1551). On the 
other hand, ‘habere ius’ means several things, one of which is to share a greater 
good, and even today in neo-Latin languages we have the notion of ‘avere ra-
gione,’ ‘tener razon,’ ‘avoir raison’ (to ‘hold’ or ‘have’ reason). In Rome, the 
‘habere ius’ of one who has committed parricide was the right to be thrown into 
the River Tiber in a bag filled with vipers. Other texts presented by Tierney are 
equally questionable. He observes that the divine commandment ‘Honour thy 
father and mother’ can be rephrased by saying that ‘parents have a right to the 
respect of their children’ (Tierney, 1988, p. 33), which is simply a conjecture that 
has been pushed too far.  
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Introduction 
The history of law is situated somewhat ambiguously among other historical 
disciplines. On the one hand, the history of law is a ‘history of something’ (see 
Popper, 1994, pp. 470–471), confined to a particular object and to a discipline- 
specific point of view from which history can be written. On the other hand, law 
is a special ‘something’ for at least two reasons. 
One is the temporality of law, which makes it different from other subjects of 
historical inquiries. Current mathematical knowledge results from a long and 
winding path of historical development, but no awareness of this path is required 
to learn and apply state-of-the-art mathematics. Historical consciousness may 
sometimes be an enhancement, but it is always a luxury. However, historicity is 
inherent to law, at least in its form dominant in the modern West, because this 
form of law states the conditions of its own validity in temporal terms. Legal 
order is a succession of norms, which are either in force, no longer in force, 
replacing each other, or repealing and amending each other. Finding one’s way 
round in this normative nexus requires some form of historical consciousness. 
This brings us to the second reason why law is a specific object of a ‘history of 
something’, namely, its direct connection to political power. History of law 
implies the situatedness of lawmakers. It has a side effect of relativizing and 
historicizing legal orders. While some legal orders, especially democratic ones, 
may be relatively immune to this operation, some others find it too much of a risk 
for their legitimacy to admit that there was a law before them, as that may imply 
that there will be a law after them. 
That the latter point should apply to socialist regimes in Central and Eastern 
Europe after 1917 and 1945 is far from obvious. The Marxist philosophy that 
inspired the official ideology comprised an expressly historicist approach to social 
norms. Even though it insisted on the finality of history, it also posited a long 
succession of changing forms of production, each of them with its own particular 
normative setup. An examination of this historical process was the crux of his-
torical materialism. The history of law should actually thrive under socialism. In 
most cases, however, it demonstrably did not, and one of the reasons was the fact 
that the philosophical and ideological tenet about history ending in communism 
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could not withstand the pressure of detailed analysis of the variety of the laws of 
the past and their political and cultural embeddedness. This objection against the 
history of law would in fact be common to all monocratic systems for which 
pluralism is a threat, even if it is only extending into the past. Incidentally, the 
argument should also work against comparative law: there would be little point 
in comparing socialist countries to one another, as they were all supposedly 
steering towards legal standardization, and the results of any comparison be-
tween a socialist and a capitalist legal order were taken for granted. 
Furthermore, the role that the history of law played in the late 19th and early 
20th centuries should be considered. At the time, in Europe, the history of law, 
especially if we include Roman law, was traditionally a necessary element of legal 
training and an important playfield for debates weighing on the legal reforms at 
the time, both in public and in private law. The political relevance of the history 
of law was indisputable, and so was the role of law as a carrier of national 
identities. In the early modern and modern period, law was ultimately tied to the 
national project and to the model of a nation-state, a connection reinforced by 
the high wave of modern constitutionalism (see Thornhill, 2011). The history of 
law was thus embedded in national history (for Germany, see Haferkamp, 2018). 
It became a natural point of resistance against any form of post-nationalist or 
internationalist modes of thinking. By the same token, the history of law could 
also form a foundation of the identity of the legal profession as a carrier of a 
disciplinary and professional ethos. 
This brief overview of some among the many reasons why legal history could 
not thrive under socialism makes any proof to the contrary valuable. In this 
chapter, I undertake an analysis of the biographical and scientific trajectory of a 
Polish legal historian Juliusz Bardach (1914–2010). He was a scholar of ex-
ceptional standing in a socialist country, a remarkable feat in many ways. Poland 
was not only ‘the merriest barrack in the Soviet camp’, but it was also an ex-
ception from the point of view of academic history (for the socialist period, see 
Connelly, 2000). The old argument, according to which Poland can be treated as 
a mirror of all the problems of Central and Eastern Europe (Garrison Walters, 
1988, p. 170), does not work for the history of law. However, an exception 
makes it possible to triangulate an image of what might otherwise be mistaken 
for a universal course of a social process. The same reasoning applies to Bardach. 
He was not typical or representative—indeed, he was quite the opposite—but his 
biography ‘allows us to follow almost a hundred years of uneasy history of 
Eastern Europe’ (Sokalska, 2017, p. 18). His influence makes Bardach’s case an 
excellent starting point for a study of the vicissitudes of legal history in Poland 
under socialism. The opinion of Henryk Olszewski that ‘almost all historians of 
law in Poland can think of themselves as his students’ (Olszewski, 2010, p. 163) 
is certainly shared by many: ‘[I]n retrospect, Bardach deserves to be called the 
most important figure in the historiography of law in Poland in the second half of 
the 20th century’ (S. Salmonowicz quoted in Zakrzewski, 2016, p. 62). 
Although Bardach’s autobiographical notes remain unpublished (Szlachta, 2014, 
p. 80), it is only a matter of time before he becomes the subject of a full-fledged 
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biography. As Tadeusz Rutkowski observed in his seminal book on political aspects 
of the organization of historical science in Poland in the first 25 years of the 
People’s Republic, biographical studies of Polish historical sciences are still ‘in a bad 
state’ (Rutkowski, 2008, p. 19). However, a number of biographical sketches have 
been published, many of which I cite here. A detailed synopsis of Bardach’s work 
on Lithuanian law by Tomasz Siewierski (2010) is particularly precious for a non- 
specialist. As Rutkowski has pointed out (Rutkowski, 2008, p. 15), there are still 
too few critical monographic works on the history of historical science under so-
cialism, and the same applies to historical-legal science. Nonetheless, a number 
of valuable contributions, first and foremost in Czasopismo Prawno-Historyczne, 
covered some aspects of the development of legal history under socialism and 
after 1989. 
In this chapter, I do not attempt a prosopography of the history of law under 
socialism in Poland. Apart from a few concluding remarks, I do not read 
Bardach’s life’s work as a model for his (or any other) generation or cohort. 
Instead, I suggest reconstructing his contribution to what could be called 
‘the agenda of the history of law’ in Poland after 1945: its general direction of 
research, including the selection of topics and the methodological strategies, 
as well as its relation to other disciplines and to its own disciplinary past 
before 1945. 
Bardach’s life at a historical intersection 
Juliusz Bardach was born into an assimilated Jewish family in Odessa in Russia in 
1914, the oldest son of Mejer Bardach and Ottylia Neuding.1 His father was a 
dentist. In 1922, the family was repatriated to Poland, to Volodymyr-Volynskyi 
(then Włodzimierz Wołyński). At this point, Bardach—according to his hand-
written curriculum vitae attached to his university enrolment file—started to 
learn Polish. At home, he was prepared for the second grade of gymnasium, and 
for six years he attended a public gymnasium in Włodzimierz. In his final grade, 
he changed to a private gymnasium, passed his maturity exam, and in 1933 
enrolled as a law student at the Faculty of Law and Social Sciences of Stefan 
Batory University in Vilnius (then Wilno in Poland). On his registration form, 
Bardach entered his nationality and his mother tongue as Jewish. 
The beginnings of an academic career and the Second World War 
Poland before 1939 had five state universities and more than 20 state and non- 
state academic higher schools (not to mention institutions of religious formation, 
one of them, Chachmei Lublin Yeshiva, among the most renowned in the world) 
(see Bajerski, 2016). In this academic scene, legal science enjoyed an important 
place. The curricula in law were dominated by the Austro-Hungarian model, since 
only in the Austrian partition had Polish been the language of university teaching 
before 1918, which gave the former Austro-Hungarian academics an advantage. 
In 1920, a ministerial ruling introduced a unified university curriculum in legal 
118 Marta Bucholc 
sciences that lasted until the first decade after the war (Wołodkiewicz, 2015). The 
balance between scientific formation and the needs of practical professional 
training was achieved by the domination of theoretical and historical subjects in 
the first two years, including Roman law as a propaedeutic of civil law, legal 
theory, the history of Polish law and state regimes, and the history of law and state 
regimes in Western Europe. From the very beginning, this concept of legal 
education was heavily contested (see Marszał and Srokosz, 2010). 
The high prestige of the history of law as well as its crucial role in academic 
teaching were an incentive for outstanding students. From the beginning of his 
studies, Bardach was a member of the seminar of Polish and Lithuanian law of 
Professor Stefan Ehrenkreutz (1880–1945). Ehrenkreutz would later become 
the last Rector of Batory University; he was a senator of the Polish Republic until 
1938 and, in 1939, he supervised Bardach’s master’s thesis. Bardach also parti-
cipated in seminars of Henryk Łowmiański (1898–1984) and of Wiktor 
Sukiennicki (1901–1983), who had once belonged to the Kelsen Circle in 
Vienna. During his studies, Bardach made a number of intellectual connections, 
which survived the war and proved vital for his later personal ties and his aca-
demic profile. He also became a political activist, a member of the socialist youth 
movement and, after 1935, a member of the Polish Socialist Party (for details on 
Bardach’s student years, see Filaszkiewicz, 2016). 
In 1939, Bardach had to leave Vilnius to escape the Soviets. In 1942, the 
Nazis killed his first wife, his parents, his sister and his uncle’s family, who had all 
remained in Włodzimierz. The only surviving member of the family was Juliusz’s 
brother, Janusz Bardach (1919–2002), who was sent to the Gulag. After the war, 
Janusz emigrated to the United States and made a name for himself as a surgeon 
as well as an author.2 
Having survived in various parts of the Soviet Union until 1944, Juliusz 
decided to join the First Polish Army, organized by the Soviets. He would re-
main in the army for some time, reaching the rank of colonel in the political 
division. Soldiers with the rare benefit of higher education were often placed 
there and given the task of politically educating soldiers, many of whom had very 
little sympathy with Marxist-Leninist ideology. In 1946, Bardach was nominated 
military attaché at the Polish Embassy in Moscow, where he remained until 
1948. He was approached by the authorities of the Faculty of Law of the newly 
established University of Łódź in 1945 as a potential docent. However, the army 
refused to let him go, even though Łódź in post-war times was a political project 
of pivotal importance, including a new people’s university meant to take up the 
space left by the devastated bourgeois Warsaw academia (see Zysiak, 2018). 
Second beginnings 
While still in active service, Bardach obtained a doctorate at the prestigious 
Faculty of Law of the Jagiellonian University in Cracow, based on a dissertation 
on Adoption in Lithuanian Law of the 15th and 16th centuries, which he had 
published in 1938. His supervisor was Professor Adam Vetulani (1901–1976), 
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an excellent specialist in church and canon law (a subject that disappeared 
from university teaching after the war) and the history of Polish law. Olga 
Filaszkiewicz explains that the reason to approach Vetulani was that the original 
supervisor, Ehrenkreutz, died in 1945 (Filaszkiewicz, 2016, p. 94). Vetulani was 
most definitely not a politically correct figure after 1945. Nevertheless, upon his 
return from abroad in 1947 he became the Chair for the History of Polish State 
and Law and later a dean of the Faculty of Law, although he was never a party 
member and for many years was under surveillance by the Secret Service. Bogdan 
Szlachta quotes Bardach remembering his concern that because of his declared 
Marxist views and his pre-war socialist card, he could have been an undesirable 
supervisee for Vetulani, an unwanted addition to ‘his school’ (Szlachta, 2014, 
p. 80). Bardach remained close to Vetulani throughout his academic career, and 
he was one of the eight doctoral students supervised by him who would all 
become law professors. In this way, the influence of Bardach is also a part of a 
larger historical trend. Vetulani was a direct continuator of the 19th century 
‘Cracow school of historians’ (see Mączak, 1993, p. 236; Wandycz, 1992). 
Bardach’s influence would thus be instrumental in extending this school’s impact 
into the 20th and then the 21st century. Vetulani was also known in the West: 
among other things, he received honorary doctorates from Strasbourg and 
Nancy, which he could not receive in person because the authorities would not 
let him travel abroad. Through liaison with Vetulani, Bardach, still a high- 
ranking officer of the People’s Army, would thus become a friend with a person 
of high-bourgeois origin, close to the Church, including the future pope John 
Paul II, Karol Wojtyła, who also studied at Jagiellonian University and was later 
Bishop of Cracow (see Dobra starość…, 2007). Bardach even protected Vetulani 
from a politically and ideologically motivated relocation to Wrocław (cited in 
Szlachta, 2014, pp. 81–82). 
In 1950, Bardach was released from the army with very unfavourable notifi-
cations in his personal file: ‘heard to express views hostile to the Soviet Union’, 
and ‘a pre-war socialist’. An official remark of this kind was a career killer in the 
army. However, as a Marxist researcher, Bardach was good enough for a uni-
versity job (Zakrzewski, 2016, p. 58) and the Faculty of Law of the University of 
Warsaw employed him. 
In my brief history of Polish sociology (Bucholc, 2016), I argued that there 
were two distinct roles that academics with a pre-war education played im-
mediately after the war: survivors and supervisors. The war brought about cat-
astrophic destruction of Polish universities, and two of them, Lwów and Wilno, 
were lost (while Germany lost the university in Breslau to Poland). However, 
those professors and docents who lived through the war, the Holocaust, the Nazi 
and Soviet occupations and the Warsaw Uprising of 1944, or who returned from 
emigration after 1945 were still a significant component of the human resources 
on which the new academia could be based. They brought with them their pre- 
war research agendas, knowledge and international networking capital but also 
intellectual habits and academic ethos. They were survivors themselves, but 
through them and with them the traditions of pre-war university also survived, 
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though sometimes in disguise. Many of the survivors never joined the party, and 
indeed the phenomenon of highest-ranking academics who were not party 
members was one of the particularities of Poland among the Eastern bloc 
countries. However, the survivors were few and moreover, from the point of view 
of the Communist Party, they were too unreliable, even though some of them, 
like the prominent sociologist Józef Chałasiński, seemed genuinely to link their 
fate to that of the new regime early on (see Bucholc, 2016, pp. 20–21). Hence 
the political necessity of politically reliable supervisors. 
Most of the supervisors were recruited from the cohort born in 1920. They 
ensured ideological cohesion, attacked pre-war academics and were quickly in-
cluded in the academic teaching, transmitting the new ideology to their students. 
Many of them would later emigrate and become well-known European scholars, 
like some of the members of the so-called Warsaw school of the history of ideas, 
including Leszek Kołakowski or Bronisław Baczko (see Bucholc, 2017a). 
However, they were naturally themselves educated either before the war or by 
survivors after the war, thus—through a kind of intellectual osmosis—becoming 
carriers of pre-war, bourgeois academic culture and scientific knowledge. The 
‘survivor effect’ translated into very practical things that were far from obvious in 
the academy in the late 1940s and early 1950s: the command of foreign lan-
guages, the experience of travelling abroad for research, the direct or indirect link 
with colleagues in the West and the personal experience of pluralism and free 
debate in science. 
Bardach’s role was initially one of a supervisor, and ‘was often perceived as a 
political imposition on science’ (Salmonowicz cited in Zakrzewski, 2016, 
p. 58). Rutkowski summarized the period of Stalinism at the University of 
Warsaw thus:3 
The years 1949–1955 were a time of strong ideological pressure at the 
University of Warsaw […]. It was followed by personal changes in the 
academic staff, first and foremost at the faculties which were important for 
ideological reasons: Philosophy, History, Law, Political Economy and the 
Faculty of Journalism, which was founded at the end of this period. 
Academics came to them by way of a speedy ‘party’ promotion (including 
Juliusz Bardach, Rafał Gerber, Stanisław Ehrlich, Julian Hochfeld). 
(Rutkowski, 2016, p. 442)  
In the 1950s, Bardach spoke at a number of congresses and symposia, following 
the party line, sometimes using a very sharp tone (Rutkowski, 2008, p. 153). He 
also performed a ‘party lustration’ at the Instytut Zachodni4 in 1952 (Rutkowski, 
2008, p. 226). In the late 1940s, some form of methodological pluralism was still 
in place by sheer force of facts. As Rutkowski points out, commenting on the first 
post-war (and seventh ever) General Congress of Polish Historians in 1948 in 
Wrocław, which was dedicated to the so-called ‘Recovered Territories’ (Ziemie 
Odzyskane)—‘there was next to no Marxist historical scholarship on the 
Recovered Territories’ at the time (Rutkowski, 2008, p. 124). Polish historical 
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science had to learn Marxism as it went along, and the political reinforcement of 
history departments was a necessity. Hence, the interplay of ideology and sci-
ence, a development that was much more complicated than any retrospective 
projection could possibly imagine. To name just one example: Bardach em-
phatically opposed the presence of ‘political Catholics’ in the Instytut Zachodni 
(Rutkowski, 2008, p. 226), but Stanisław Alexandrowicz remembers that it was 
his intervention in 1952–1953 that saved the university job of Brygida Kürbis, 
who was fired because she regularly attended Catholic masses (Alexandrowicz, 
2010, p. 155). Bardach’s argument was the high quality of Kürbis’ scientific 
work, and she did indeed become a history professor herself. 
In 1950, Bardach was, according to Rutkowski, ‘the rising star of party his-
torical science’ (Rutkowski, 2008, p. 153). He was, of course, a party member, 
and even though he underlined his pre-war socialist commitment on many oc-
casions, he did not resign his Communist Party membership until 1990, which 
many others did, especially in 1968 and 1981. In 1950, Bardach became an 
Acting Professor and an Acting Dean of the Faculty of Law as a result of the 
Marxist reorganization of the academia in historical science. In the same year, any 
ties with the Western community of historians were cut and a period of intensive 
party work on the new design of Polish historical science followed (Rutkowski, 
2008, p. 160). In this process of ideological restructuring, the history of law and 
state was perceived as part of the agenda of the Marxist science of history more 
than the Marxist science of law. It was no longer the history of state regime, and 
in 1950 Bardach himself requested the terminological shift from ‘state regime’ 
(ustrój) to ‘state’ (państwo) as better expressing the new Marxist orientation 
(Z prac…., 1950, p. 99). However, already in 1951, he insisted on the relative 
autonomy of the history of law, arguing as follows: 
Just as we cannot separate the legal and state developments from their socio- 
economic basis as it was usually done by bourgeois scholars, we cannot 
reduce the interest in state and legal developments to the study of their base 
or, which also did happen, to the study of the development of the forces of 
production. To replace law with economics, and the history of the state and 
the law with social or economic history would be a vulgarisation of Marxism. 
(Bardach, 1951, pp. 2–3)  
The Thaw and 1968 
The universal cesura of post-war academic and political history alike is, as in the 
Eastern bloc as a whole, the year 1956, which in Poland goes by the name of the 
‘October Thaw of 1956’. The second half of the 1950s was a period of revival in 
Polish intellectual life, of renewing or establishing new contacts in the West and of 
a certain relaxation in ideological rigor. In 1955, Bardach became a university 
professor, and in 1960 an ‘ordinary professor’, employed in the Institute of 
History of Law established in 1952. He also held a post at the Polish Academy of 
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Sciences, where he directed the historical part of the Institute of Legal Sciences. 
As a direct consequence of the Thaw, the contacts between Polish and French 
historians were renewed, and in June 1957, Bardach, as one of three Polish de-
legates, participated in a conference entitled ‘The Days of History of Law’ in Paris 
(Rutkowski, 2008, p. 314). In the 1950s, Bardach joined a number of com-
mittees responsible for preparing a new framework of historical studies in Poland. 
The Thaw did not last long, an ideological offensive was soon relaunched and 
Bardach’s star, one of the brightest immediately after 1956, started to fade. 
Halfway through the 1960s the opinion that he was ‘too liberal’ for the taste of 
the party was established (Rutkowski, 2008, p. 350). By 1967, Bardach lost his 
influence on the political line in science (Rutkowski, 2008, p. 435). In July 1963, 
still a member of the History Section of the Department of Education of the 
Central Committee, he became an object of interest to the Security Service and 
remained so until 1974 (Rutkowski, 2008, p. 435). In 1962, he had to move 
with all his team from the University of Warsaw to the Institute of History of 
Polish Academy of Sciences, directed by the leading medieval historian, Tadeusz 
Manteuffel. There he stayed on until his team was dissolved in 1968. 
The year 1968 is a turning point whose ripple effect in Polish intellectual history 
is far from adequately reconstructed. As a result of the anti-Semitic campaign 
sponsored by the Soviet authorities, a purge was orchestrated by the party with 
little or no social resistance. Student protests at the University of Warsaw in March 
1968, apparently analogous to those in the West, led to the expulsion of student 
leaders. A few professors who supported them were also fired, including Bronisław 
Baczko, Zygmunt Bauman, Włodzimierz Brus, Maria Hirszowicz, Leszek 
Kołakowski, and Stefan Morawski. Most of them would soon emigrate. 
Bardach was one of the supporters of the students’ protests. He was among the 
signatories of a letter to the Minister of Education defending students victimized by 
the security forces after a rally in Warsaw (Rutkowski, 2008, p. 470). His precarious 
situation at the time is reflected in the following words of the rector of the 
University of Warsaw at a meeting in which the crisis at the university was discussed: 
It has been stressed that there is a strong pressure exercised on the part of 
professors on younger academic staff, for example in the Faculty of History 
by Prof. Gerber, Herbst, Manteuffel, in the Faculty of Law by Prof. Ehrlich, 
Katz-Suchy, Maneli, Bardach, and in the Faculty of Philosophy by Prof. 
Szacki, Baczko, Hirszowicz, Morawski. (Cited by Rutkowski, 2008, p. 522)  
In this collection of names Bardach is accompanied by Baczko, Hirszowicz and 
Morawski, who would lose their jobs, but also, among the others, by Jerzy 
Szacki, a historian of ideas and the main representative of the Warsaw School of 
the history of ideas, and by Stanisław Ehrlich, who would soon supervise the 
doctorate of Jarosław Kaczyński, the future leader of the national-conservative 
party Prawo i Sprawiedliwość. 
The year 1968 was a hard blow for the intelligentsia and for the academy. By the 
end of the 1960s, as many as 20,000 persons (the counts vary substantially), 
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Figure 6.1 In 08.03.1968 thousands of students gathered in the courtyard of 
the University of Warsaw in protest against the violations of the 
extraterritoriality of the university. The militia attacked the youth and 
dispersed the demonstration.   
persecuted or discriminated against due to their real or alleged Jewish origins or 
Zionist sympathies, left Poland with one-way travel documents stating that their 
holders were not Polish citizens. Those who did not emigrate were harassed and 
intimidated, and a deep re-organization of academic life followed. Bardach’s team 
at the Polish Academy of Sciences was dispersed and the director himself was fired 
from the Academy. In his farewell speech, he stated his outrage at the scale of 
personnel changes in scientific institutions and journals, and he declared that the 
circumstances of 1968 reminded him of the ‘worst methods of Stalinism’ 
(Rutkowski, 2008, p. 499). The Security Service recorded the speech. However, 
Bardach remained a professor at the University of Warsaw, and he was neither 
removed from the party nor isolated from the international historical community, 
even though in 1970 during the XIII International Congress of Historical Sciences 
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in Leningrad, Polish authorities recommended him especially to the attention of 
the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti, the Soviet Committee for State 
Security (KGB) (Rutkowski, 2008, p. 532). 
Public appreciation after 1989 
Bardach lived through the Russian Revolution, two World Wars, the communist 
takeover in Poland and the many ups and downs of the Polish socialist state 
ending in the transformation of 1989. His life passed at a historical intersection 
between the East and the West, between the old imperial Europe of the 19th 
century, the totalitarianisms of the 20th and the new turn towards the West after 
the fall of the Eastern bloc. After 1989, Bardach as a senior scholar enjoyed 
public acknowledgment of his work and person. He obtained three honorary 
doctorates, two from Polish universities, Łódź (1995) and Warsaw (1996),5 
followed by the University of Vilnius (1997). Jagiellonian University celebrated a 
renewal of his doctorate in 1999. Bardach, who had been decorated many times 
in his army days, received a number of civilian honours and awards after 1989, 
including the Grand Cross of the Order of Polonia Restituta (2002) and the 
Order for Merits to Lithuania (2006). He was also honoured by many festschrifts 
(the last one on his 90th birthday). 
Bardach lived in Warsaw until his death in 2010. In 2013, an award named 
after him was funded by the Institute of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in Kaunas 
(Szlachta, 2014, p. 84). In many eulogies, he was remembered by his colleagues, 
as well as by his students and supervisees, many of whom belonged to the elite of 
Polish historians. 
Bardach’s oeuvre and how to understand it 
Bardach insisted that narrow specialization is not advisable in science. It would 
be neither possible nor necessary to characterize his large oeuvre in full (for a 
discussion in Polish, see Olszewski, 2010; Siewierski, 2012; Zakrzewski, 2016), 
but an overview of the most relevant features is crucial for an understanding of 
Bardach’s role in the formation of the agenda of legal history in Poland. 
The Lithuanian connection 
The most remarkable aspect of Bardach’s work is his lifelong study of Lithuanian 
law, in which he became the best-known specialist in Europe next to Łowmiański 
(Olszewski, 2010, p. 162). When still a student, he gave a talk on Lithuanian law 
at the General Congress of Polish Historians in Vilnius in 1935, and in 1938 he 
published a dissertation on adoption in the Lithuanian law. His warm feelings for 
Lithuania were born in his student days in Vilnius and never ceased throughout 
his lifetime. These sentiments were as useful as they were genuine: they were in 
line with Ehrenkreutz’s seminar and it was an established area of research at the 
Stefan Batory University. The importance of Lithuanian law and in particular of 
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the Lithuanian statutes for legal developments in Eastern Europe was an addi-
tional argument: in the early 1930s, it was neither an exotic interest nor a 
marginal one. Moreover, studies on the legal traditions of Poland-Lithuania were 
of great political relevance in the 1930s, and to pick Lithuania as a subject of 
research might have been at the time a good career move. 
This was less the case after 1945. Poland-Lithuania, a sworn enemy of the 
Grand Duchy of Moscow was, after all, a feudal state that ruthlessly suppressed its 
peasantry, so its laws would hardly deserve much attention unless as an 
illustration of the tenets of Marxist philosophy. However, Bardach’s initial pre- 
war research was, in fact, far from it. In his work on adoption, he set out to 
document the existence of adoption as an institution of customary law, pointing 
out that even though it was not regulated in the statutes it was a part of everyday 
legal practice. It was not only a study in customary law (see Siewierski, 2012, 
p. 109): Bardach’s analysis went in the direction of the historical study of ‘living 
law’ (lebendes Recht) à la Eugen Ehrlich and it proved a far-reaching independence 
of socially generated normative order from the statutory ‘law in books’. 
In all Bardach’s work on Lithuania, he stressed the independence and originality 
of Lithuanian law and the fact that it was never ‘colonized’ (my term) by Polish 
tradition. This was, again, a double-edged argument: on the one hand, it went 
against pre-war and pre-partition Polish nationalism; on the other hand, it docu-
mented the longstanding independent legal tradition of Lithuania (then a Soviet 
republic). Conscious of this ambiguity, Bardach opposed nationalistic interpretations 
of Lithuanian legal history. Siewierski (2012) remarks that a paper that deserves 
attention in this context is Bardach’s review of a book by a Lithuanian historian Jonas 
Žmuidzinas published in Paris in 1978 under the title Commonwealth polono- 
lithuanien ou l’Union de Lublin (1569). In the review, Bardach insisted on the 
multifaceted, historically informed use of the notion of nationhood (see also 
Bardach, 2009). Bardach’s interest in Lithuania was not popular with the communist 
authorities: in 1969, during the 10th General Congress of Polish Historians in 
Lublin, Bardach’s presentation on the Polish-Lithuanian Union of Lublin was 
downgraded from a plenary lecture to an ordinary session (Zakrzewski, 2016, p. 60). 
Bardach never prepared a comprehensive history of Lithuanian law, but among 
his 637 publications the Lithuanistic part (more than 120 according to Andrzej 
Zakrzewski, 2016, p. 59) is the largest coherent corpus, pertaining not only to 
the law but also to culture and the political history of the land, not only as a part 
of the union with Poland.6 Some of these works were written before the war and 
the vast majority after 1956. Many of them were translated into foreign lan-
guages, mostly French and Russian, but also Lithuanian, Belarusian, Italian, 
Ukrainian, English and Flemish. 
History of the Polish state and law 
Bardach’s magnum opus reflected an encyclopaedic inclination shared by some of 
his contemporaries (see Sułek, 2012). It was a five-volume synthesis of the his-
tory of the Polish state and law, the first volume of which was dedicated to the 
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period before the 15th century and which Bardach authored himself while at the 
same time acting as an editor for the whole work. Five volumes published in 
Warsaw between 1957 and 19827 cover the history of Polish state regimes and 
law, including public law, private law and procedure, until 1939. It is still a 
standard reference work, with an outreach far exceeding the field of legal history. 
That the ambition to carry out such a far-reaching project became realizable at 
this very point bespeaks a need to synthesize the science of legal history based on 
new Marxist premises. On the other hand, it also indicates that there was a 
continuity between the pre-war efforts and the developments in the socialist 
historiography of law. In particular, Bardach contributed significantly to the 
study of Polish parliamentarism in the early modern and modern period, whose 
development he depicted with great attention to the internal logic of a form of 
polity, which developed parallel to the Western representative monarchies but 
under very different political and cultural conditions. The grand synthesis partly 
resulted from Bardach’s teaching duties, and one additional product of this effort 
was a handbook Historia państwa i prawa polskiego, co-authored by Bardach, 
Bogusław Leśnodorski and Michał Pietrzak, which was first published in 1976. 
The book was reprinted, revised and republished several times until 2009. As a 
result, for more than 30 years Bardach’s work remained a standard handbook 
for law students in courses on Polish history, whose share in legal education 
gradually sunk after 1989, in line with the turn to ‘dogmatic’ aspects of law. 
Disciplinary ethos, methodology and the problem of periodisation 
In socialist Poland, the history of law was not separated from history in general, 
and legal historians played crucial roles in institutional historical science 
(Rutkowski, 2008, p. 14). Their impact seems, indeed, to have been stronger in 
history than in legal science. This is probably because in Poland—as opposed to 
certain other academic traditions—legal historians would usually specialize in the 
history of law only, doing little scholarly work in dogmatically oriented branches 
of law and not engaging in teaching beyond the historical subjects. 
Bardach perceived historical-legal sciences as an interdisciplinary field, ‘whose 
particular vocation it is to use its research techniques and its own approach to 
enrich both legal and historical science’ (Bardach, 2001, p. 33). Even though 
this quote comes from a late paper, it does summarize Bardach’s disciplinary 
attitude throughout his life rather well: he felt comfortable between epochs, 
languages and discourses (see Zakrzewski, 2016, pp. 60ff ). 
One particular feature of Bardach’s general philosophy of legal historical re-
search was his appreciation of the role of culture (Olszewski, 2015, p. 16). This 
was particularly evident in his attention to legal language and its link to vernacular 
languages. He was a student of ‘travelling concepts’ avant la lettre, and he en-
dorsed the main tenet of this approach in today’s cultural studies (see Bal, 2002), 
according to which the use of concepts and their transformations are part of 
cultural practices and cannot be separated from them. Particularly his work on the 
reception of law and on the comparative method belong to this field, in which he 
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consciously traced the pathways of legal institutions, concepts and terminologies. 
The attention to customs, uses and habits—including linguistic habits—continued 
from pre-war times, and in his later work Bardach insisted that the history of law 
forms the core of socio-legal studies, which cannot put culture aside (Olszewski, 
2015, p. 17). This, in turn, made his stance problematic from the point of view of 
orthodox Marxist historiography: already in the 1950s, Bardach opposed the view 
that law was ‘detached from general culture’ and stressed continuities between the 
law and culture of Poland in various historical epochs (Olszewski, 2015, p. 17). In 
this manner, he did incorporate the dangers of the history of law to Marxism as a 
political ideology. Despite his self-declared commitment to Marxist methodology, 
his research was concerned with the historical and cultural contingencies of law 
and not with its determination by the forces of production and class struggles. 
Against this culturalist interpretation of Bardach’s work, an argument could be 
raised that he remained very much focused on the problem of periodization, 
particularly in the history of the Polish state and Polish representative government. 
The focus on periods of development as relatively closed units of historical progress 
was typical for Marxist historiography seeking finality and determination in the 
succession of phases. Rutkowski cites a significant clash between Polish and Soviet 
legal historians at a conference held in Poland in 1952, where Bardach himself 
reported a vivid discussion with Soviet guests, who very sharply criticized the 
‘negativist’ vision of periodization presented by one of the speakers pleading for 
different periodizations for different socioeconomic formations. The Soviet guest, 
Arkady Sidorov, opted for a ‘monist’, linear and universalist model of periodization 
as the only one compatible with historical materialism (Rutkowski, 2008, p.196). 
Bardach adhered to the party line in this respect, but already in 1949, quoting 
Lenin, he argued that ‘each division, each periodization is an attempt to impose a 
certain scheme, to divide the existing unity of history for our cognitive purposes’ 
(Bardach, 1949, p. 23) and that it was in full accordance with historical materi-
alism. Bardach’s influence on the periodization of history of the Polish state, 
combined with his role as editor-in-chief of an encyclopaedic synthesis, was de-
cisive and has only relatively recently been challenged (Zakrzewski, 2016, p. 59). 
Olszewski thus characterized Bardach methodological stance: 
Juliusz Bardach created his workshop over decades. He construed it on the 
go, in the course of researching specific subjects. He did not think of himself 
as a methodologist of scientific research. His methodological texts were not 
conceived of as ambitious preaching on how historians of law should do 
their research, but they emerged as a result of years-long, persistent, in- 
depth studies of sources. (Olszewski, 2015, p. 24)  
There is an analogy here between Bardach and the historians of ideas from the 
Warsaw school. They remembered the role of methodology in their discussions, 
and to an extent also in their work, as marginal and ancillary (see Bucholc, 
2017a): their method was dictated by the subject and was, in the sense of Paul K. 
Feyerabend, ‘opportunistic’. From this point of view, Bardach’s statement of 
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1955, according to which ‘the history of the state and law has no method of its 
own’ (Historia… 1955, p. 3), is probably more than just lip service to the 
Marxism of the age. 
Numerous miscellanea, including the problem of Roman law 
Bardach’s work included a large variety of miscellanea. One important section of 
this work were his biographical essays, most of which were dedicated to im-
portant figures in Polish 19th century historiography (Olszewski, 2015, p. 23). 
He also honoured many of his friends and colleagues with eulogies and mem-
ories. Olszewski interprets this as resulting from his conviction that science needs 
great personalities. However, it could also be seen as a commitment to the 
disciplinary tradition of history, which was also a national scientific and in-
tellectual tradition, predating both the independent modern Polish state and 
socialism. Bardach’s biographical essays may be indicative of a sense of belonging 
to a historically continuous community of scholars, and it may also be seen as a 
self-legitimizing effort: remembering is an instrument of inclusion. This focus on 
national tradition was common to many scholars of the time, including in par-
ticular Szacki (see Bucholc, 2017b). The feeling that tradition was not sum-
marized in a satisfactory manner, that it was, in a way, left free-floating by the 
ideological turn after 1945, seems to have been pervasive in socialist Poland. It is 
somehow telling of the general climate in academia that this feeling evolved into 
reconstructive and commemorative projects initiated by scholars once affiliated 
with the Marxist party vanguard in their respective disciplines. 
One other section of Bardach’s miscellanea was Roman law. He dedicated 
little attention to this branch of historical legal studies, but in 1999, he published 
Statuty litewskie a prawo rzymskie.8 This book was a critical commentary to the 
new edition of the Lithuanian statutes, and it is, as far as can be confirmed based 
on the available bibliographies, the only major reference to Roman law in 
Bardach’s oeuvre. It was a continuation of work started before 1939: Bardach 
remembered that Ehrenkreutz held a talk on the influence of Roman law on the 
Lithuanian statutes at a conference in 1935 in Vilnius, and he appointed Bardach 
as a discussant of his paper (Bardach, 2016, p. 521). 
The position of Roman law in Polish socialist universities was marked by an 
interesting ambivalence. Some authors insist that the communist takeover with 
its subsequent law-making did in fact destroy the pre-war legal tradition in 
Poland as it did in other socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (see 
Kühn, 2011). However, the continued presence of Roman law as an important 
element in this tradition would be an argument to the contrary. Church law and 
canon law vanished from universities immediately after the war, sharing the fate 
of theology. Witold Wołodkiewicz cites a discussion during the First All-Polish 
Conference of Legal Historians in 1950, when Rafał Taubenschlag overtly stated 
that he ‘did not see any chance for Roman law to develop in Poland’ apart from 
legal papyrology and the studies of influence of Roman law on Polish law 
(Wołodkiewicz, 2012, p. 209). 
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But Roman law—though criticized heavily by the new authorities—held on. 
Moreover, in the 1950s, Latin was still perceived as a must for law students, even 
those taking advantage of a speedy educational track created after the war to 
make up for the decimation of legal professions in the years 1939–1945 
(Olszewski, 2017, p. 39). During the many reforms of university curricula, 
Roman law was reduced alongside other historical subjects and was perceived as a 
course of less and less propaedeutic value. Nevertheless, in the years 1944–1975, 
Roman law was taught throughout the land (see Czech-Jezierska, 2015). In the 
reform of 1975, however, based on the project of Bardach’s student Jan 
Baszkiewicz, Roman law was combined with other historical subjects and sepa-
rate lectures on Roman law were abandoned, which antagonised many legal 
historians (Wołodkiewicz, 2012, p. 210). In the 1980s, Roman law was re-
instated as a subject in its own right, only to become subject to quite new adverse 
pressures after 1989. Throughout the socialist period, there was both human and 
intellectual capital in the field of Roman law in Poland, but Bardach’s connection 
to this field was weak. For example, among the many personages he wrote about 
as a biographer or a friend there was not one Romanist. A passionate reviewer, he 
wrote only one review of a book on Roman law (more precisely, about its in-
fluence in Poland) (Bardach, 1991). 
While the division of labour in the history of law after 1945 continued the pre- 
war categorizations, the stress on Roman law and ancient law in the research 
agenda gradually weakened. A quantitative study of the contributions to the 
most important historical-legal journal published in Polish, Czasopismo Prawno- 
Historyczne, since the 1990s, shows that Romanist papers were a thematic 
minority, with more than six times fewer contributions than Polish legal history, 
but also twice fewer than universal legal history and the history of legal and 
political doctrines and also almost twice fewer than various miscellanea 
(Materniak-Pawłowska and Krzymkowski, 2018, pp. 349–350). Roman law 
seems to have fallen victim to ideological considerations much more than any 
other branch of history of law. 
Vicissitudes and serendipities 
In the very tentative and incomplete balance of Bardach’s biography and oeuvre, 
there are a few elements that have been given relatively little attention in the existing 
scholarship. The first of them is Bardach’s Jewish origins. As Olena Sokalska re-
marked (Sokalska, 2017, p. 14): ‘It is ironic to note that in Poland, it is often only 
after the death of an eminent Pole that two things about him are noticed: that he 
was eminent and that he was Jewish.’9 While in some biographical notes he is de-
scribed as coming from a Jewish or Polish Jewish family, in many others it is not 
mentioned at all. Bardach was included in a publication edited by Wiesław Kozub- 
Ciembroniewicz on scholars of Jewish origins at the Jagiellonian University with a 
very informative biographical essay by Bogdan Szlachta (2014). However, in this 
essay, apart from the first sentence of the biography, there is no mention of 
Jewishness as a factor in Bardach’s life or career, even though the very nature of the 
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publication seems to suggest that gathering a number of scholars under the same 
heading was dictated by the perceived salience of the criterion. Bardach’s Jewish 
origins almost certainly played a role in his life after 1945 at least once, in 1968, but 
even in the narratives of this year, it is not mentioned at all. As far as publications are 
concerned, Bardach wrote one article in which the legal situation of Jews was dis-
cussed (Bardach, 1990, translated into French and English), and in 1989 he re-
viewed one book on the history of Jews in Poland in the 17th–18th centuries. Too 
little information is available precisely to assess the impact of Bardach’s Jewish ori-
gins on his work or career, but the same factor played a key role in the biographies of 
many of his contemporaries in various scientific disciplines. Any prosopography of 
Polish legal historians should take this into account to ensure correspondence and 
synergy with studies in intellectual and academic history in Poland and in Central 
and Eastern Europe in general. 
Another factor, which is definitely understated, is that Bardach was a native 
speaker of Russian. This aspect is not discussed in any of his biographies or 
eulogies cited here apart from one, by Stanisław Alexandrowicz: 
I was particularly impressed by Juliusz Bardach during the joint meetings of 
Polish and Soviet historians. (…) During the sessions, the interventions by 
Prof. Bardach as a speaker, and even more as a discussant, were always very 
much to the point, and they were also bold. (…) Professor was able to 
conduct a polemic with the Soviet colleagues, very intelligently, but also in a 
very civil and diplomatic manner. In this, he spoke excellent literary Russian, 
more pre-revolutionary than Soviet. In view of his unusual tactfulness, his 
criticisms were never directly repudiated. (Alexandrowicz, 2010, p. 155)  
An excellent command of Russian was not, by and large, a unique feature in 
academia, but it was not a universal feature either, and it was certainly a sig-
nificant cultural asset. Among the historians educated in Poland before 1939, the 
orientation to the West was self-explanatory, which entailed a command of 
Western languages, in particular French and German.10 Russian was not a lan-
guage of Polish historical science, apart from specialists in thematic fields where it 
was relevant. It does not take much to realize that a person capable of using an 
‘excellent’ Russian would find it much easier to display tact and diplomatic skills 
in difficult talks with Soviet partners. 
The part of Bardach’s work published in Russian has been underplayed in 
recent accounts, and the focus is mostly on his many ties to Western academia 
and on his recognition in the West to which his numerous memberships and 
affiliations attest.11 However, he was also a regular member of various com-
mittees of socialist historians, in which Soviet academics played varying but 
important roles. Even though Polish historiography has liberated itself from full 
dependence from the Soviets since 1955 (Rutkowski, 2008, p. 265), it did not 
mean a break of bilateral and multilateral contacts and coordination within the 
Eastern bloc. 
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Bardach’s bibliography shows 11 books, articles and chapters published in 
Russian (including translations from Polish), at least 5 of them published after 
1989, and 11 reviews of books published in Russian, some of them after 1989 
and representing a wide range of topics. A few papers on the state of historical 
science in the USSR, on the debates with Soviet historians and on Soviet his-
toriography, as well as eulogies for Soviet historians,12 also form a part of this 
category, only outnumbered by works in French (over 50, including, however, 
only one aforementioned review of a book published in French). It is important 
to realize that the connection to Soviet academia was the only viable Eastern 
connection for a socialist historian before 1989 and that it was critical in the 
1950s, which was also the formative period of Bardach’s career. For example, in 
1955 he was a representative of Polish historical sciences delegated to discuss the 
publication in Russian of a comprehensive history of Poland prepared by Soviet 
historians (Istorija Polszi), a debate in which Polish historical science took a 
critical stance concerning the Soviet view of Polish history, albeit phrased with 
the usual lip service to Soviet colleagues (see Rutkowski, 2008, p. 263ff).13 That 
Bardach was not unilaterally westward looking was an important asset for the 
new institutionalization of the history of law.14 
Conclusion 
Bardach’s impact on the agenda of the history of law in socialism was complex and 
multidimensional, though not easy to measure in an exact manner. In the 1950s, 
he held a key position as a party scholar in determining the new organizational 
forms and research directions for Marxist historical science in Poland. In the 
1960s, he lost much of his political influence, but he remained an established 
author, able to travel abroad much easier than many of his colleagues, well con-
nected both in the East and in the West, keeping in touch with Soviet historical 
science while making a name for himself in Western international organizations 
and institutions. His work was largely a continuation of pre-war research agendas 
via direct personal links. He combined his commitment to the pre-socialist science 
of history, including its relative methodological openness and interdisciplinarity, 
with a focus on certain typically Marxist research topics, in particular on period-
ization. He was a very well-connected historian, an editor and an author of much- 
used reference books. In Bardach, the history of law gained a valuable asset in its 
constant interplay with historical science, but much less so in legal science, which 
contributed to its distancing from other branches of legal science. 
Bardach’s biographical trajectory shares certain transdisciplinary patterns 
observed in socialist academia. His status as a supervisor combined with the 
possibility that he was indeed a ‘survivor in disguise’. It was not unusual in 
scholars born between 1910 and 1919 who seem to have been affected by a kind 
of a post-factum ‘generational underdeterminacy’. Those born before 1910, like 
many of those with whom Bardach kept crossing paths constantly, including, for 
example, the influential sociologist and historian of ideas Nina Assorodobraj- 
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Kula (1908–1999), managed to finish their education well before the war and to 
take the first steps in their academic careers according to the European pre-war 
model, the memories of which they then carried on as survivors of bourgeois 
academic culture. Those born in the 1920s had no pre-war academic formation 
themselves; they were open to academic Marxism, predestined to play the role of 
supervisors of ideological takeover. They would include future revisionists like 
Leszek Kołakowski (1927–2009) or Zygmunt Bauman (1925–2017). 
This generational mechanism was somehow reflected by the consequences of 
March 1968. Rutkowski wrote: 
The effect of the March events was a takeover of the main role in historical 
science by historians of the younger generation, born at the turn of the 
1920s and 1930s. Some of the scholars whose scientific activity culminated 
in the 1940s and 1950s, whose position was an established one, were pushed 
aside from the mainstream of state politics. They were tolerated because of 
their work and their position abroad, their functions at the universities and 
in foreign institutions, but they were treated with suspicion, so they were 
removed from influencing decisions in matters of science. This referred, 
among the others, to Juliusz Bardach (…). (Rutkowski, 2008, p. 589)  
Younger historians who did not fall for the charms of revisionism and were loyal 
to the system made a speedy advance after 1968. Survivors—some of 
them—managed to survive, but their impact was meagre to the extreme apart 
from direct personal influence on their immediate students and colleagues. 
Bardach, who by his birthdate would qualify as a survivor, started his academic 
path with an almost five-year delay due to his army service, and it put him in an 
in-between position. He was established enough by 1968, but he was not con-
sidered trustworthy as a party scholar after that. This might have been a blessing 
for his work: he was no longer working on the ideological frontline. His scientific 
biography demonstrates the involvement of legal history in political, academic, 
cultural and intellectual agendas over the timespan of more than six decades. 
It also demonstrates the pivotal importance of an understanding of these agendas 
for a fuller grasp of what the history of law was and could be under socialism. 
Notes 
1 The biographical information in this section is based on the following: 
Filaszkiewicz (2016); Rutkowski (2008), p. 153; Olszewski (2010); Siewierski 
(2010) (2012); Szlachta (2014); and Zakrzewski (2016) as well as two scans of 
Bardach’s admission documents from Stefan Batory University (a handwritten 
curriculum vitae and an enrolment form), kindly made available to me by Olga 
Filaszkiewicz, to whom I am very grateful. 
2 His memories were published by the University of California Press in two vo-
lumes: Man Is Wolf to Man: Surviving the Gulag (1999) and Surviving Freedom: 
After the Gulag (2003) (both volumes together with Kathleen Gleeson).  
3 My translation. 
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4 A research institution established in 1944 to study the history of Polish-German 
relations, especially in the Recovered Territories.  
5 Bardach received his PhD from Jagiellonian University; therefore, despite being a 
professor at the University of Warsaw, he was eligible for an honorary doctorate 
from the same.  
6 Bardach’s bibliography is available on the website of the Institute of History of 
Law of the Faculty of Law, University of Warsaw: http://bibliografia.ihp.wpia. 
uw.edu.pl/biblio2.php (retrieved December 17, 2019).  
7 J. Bardach, Historia państwa i prawa Polski do połowy XV wieku, Warsaw 1957; 
Z. Kaczmarczyk, B. Leśnodorski, Historia państwa i prawa Polski od połowy XV 
wieku do 1795 roku, Warsaw 1957; Od rozbiorów do uwłaszczenia, J. Bardach, M. 
Senkowska – Gluck (eds.), Warsaw 1981; K. Grzybowski, Od uwłaszczenia do 
odrodzenia państwa, Warsaw 1982; Historia państwa i prawa Polski 1918–1939, 
F. Ryszka (ed.), cz. 1–2, Warsaw 1962, 1968. 
8 In 1997, Bardach published a paper on the same subject, ‘Wpływ prawa rzyms-
kiego na Statuty litewskie oraz ich oddziaływanie na kraje sąsiednie’ in the journal 
Lituania (1–2/1997, pp. 12–36).  
9 ‘У Польщі іронічно зауважують: часто лише після смерті видатного поляка стає 
відомо про нього дві речі, що він був видатний і що він був єврей.’ 
10 In 1936 and 1937, Bardach reviewed of two volumes of a book by G. Wirschubski, 
Das Strafrecht des Litauischen Statuts, for the journal Ateneum Wileńskie 
(1936, vol. 11, pp. 516–518, and 1937, vol. 12, pp. 604–606).  
11 He was a member of Société Jean Bodin and Société d’Histoire du Droit, as well 
as of Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei (since 1974) and Accademia Mediterranea 
delle Scienze (since 1982). He was also a Vice President of the Commission des 
Anciens Pays et Assemblées d’Etats et du Parlamentarisme and was President 
of the Commission for Slavonic Studies of the International Committee of 
Historical Sciences (1980–1985).  
12 Including Boris Grekov, Lev Tcherepnin, Vladimir Pashuto, S. Youshkov.  
13 A review, co-authored by Bardach, S. Arnold and S. Kieniewicz, of the first 
volume of this book was published in Polish in 1954 (Kwartalnik Historyczny 
1954, No. 4, pp. 222–233) and in Russian (authored by Bardach alone) in 1955 
(‘Wiestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR’ 1955).  
14 Another trajectory of disciplinary development is shown by sociology, which did 
not have a comparable asset to legitimise a turn to the East—and avoided this 
turn almost entirely (see Bucholc, 2016).  
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	7 Valdemārs Kalniņš 
(1907–1981) 
The founder of Soviet legal history  
in Latvia 
Sanita Osipova   
Introduction 
In natural sciences, existing knowledge is fundamentally revised only in the light 
of new scientific findings. This is certainly the case in biology, physics, chemistry, 
and astronomy. However, history, including the history of law, belongs to the 
humanities, and the message it communicates can be exploited, among other 
things, for political purposes. Raymond Aron viewed history as an ever-evolving 
time-linked myth (Aron, 2000, p. 480). Like myths, the stories that are part of 
history can be told in different ways, with certain facts brought to the fore and 
others concealed, with past events construed or falsified. Events of the past have 
an impact on an individual’s worldview as, in the process of socialisation, they lay 
the foundations for the individual’s national identity as well as his or her un-
derstanding of the state, justness, or historical injustices that need to be repaired. 
In telling history to a nation, the teller shapes its identity, national identity being 
a historical-cultural phenomenon (Smits, 1997, pp. 6–7). By altering the nar-
rative of past events, we can influence the minds of society. By means of history, 
the existing order, power, state, and law can be rendered illegitimate or, con-
versely, legitimised in the public consciousness and the values prevailing in so-
ciety can be changed. That is the reason why history, unlike the natural sciences, 
has undergone ‘rewritings’ not only on account of new scientific developments 
but also for political reasons, with the change of the ruling ideology and power. 
The development of Latvian legal history from the 19th to 
the mid-20th century 
Latvian legal history as it has been recorded in the works of legal historians since 
the 19th century is itself worth a serious study. Depending on the ethnicity 
(nationality) of the historian, on the state to which the territory of Latvia be-
longed in a particular period, and on the ruling ideology of that period, the same 
historical facts and sources of law are either emphasised or concealed, as well as 
interpreted in directly opposite ways. This explains why legal history books 
housed in Latvian libraries give drastically different ideas of the nature and social 
implication of law that used to be in force in the Latvian territory. The following 
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schools of legal historians can be identified as having studied the legal history of 
Latvia from different perspectives and using different methodologies.  
1 In the 19th and early 20th century, interest towards the history of law was 
maintained by the historical school of jurisprudence (Lazdiņš, 2006, 
pp. 21–23). During this period, studies were mainly carried out by Baltic 
German historians of law, who viewed the history of Baltic law as part of 
German legal history (Meļķisis, 1998, p. 1).1 This was because Livonia was a 
vassal state of the German Empire and also because it was the Baltic 
Germans who constituted the elite of the Russian Empire’s Baltic 
‘Governorate’ (Guberniya), and the German language was a state 
language there until the last quarter of the 19th century. One of the more 
widely known Baltic German historians of law was Friedrich Georg von 
Bunge (1802–1897) (Lazdiņš, 2000, p. 12). 
However, during this period, alongside the Baltic Germans’ efforts in 
studying the local law as part of the German legal culture, scholarly activity 
was also carried out by Russian legal historians. In their studies, especially at 
the end of the 19th century, after the Empire had been centralised and the 
policy of Russification had begun, they emphasised the historical presence 
and influence in the Baltics of Russian, or, at least, Slavic legal culture and 
Eastern Orthodox Christianity.2 Thus, matters of Latvian legal history were 
mainly discussed between German and Russian scholars (Lazdiņš, 2000, 
pp. 10–19). Moreover, Latvia itself did not yet exist at that time, as the 
territories populated by Latvians, which would be united into a state in 
1918, were divided into various governorates of Russia.  
2 Latvian legal culture and its history were studied at a qualitatively new level 
and in the 20th century time with support from the national state in the 
Republic of Latvia, during the period between the two World Wars. It was in 
this period, after the Latvian people had established their state, that the 
foundations of Latvian legal history were laid. A substantial contribution to 
the studies of Latvian legal history was made in the inter-war years of the 20th 
century by Arveds Švābe (1888–1959)3 and Vasīlijs Sinaiskis (1876–1949) 
(Kovaļčuka and Eļtazarova, 2009, pp. 12–13). The notion of Latvian legal 
history, as formed by the Baltic German lawyers, was revised. Jānis Straubergs 
writes the following with respect to the revaluation of history: 
Every major work in the field of Latvian history has to come up against 
certain traditions shaped by the German historians, and to face the 
skepticism with which the departure from those traditions is received. 
(Straubergs, 1936, p. 5).  
The development of legal history as a scholarly discipline was still influenced by 
the historical school of jurisprudence (Lazdiņš, 2006, pp. 41–42). However, in 
contrast to the studies by Baltic Germans, who had been emphasising the 
dominance of German legal culture in the former territory of Livonia, during this 
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time an expressly Latvian perspective was developed (Birziņa, 1999, p. 157). 
Scholars during the inter-war period pointed out that the true essence of Latvian 
legal consciousness lay in folklore, particularly in short quatrain songs called 
dainas (Sinaiskis, 1938).  
3 The whole legal system and jurisprudence of Latvia were substantially 
changed as a result of the Soviet occupation (1940/1941 and 1944–1990/ 
1991). The changes affected not only substantive and procedural law and 
the judiciary but also academic legal disciplines such as legal theory, 
philosophy, and history, which were fundamentally revised to comply with 
Marxist-Leninist dogmas (Osipova, 2007). The previously existing state was 
declared a state of reactionary bourgeois exploiters hostile to the people, and 
the legal history maintained by it was discredited as being ‘falsified’ and a 
‘pseudo-discipline’ that had to be consigned ‘to the dustbin of history’ 
(Kļava, 1953). The methods used by legal historians during the inter-war 
period were declared antiscientific, and their works ended up in closed 
library archives. 
Rapid changes or how the school of legal history was 
destroyed in Latvia 
Metamorphosis of the legal system and doctrine was only possible because, 
within half a year of the occupation, the laws of the Russian Soviet Federative 
Socialist Republic came into force in the territory of Latvia (Latvijas PSRS 
Augstākās Padomes Ziņotājs, 1940), just as they did in Estonia and Lithuania. 
Simultaneously the Soviet programme of legal studies was introduced, which had 
to be taught using textbooks approved at the all-Union level. 
As early as 1940, Soviet legal history in the University of Latvia was taught to 
students by Valdemārs Kalniņš (1907–1981) (Birziņa, 1999, p. 265). Within a 
very short time (a couple of months between the proclamation of Soviet power in 
the summer of 1940 and the beginning of a new academic year in autumn), he 
replaced the inter-war period idea of legal history, formed under the influence of 
the historical school, with a diametrically opposite concept of legal history. In 
other words, the teaching of a political discipline complying with Soviet ideology 
started immediately following the occupation, and Latvian legal history within 
this discipline was viewed in the context of that of the USSR, based on the 
periodization of history adopted by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(CPSU) (Kalnin, 1954, p. 4). 
The University of Latvia Library still keeps Soviet textbooks in legal history 
from the time immediately after World War II—books in Russian on the history 
of state and law of the USSR (Denisov, 1947; Jushkov, 1950). The history of 
state and law of the USSR was also the name of the first course in legal history, 
which complied with the Soviet doctrine and was taught to students in 1940. 
Even during my own studies, matters were not substantially different. Although 
between 1986 and 1991, I was part of a Latvian-speaking group, we studied the 
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history of state and law of the USSR using Russian textbooks approved as ‘good’ 
at the all-Union level. At the heart of the history of state and law of the USSR, 
there was the teaching of the state and law history of Russia, in which the state 
and legal histories of other Soviet republics were touched upon as a subordinate 
subject (Zhidkov, 1988–1991). 
However, to legal students in 1940–1941 and 1944–1945, these books on the 
USSR state and law history were not yet available in sufficient quantities. It is also 
not entirely believable that at the time immediately following the occupation 
students had a sufficient knowledge of the Russian language allowing them to 
learn from those books.4 Therefore, they mainly studied by listening to lectures 
and making notes. Thus, the lecturers played the most important part in in-
troducing the Soviet teaching of legal history. 
To keep the lectures in line with the Soviet legal dogma, that is, politically 
correct, the lecturers’ work was under constant supervision. Professor Līna Birziņa 
(1910–2007) writes in her memoirs that during the post-war years, lectures were 
attended, without prior notice to the lecturer, by a ‘visitor’ and a shorthand writer 
who took down notes on the lecture. From the 1950s, lectures were recorded 
using a technical innovation such as a magnetic tape recorder. If ‘departures’ from 
the ideological course set by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union were found 
by reviewers in the recorded lectures, meetings were called and held at the ‘Great 
Hall’ (Magna Aula) of the University of Latvia to publicly criticise the politically 
incorrect utterances made during the lectures and to shame the guilty teacher in 
front of colleagues and co-workers. This was how the Soviet system controlled the 
‘lecturers’ political stance’ (Birziņa, 1999, p. 269). Furthermore, one should not 
forget another system functioning alongside this open surveillance, namely, KGB 
informants. In the Soviet system, there were KGB agents among students as well as 
among university teachers who collected information about misconduct during 
lectures. The consequences of such information being reported were not public, 
but they were considerably more serious than mere public correction. 
The work of the historical legal school previously formed in Latvia (mainly 
constituted by Professor Švābe and the students) ended, as none of the Latvian 
legal historians of the inter-war period went on to work in Soviet legal studies 
after World War II. The 1940–1941 experience motivated many scholars to flee 
at the end of the war. For a second time now, Vasīlijs Sinaiskis, a historian of 
Roman law, fled from the Bolsheviks to the West (Feigmane, 2010).5 Arveds 
Švābe and his student Benno Ābers, too, left Latvia at the end of the war (Strods, 
1988). Another student of Švābe, Tālivaldis Jānis Zemzaris, remained in Latvia 
and even continued working in science after the establishment of Soviet power, 
albeit in meteorology, not law. However, Zemzaris lost his job in 1949, having 
been ‘accused of participating in “organisations of bourgeois Latvia” and in-
cluded among the individuals unwanted by Soviet power’ (Auns, 2002, p. 149). 
Thus, for various reasons, none of the specialist legal historians of the inter-war 
period were engaged in the development of Soviet legal history. 
Soviet legal history in Latvian SSR was taught by Valdemārs Kalniņš; later on, 
he turned this field of study into a discipline, becoming the founder of the Soviet 
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Latvia school of legal historians. Among the members of this school were 
Professor Līna Birziņa and assistant to Kalniņš, future Professor Romāns Apsītis 
(1939) (Birziņa, 1999, p. 272). 
Valdemārs Kalniņš’s controversial scientific work: Before 
and after the Soviet occupation of Latvia 
How did Valdemārs Kalniņš find his way into legal history studies? He was a 
polyglot: apart from his native Latvian, he was fluent in Latin, German, and 
Russian. He was a lawyer: after graduating, in 1931, from the University of Latvia, 
Department of Law, Professor Sinaiskis prepared him for research and teaching 
work in civil law and Roman civil law. Thus, during his studies and at the be-
ginning of his scholarly career, Kalniņš did not specialise in Latvian legal history. 
Before the Soviet occupation, he taught civil law (Kalniņš, 1939), Roman law, and 
Roman law history at the university. In 1938, he defended his doctoral thesis 
entitled Universal Succession in Roman Inheritance Law (Birziņa, 1999, p. 265). 
It would have been easier to analyse the changes introduced into legal history 
studies by the Soviet ideology if there had been works by the same author 
published both before and after the establishment of Soviet power. However, as 
already mentioned, none of the Latvian legal historians of the inter-war period 
went on to work in Soviet legal studies. Kalniņš, for his part, worked in the field 
of civil law and Roman private law. Still, the substantial differences between 
inter-war period jurisprudence and the Soviet doctrine in their understanding of 
the essence of law, the sources of law, and legal methodology, in other words, in 
their treatment of historical legal norms, can be clarified by comparing Kalniņš’s 
publications before and after 1940. 
First of all, it should be stressed that before 1940, Kalniņš only used works by 
lawyers in analysing and evaluating the history of Roman legal institutions. His 
publications contain references to works by jurists from the Roman Empire 
(Gaius, Ulpianus, Paulus, etc.); the Russian Empire (Pokrovsky I. A.); Germany 
(Bachofen J., Fehr M., Dernburg H., etc.); and, of course, by his teacher Vasīlijs 
Sinaiskis (Kalniņš, 1939, p. 7). Unlike many other scholars, who in their works 
praised Latvia’s authoritarian ruler at the time, Kalniņš was apolitical. Working in 
the field of civil law, he was using the term ‘the Civil Law of Latvia’ (Kalniņš, 
1939, p. 2), not ‘President Ulmanis’ Civil Law’ (Vīnzarājs, 1938, p. 803). In 
fact, there is no evidence of an ideological impact on his pre-1940 works that 
analysed legal institutions, nor is there servility to authoritarian state rule—simply 
objective legal analysis. 
Developed in a similar manner, his 1939 civil law studies programme contains, 
in section II, a brief overview of the historical development of civil law, including 
the reception of Roman law, as well as of legal philosophy, where he mentions 
the school of natural law and the historical school, Hegel’s teaching, and the 
influence of sociology—a popular research area at that time—on civil law. The 
programme, however, does not mention either Marxism-Leninism (Kalniņš, 
1939, p. 2) or National Socialism—the ideology some Latvian scholars of that 
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time sympathised with (Gailīte, 2014, pp. 97–98). My guess is that the objective 
academic style of lectures and publications, alongside his reticence to express 
enthusiasm about an authoritarian Latvia or critical opinions on Soviet ideology 
and law, were precisely the reasons (Kovaļčuka, 2011, pp. 81–95)6 why the 
Soviet powers found Kalniņš eligible to continue working at the university and to 
teach Soviet legal history, an ideologically important course. In fact, prior to 
1940, Kalniņš had never publicly expressed his political views. He had not 
‘stained’ himself by demonstrating loyalty to the authoritarian state. In addition, 
Kalniņš’s good knowledge of Russian might have played its part, for he could use 
it not only in everyday situations but also in the academic context. As Professor 
Birziņa wrote: ‘sadly, on official occasions [in the Soviet state], especially in 
academia, only Russian would do’ (Birziņa, 1999, p. 268). 
Kalniņš’s publications from the Soviet period, however, invariably start with 
citations from Lenin (Kalniņš, 1963, p. 3), Stalin (Kalnin, 1954, pp. 2–4), and 
materials from the programme and regular congresses of the Communist Party 
(Kalnin, 1962, p. 3). A similar tendency can be observed in the studies course 
programmes: in the pre-occupation period, they only included sources of law and 
the legal doctrine (Kalniņš, 1939, pp. 1–3), while in the Soviet times, the re-
commended reading list began with numerous works by Karl Marx, Lenin, and 
Pēteris Stučka (1865–1932), followed by materials from CPSU congresses and 
decisions of the plenum. Only after tribute was paid to the ruling regime were 
legal sources and sources of Soviet legal doctrine that were necessary for studying 
given (Kalnin, Apsitis, 1970, pp. 20–30). One can only imagine the degree of 
intimidation required to make an individual as Kalniņš drastically change his 
scholarly style to please the ruling regime. 
During the Soviet period, not every person could pursue a career in academia 
and freely choose to become a scholar in the field of Soviet legal history, as the 
politically unreliable individuals were denied the possibility of working in a number 
of professions, including scientific and academic work (Auns, 2002, p. 149).7 
Furthermore, the academic freedom of those allowed to work as scholars was also 
restricted; for example, scholars could not freely choose research objectives, all of 
which were clearly defined in the party policy documents. Legal historians in the 
Soviet state were entrusted with a politically important task, namely, to sub-
stantiate the claim that ‘the Soviet state is the new, superior and historically ulti-
mate type of state’ (Kalnin, 1954, p. 2). For this purpose, the whole course of 
history of the future Soviet peoples up to the Great October Socialist Revolution 
had to be rearranged as a class struggle on the way to communism. 
The research objective mentioned in Kalniņš’s doctoral thesis written and 
defended in 1954 (in Russian) was: 
to show how the Latvian people, led by the communist party, in a fierce 
struggle with class enemies broke free of the bourgeois power and 
established a dictatorship of working people, joined the family of friendly 
nations of the USSR, developed and consolidated its national Soviet 
statehood and socialist law. (Kalnin, 1954, p. 1) 
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To achieve this purpose, history as a discipline was fundamentally revised to 
introduce periodization complying with, as Kalniņš wrote in his thesis, ‘historical 
materialism—the scientific approach developed by Marx and Engels, and ad-
vanced by Lenin and Stalin, based on regularities in the evolvement of society 
and on the laws of the course of history’ (Kalnin, 1954, p. 3). This is also clearly 
reflected in Kalniņš’s later works; for example, in the 1964 publication devoted 
to Pēteris Stučka’s contribution to the study of Roman law: 
P.I. Stučka endeavoured to evaluate Roman law from scientific, that is, 
Marxist-Leninist perspectives. […] As P.I. Stučka wrote, ‘ours is a revolu-
tionary viewpoint which presupposes paying special attention to epochs.’ 
(Kalnin, 1964, p. 37)  
The history of Latvia, too, was re-divided into ‘epochs’ (Kalniņš, 1972, 
pp. 49–50). It should also be noted that a new state and law history discipline 
was created from the legal history (German Rechtsgeschichte) influenced by the 
historical legal school because, according to Marxist dogma, law only emerges 
and changes along with the state and therefore must not be viewed in isolation 
from it. 
The second task that Soviet legal historians were entrusted with was to mark 
the rights of exploiters in different periods as an instrument of oppression and an 
impediment to the development of working people, as ‘also the earlier history 
serves to ideologically boost the driving forces of people in their struggle for 
building communism’ (Kalniņš, 1963, p. 3). Soviet legal history described the 
ancestors of Latvians—the tribes of the Balts and Livs—as a class oppressed by 
their conquerors, that is, working people subjected to exploitation. They appear 
in history books as peasant serfs and poor rightless townspeople (Kalniņš, 1972, 
pp. 49–50). Another concept that Soviet historians had to incorporate in their 
publications was that of the Russian people being friendly to the peoples of the 
other Soviet republics. In the case of Latvia, it was emphasised that at a certain 
point in history Russians had stepped in to support Latvians in their fight against 
the German occupants, the Crusaders (Sudrabkalns, Drīzulis, 1951, p. 21). 
It was thus only logical from the Marxist-Leninist standpoint that a previously 
oppressed people—the Latvians—should be included in the Soviet Union, a 
family of liberated working peoples. This way of presenting history, with the 
development of history viewed as a result of the insatiable struggle between 
antagonistic classes, directly determined the structure of history-telling. For ex-
ample, The State System and Law of the Duchy of Courland (1561–1795), a book 
published in 1963, is structured as follows. First comes the history of the state, 
which describes the respective historic period and the political situation in the 
state (Kalniņš, 1963, pp. 5–9), including its division into classes. The ruling class 
in the work in question constituted landowners; priests; burghers; or wealthy 
townsmen; and free farmers (Kalniņš, 1963, pp. 10–12). Then came the 
exploited class: peasants, broken down into seven groups depending on their 
material status (Kalniņš, 1963, p. 14). 
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The description of each class contains information on the legal status of the 
individuals belonging to it, with references to the legal sources where that status 
was regulated. Next comes a description of the state system, with a special em-
phasis on the judiciary (Kalniņš, 1963, pp. 25–27). Part two of the book is legal 
history, mainly referring to, describing, and citing various sources of law 
(Kalniņš, 1963, pp. 28–47). The book contains no analysis of the branch of law 
dealing with public law. Other legal history textbooks (Kalnin, 1962) from which 
the state and law history of Latvian SSR was taught (Kalnin, Apsitis, 1970), as 
well as the respective studies programmes, were structured in a similar way. 
What especially strikes the eye in the contents of the studies’ programme is the 
third task entrusted to the Soviet legal historians—to use scholarly ways to 
condemn as false or wrong all other versions of legal history and to prove the 
reactionary nature of the previous state, that is, to criticise the Republic of Latvia 
and its laws (Kalnin, Apsitis, 1970, pp. 12–13). There was only one ‘right’ 
version of legal history, and that was Soviet legal history. There was only one 
state enjoying justness and equality—the USSR. There was no such thing, not 
could there be such a thing, as bourgeois justice, the Soviet dogma maintained. 
I will not analyse the vocabulary developed for criticising liberal national or 
bourgeois states, as it should be studied as a separate research subject. Moreover, 
I doubt whether this vocabulary is at all translatable into languages that have 
never been used to put Soviet ideology into effect. For example, Kalniņš, re-
ferring to Stučka, criticised the dogmatic representation of Roman law in 
bourgeois literature and emphasised the advantages of the Soviet approach to 
research (Kalnin, 1964, p. 37). 
Kalniņš, however, did not take part in the politically ordered disparagement of 
works by expatriate Latvian legal historians, even though it was a widespread 
practice, especially during Stalin’s lifetime (Kļava, 1953). Quite the opposite: 
despite the censorship and the strict boundaries set by the Soviet ideology for 
research in the field of legal history, Professor Kalniņš managed to ensure con-
tinuity in Latvian legal history studies. While being politically correct in his 
publications, he still included references to sources that contained alternative 
information and opinions of ‘reactionary’ scholars.8 For example, when writing 
about urban law, Kalniņš preserved the previously developed terminology (cre-
ated by Baltic German rather than Latvian legal historians: e.g., Švābe wrote 
about ‘townsmen’ (namnieki) (Švābe, 1940, p. 257), thus Latvianising the 
German term ‘burghers,’ whereas Kalniņš returns to ‘burghers’ in his books. 
Kalniņš remained loyal to historical facts discovered by his predecessors: for 
example, he stepped back from the idea of constant antagonism between 
Latvians and Germans. He wrote that ‘at the onset of [the city of] Riga, it was 
rather easy to become a burgher. Not only Germans, but also the local non- 
Germans (Livs, Latvians, Russians, etc.) were included as burghers at the time’ 
(Kalniņš, 1972, p. 44). In his publications, Kalniņš provided references to works 
by Baltic German legal historians as well as to publications by the legal historians 
working in the period of the Republic, albeit not during Stalin’s lifetime but only 
from the ‘Khrushchev Thaw’ onwards. 
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Rounding up the topic, I asked myself only one question. Is the Soviet state 
and law history at all an academic discipline? Can we recognise as a discipline a 
mass of information purposefully generated at the request of, and under the 
management and supervision of, a totalitarian state? Can there be such a thing as 
science or the humanities without the academic freedom to create; can a dis-
cipline exist where it is closely supervised, censored, and customised to reach 
certain political goals? Soviet legal history was created without observing the key 
prerequisites of academia—scholarly objectivity and neutrality. I have come to 
the conclusion that Soviet legal history was created not as an academic discipline 
but as a vehicle for propaganda, aiming to consolidate the Soviet ideology in the 
mind of homo sovieticus, as well as to spread it outside the state borders. 
Conclusion 
Latvia was founded in 1918. The Latvian legal history originated in the inter-war 
period re-evaluating and revising the legal history understandings of the German 
and Russian scholars of the 19th century. The entire legal system and jur-
isprudence of Latvia were substantially changed as a result of the Soviet occu-
pation (1940/1941 and 1944–1990/1991). The changes affected not only 
substantive and procedural law and the judiciary but also academic legal dis-
ciplines such as legal theory, philosophy, and history, which were fundamentally 
revised to comply with Marxist-Leninist dogma. The work of the historical legal 
school previously formed in Latvia (mainly inaugurated by Professor Švābe and 
his students) was ended, and the Latvian legal history was discredited. 
Scholars’ freedom to choose to work in the Soviet legal history field was re-
stricted, and the key prerequisites of academia—scholarly objectivity and 
neutrality—were not respected. The loyalty of scholars and content of their 
lectures were under permanent CPSU and KGB surveillance, performed by 
different methods. Legal historians in the Soviet state were entrusted with several 
politically important tasks, namely, to substantiate the claim that ‘the Soviet state 
is the new, superior and historically speaking the ultimate type of state,’ to mark 
the rights of exploiters in different periods as an instrument of oppression of 
working people, to use scholarly ways to condemn as false or wrong all other 
versions of legal history, and to prove the reactionary nature of the previous state. 
In the light of the above, I conclude that Soviet legal history was created not as 
an academic discipline but as a vehicle for state ideology. Therefore, the con-
tribution of Soviet legal historians is contradictory. 
Notes 
1 A number of outstanding Baltic German legal historians were active in the 19th 
century Baltics: Friedrich Georg von Bunge, August von Bulmerinq, Astaf 
Transehe-Roseneck, Leonid Arbuzov, and others.  
2 For example, Russian civil law historian S. V. Pakhman (Семен Викентьевич 
Пахман 1825–1910) in his monograph История кодификации гражданского 
права (Москва: Зерцало, 2004) analyses the history of Baltic law as part of Russian 
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legal history. This was consistent with the political reality, as the whole territory of 
Latvia had been part of the Russian Empire starting from the 18th century.  
3 For example, Švābe A. Latvijas vēsture. 1800–1913. Trešais izdevums, Rīga: Avots, 
1991, Švābe A. Latvijas vēsture 1800–1914. Trešais izdevums. Rīga: Avots, 1991, 
Švābe A. Latvijas cilšu tiesības. Rīga: [b.i.], 1939, Švābe A. Latvju kultūras vēsture. 
II. daļa. Rīga: A. Gulbja apgādībā, 1922, Latvju kultūra. Zin red. Arveds Švābe. 
[b.v.] A. Klāvsona apgāds, 1948.  
4 Even though, from the Soviet occupation on, a Russian language exam was part of 
the university entrance exams.  
5 Vassily Sinaisky spent the last years of his life in Belgium, where he died in 1949.  
6 The situation in Soviet Russia, its treatment of the church and religion, private 
property, kolkhozes, etc., was widely discussed in the Latvian press. In turn, 
Russian émigré lawyers used Latvia as a centre for publishing their periodical 
Statute and Law (Закон и Право) (1929–1938).  
7 Here, we can once again recall Tālivaldis Zemzaris. 9. 
8 E.g., Baltic Germans such as Ch. G. von Ziegenhorn, C. von Rummel, F.G.von 
Bunge; see: Kalniņš V. Kurzemes hercogistes valsts iekārta un tiesības (1561.–1795.), 
Rīga: Pētera Stučkas Latvijas Valsts universitāte, 1963, pages 8, 10, 15. Also, works 
by legal historians of the inter-war period, such as Arveds Švābe, Benno Ābers, 
Tālivaldis Zemzaris.  
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8 Getaway into the Middle Ages? 
On topics, methods and results 
of ‘socialist’ legal historiography 
at the University of Jena 
Adrian Schmidt-Recla and Zara Luisa Gries   
Introduction 
This paper chooses a personal and local approach to interpreting legal history in 
East Germany. It examines the topics and results of Gerhard Buchda’s 
(1901–1977) own works and of the works of his graduate students at the 
University of Jena, where Buchda held the chair of German civil law, commercial 
law and German legal history from 1949 to 1967. ‘Buchda and his students at Jena’ 
may sound surprising, as Jena produced one of the most famous forerunners of 
socialist theory on the state, government and the law, namely Gerhard Haney 
(1926–2012). So why did we not focus on him and his work? The answer is: 
Haney’s doctoral and postdoctoral theses (Haney, 1961; Haney, 1964a) did not 
focus on legal historiography, nor did they use legal history as a scheme or model of 
socialist law. His major project (Haney, 1967) is addressed to theory and philo-
sophy of law. Moreover, Haney’s publications on Theodor Maunz (1901–1993) 
(Haney, 1964b) were politically driven and not legal historiography (even though 
today they are most certainly a topic of legal historiography). In fact, Haney did not 
start publishing articles on legal history earlier than 1989 (Haney, 1989). 
For the above reasons, this paper does refer to a person who ran legal history at 
Jena throughout the first decades of the German Democratic Republic 
(GDR)—Gerhard Buchda. Buchda is nowadays only little known as an expert of 
medieval Saxon law who studied the Sachsenspiegel as well as medieval municipal 
law. Born in Stadtroda near Jena, he studied law, finished his doctoral thesis in 
1929 and was awarded the venia legendi in 1936 at Jena. After a short en-
gagement in Berlin he was offered a professorship of German civil law and 
German legal history at the University Halle in 1937. In 1943 he joined the 
German army (Wehrmacht) as a private. After having returned to civilian life in 
1945 he was dismissed by the University of Halle (cf. Lieberwirth, 1997, 
pp. 11–16), probably due to his membership in Nazi organizations. Buchda 
joined the National Socialist Association of German Legal Professionals 
(Nationalsozialistischer Rechtswahrerbund, NSRB) in 1933, the National Air 
Raid Protection League (Reichsluftschutzbund, RLB) in 1934, the National 
Socialist Teacher’s League (Nationalsozialistische Lehrerbund, NSLB) in 1935, 
the paramilitary unit of NSDAP (Sturmabteilung, SA) in 1937, and the National 
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Socialist German Workers’ Party (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, 
NSDAP) in 1939. There is to date no evidence that Buchda held leadership 
positions in any of them. 
After his dismissal from Halle, he decided not to leave the Soviet occupation 
zone, joined the Liberal Democratic Party of Germany (Liberal-Demokratische 
Partei Deutschlands, LDPD) in 1946, and gained a second chance at (his beloved) 
Jena. It is reported that Buchda would have had a chance to take offers from 
universities in West Germany, but he ‘stood his ground.’ In 1963 he was Dean of 
the Jena Faculty of Law. He was Chairman of the ‘Institute for State and Legal 
History’ (Institut für Staats- und Rechtsgeschichte) by the time of his retirement. 
Moreover he was granted several visas to travel to congresses held in Austria, 
France and West Germany and was able to publish in Western publishing houses 
from 1950 up to 1974. At least once (in 1956) he spoke at the German Legal 
History Conference (Rechtshistorikertag) (cf. Buchda, 1958, pp. 274–348, 274). 
As far as this study can assess, Buchda’s articles in foreign journals and his 
contributions to congresses abroad did not bring any immediate benefit for GDR 
authorities or East German Universities—at least on the basis of the topics of 
Buchda’s contributions and the methods he utilized, it is hard to see him fur-
thering the socialist cause. Possibly his mere participation in international legal 
scientific events in the role of an ‘elder statesman’ or a ‘notable colleague’ was 
estimated to be beneficial from the point of view of the SED. Such an inter-
pretation remains nevertheless speculative since one will hardly find any solid 
biographical proof of the fact that authorities tried to utilize ‘old’ or ‘traditional’ 
scholarship to their own ends. Anyway, Buchda took his leave in 1967 shortly 
before the ‘Third Higher Education Reform’ (to which cf. Kaiser, 2010) over-
ruled traditional structures, values and contents of higher education in the GDR 
and demanded the abandonment of traditional modes of scholarly work. 
During his years at Jena, Buchda was the doctoral adviser for eight doctoral 
theses with an emphasis on legal history. Despite Buchda’s personal and aca-
demic CV during the Nazi regime, it is worthwhile studying whether his work 
and the theses of his students at Jena were contrary to socialist legal historio-
graphy or not, or whether Buchda and his students formed a scientific circle 
where pre-Second World War methods and topics were kept alive. We will start 
with a brief definition of what socialist (legal) history in the GDR entailed, as well 
as examining Buchda’s own publications. This is followed by a discussion of the 
work of Buchda’s students. 
Socialist legal history in a nutshell 
In the GDR, the significance and place of legal historiography was always 
ambiguous: One could ask why have legal history at all as a subject in socialist 
education (and in courses for law students)? Officially, the legal system of the 
GDR did not have (and could not have) any historical dimension, nor was it 
based on any tradition. As this study proves, it took years to develop a 
genuine socialist legal historiography in the law schools situated in the GDR 
150 Adrian Schmidt-Recla and Zara Luisa Gries  
(Berlin, Leipzig, Halle and Jena). Moreover, the birth and the coming of age 
of the new socialist state—under the leadership of the working class and its 
political ‘vanguard,’ the communist party—and its law had to be emphasized 
as something completely new, as revolutionary, as different from all that had 
been before. A researcher or a teacher who would try to constitute the 
principles of socialist law as disconnected to the socialist revolution was 
thinking and working against the basic rules of the development of mankind 
and society. 
To overcome this dilemma and to get closer to understanding the standing of 
socialist legal history in the GDR, we (again) do not refer to Gerhard Haney and 
his post-GDR assessments but to Gottfried Härtel (born in 1925) and Elemér 
Pólay (1915–1988). In 1987 they noted concerning Roman Law and Roman 
legal history that the recognition of Roman law was indispensable for lawyers 
whose science refers to comparison and history and was of eminent practical 
importance for understanding legal events in the past and present (Härtel and 
Pólay, 1987, p. 9); which as such shows commitment to a socialist history of law in 
the late 1980s. They stressed that ‘a Marxist presentation of (legal) history is 
characterized by the recognition of the fact that any change in the socio-economic 
base is a source of the process of the development of law’ (Härtel and Pólay, 1987, 
p. 10). Here you find the classic Marxist position of base and superstructure and 
one of the basic suppositions of historical and dialectic materialism (here: ‘histMat’ 
and ‘diaMat’). ‘DiaMat’ supposes that every epoch in the history of humankind is 
characterized by so-called ‘basic’ or ‘antagonistic contradictions.’ Once these 
contradictions—necessarily class contradictions aroused by the property condi-
tions of the means of production—quantitatively mount up to a point of intol-
erability, inevitably erupting into a revolutionary situation that creates a new 
quality of human relations. Accordingly, a Marxist legal historian will describe 
institutions, principles, institutes of law, law-making and law-makers of any his-
torical period correctly only if he or she derives them from the then given socio- 
economic preconditions and will preferably refer to revolutionary situations. This 
is due to Karl Marx’s (1818–1883) and Friedrich Engels’ (1820–1895) keynote 
that the property conditions of the means of production shape all social relations. 
Marx and Engels, who remained classic references for socialist and communist 
interpretations of social relations and changes in East Germany until the end of the 
1980s, studied one revolutionary situation as a fundamental example, namely, the 
French Revolution in 1789. Hence, the French Revolution remained a central 
point of interest and necessarily a benchmark for (legal) historians inspired by 
Marx and Engels. In other words: If you come across the works of a lawyer in one 
of the Eastern bloc countries that deal with legal problems or legal consequences 
of revolutions, namely, the French or the Russian revolution in a historical per-
spective, you will most probably at the same time find some genuine ‘socialist’ 
legal historiography. Proof of this are Hermann Klenners’ (born 1926) ideas on 
French revolutionary terror as a matter of legality (Klenner, 1953, p. 14f.). With 
these basic statements in mind, let us now turn to Gerhard Buchda and then to his 
scholarly followers and successors at Jena. 
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Buchda’s work as a historiographer of law 
Immanuel Kant’s civil law, 1929 
Buchda’s doctoral thesis is a small paper of 95 pages. Buchda compares Kant’s 
(1724–1804) Metaphysik der Sitten (1797) to the works of some predecessors, 
especially to Gottfried Achenwall’s (1719–1772) Prolegomena Iuris Naturalis 
(1758) and Ius Naturae in usus auditorum (Achenwall, 1755)—books used by 
Kant for his own lectures. Buchda’s thesis is a descriptive account, offering relations, 
receptions and differences between Kant’s positions and those of contemporary 
scholars of natural law. The 28-year-old Buchda explains, arranges, points out and 
underlines, but he does not emerge as a critic. Hence there is little originality in 
Buchda’s paper, though he does at least point out that Kant’s natural law has some 
similarity to a ‘nowadays aprioristic theory of law’ (Buchda, 1929, p. 83). Here 
Buchda gains critical distance from his pattern of presenting a single position, 
noting that Kant’s positions on donation are contradictory (Buchda, 1929, p. 88). 
Buchda’s first paper affected only his own future work, for there is no sign of a 
response from the scientific community. 
History and critics of the German ‘Gesamthandsgemeinschaft,’ 
1936 
Buchda’s second book is of special interest due to the special scientific spirit of the 
age in jurisprudence in the 1930s. The problem Buchda chose, ‘joint ownership’ 
(Gesamthand), was a classic problem of legal historians who followed the German or 
Germanic branch of legal history. It is raised by the Sachsenspiegel ‘law of the region’ 
(Landrecht) in chapter I, section 12, and many scholars since the 16th century have 
tried to elucidate a theory of Gesamthand. Discussion about it still continues 
(cf. BGHZ 146, 341 = NJW 2001, 1056). German legal historians are trying to 
work out a theory that could explain problems concerning the community of heirs, 
matrimonial property, non-trading, general partnership and so on. It is of interest 
whether Buchda was influenced by attempts of the younger generation of lawyers 
and legal scientists to design new and National Socialist theories of law in 1933. It is 
said that Buchda did not make any concessions to Nazi ideology; certainly, none of 
his publications show clear Nazi influences (Lieberwirth, 1977, p. 13). 
What we can assume is that Buchda tried to evolve a theory of ‘the intelligence 
of a thing’s nature’ or ‘insight into the nature of things,’ and hence his references 
to Kant (cf. Buchda, 1936, p. 235). In his own words, he wanted ‘a nowadays 
aspired holistic consideration’ that was ‘urgently needed, not only in biology but 
also in legal sciences’ (Buchda, 1936, p. 234). The task was first ‘to study the 
special structure,’ the ‘proper legality of every entity’ (Buchda, 1936, p. 234f.). 
Thus jurisprudence had to ‘recognize’ (especially if there was a legal entity) 
(Buchda, 1936, p. 255), but it was not the jurisprudence’s responsibility to 
create or design legal entities. As Buchda said, ‘[I]deal legal subjects’ were things 
that could be thought, but this would not refer to ‘our view of life today’ 
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(‘Das würde nicht unserer heutigen Lebensauffassung entsprechen,’ Buchda, 1936, 
p. 255). Reality first was Buchda’s headline; thinking (including legal examining) 
had to follow certain given conditions (cf. Buchda, 1936, p. 255). 
The second question, whether an existing entity had subjective rights, ‘was a 
question of interpretation, of exegesis within the legal regime given’ (Buchda, 
1936, p. 256). From the author’s point of view, this could refer to Edmund 
Husserl‘s (1859–1938) so-called ‘intuition of essences and essential structures’ 
(Wesensschau) and could be related to the ‘concrete-order thinking’ (or more 
accurately: precise thinking in real regimes) offered by Carl Schmitt (1888–1985; 
cf. Schmitt, 1934, pp. 17–20, 43), though Buchda did not in fact quote Schmitt 
or Husserl. This examination becomes even more convincing when we consider 
that Buchda’s critique uses terms like ‘sound German attitude to life’ (Buchda, 
1936, p. 260), appeals to ‘demonic religious forces in the sacred leagues of the 
Germans’ to emphasize the ‘spiritual community’ inside human corporations 
(Buchda, 1936, p. 261, Fn. 8) and finds that ‘leader and loyalty’ were ‘connected 
with love and fidelity, with trust and believe, with responsibility and obedience’ 
(Buchda, 1936, p. 234). Was this a concession to Nazi ideology? We rather think 
that the young Gerhard Buchda drifted with the tide. However, he did not 
hesitate to quote such Jewish colleagues as Konrad Engländer (1880–1933). 
In the conclusion of his paper, he finally proves he was a follower of Otto v. 
Gierke’s (1841–1921) suppositions but not of his conclusions: ‘Joint ownership 
is not an institute but a principle of law; but it is (among other things) only a 
principle of acting, especially of legal transaction. Wherever human beings act 
together this represents what joint ownership is’ (Buchda, 1936, p. 265f.). But 
acting does not necessarily reveal what is behind it (Buchda, 1936, p. 270). What 
was ‘behind’ the ‘acting entity’ then was a question of positive law (and of in-
terpretation and exegesis). Once the law gives a claim, a competence, a power to 
two or more humans as an entity, then this entity was a legal body, a corporate 
body, a ‘juristic person’ as far as the power was given (Buchda, 1936, p. 293). 
In the 1940s, Buchda set aside his work on the history of dogma in jur-
isprudence and on the principles, institutions or institutes of civil law. By this 
time, he only wrote and published on legal history, and all his upcoming legal 
works focused on one major topic, namely, the jurisdiction of corporations in the 
Middle Ages and the Early Modern age. 
The medieval Pössneck collection of jurymen’s votes 
Through this work, Buchda has gained an established position among German legal 
historians. In cooperation with the historians Reinhold Grosch and Willy Flach 
(1903–1958), he carried out extensive research on the jurisdiction of municipal, 
jurymen’s and University courts from the 13th to the 19th century. He examined 
votes, sentences, decisions and expert opinions or arbitraments given by Saxon and 
Thuringian corporations. One of his projects was dedicated to the jurisdiction of the 
Faculty of Law in Halle (Buchda, 1942a, pp. 210–294; Buchda, 1943, pp. 251–318; 
Buchda, 1944, pp. 223–347; Buchda, 1954), another to the jurisdiction of the 
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municipal court of Pössneck, a small Thuringian town near Stadtroda and Jena 
(Grosch et al., 1957–1972). Grosch, Flach and Buchda found 355 jurymen’s votes, 
sentences and arbitraments from Magdeburg, Leipzig and Pössneck itself from the 
14th and the 15th century. Buchda ran this project throughout his years at Jena. The 
project resulted in a book of four volumes, published by Böhlau’s in Weimar from 
1957 to 1972. Buchda was responsible for volumes 3 and 4. Herein he examined the 
importance of the votes and sentences for a ‘general history of law.’ His indexes 
(on subjects and on persons) are in actual fact not indexes but a full commentary on 
Sachsenspiegel law as executed by the Magdeburg and Leipzig chairs of ‘jurymen’ 
(Schöffenstühle). The result stands comparison with Guido Kisch’s (1889–1985) 
Leipziger Schöffenspruchsammlung (Kisch, 1919) and complements it, with Adalbert 
Erler’s (1904–1992) Der Oberhof zu Neustadt an der Weinstraße (Erler, 1968) and 
with Friedrich Ebel’s (1944–2005) Magdeburg editions (Ebel, 1983). To this day, 
scholars can use it to check medieval and Early Modern corpora of law and legislation 
against the reality of jurisdiction. This is of significant relevance for comparative 
approaches to the Sachsenspiegel law. 
Buchda wrote numerous articles for the journal Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für 
Rechtsgeschichte, and the Halle project was published there (cf. Buchda, 1936, p. 261, 
fn. 8). Buchda also published smaller works to achieve a better understanding of 
medieval and especially Sachsenspiegel law (Buchda, 1937, pp. 468–474; Buchda, 
1939, pp. 194–207; Buchda, 1941, pp. 257–265; Buchda, 1942b, pp. 353–355; 
Buchda, 1942c, pp. 355–358; Buchda, 1950, pp. 416–440; Buchda, 1952, 
pp. 385–399; Buchda, 1955, pp. 205–215; Buchda, 1958; Buchda, 1961, pp. 64–92 
and (posthum) Buchda, 1974, pp. 90–116). Another paper was published in the 
Vorträge und Forschungen of the Konstanzer Arbeitskreis für mittelalterliche Geschichte 
(Buchda, 1964, pp. 7–24). We have found theses from 1937 to 1974, and altogether 
nine theses were printed during Buchda’s Jena years. None of these theses broached 
the issue whether medieval law is an aspect of class conflicts or to what extent it is 
influenced by the propriety conditions of the means of production. His texts do not 
refer to ‘diaMat’ at all, and is it not surprising to read Buchda’s own short conclusion 
about his focus as a scholar in 1966 shortly before he retired: ‘Litigation of the chairs 
of lay assessors, high courts and legal faculties from the 13th to the 19th century in 
connection with the history of judicature, the law of procedure and the substantive 
law’ (Spruchtätigkeit der Schöffenstühle, Oberhöfe und Juristenfakultäten vom 13. bis 
zum 19. Jh. in Verbindung mit der Geschichte der Gerichtsverfassung, des Prozeßrechts 
und des materiellen Rechts.). This is truly his legacy and it is worth questioning 
whether it influenced the work of his graduated students. 
The influence of Buchda’s work on legal historiography 
The Faculty of Law 
We now turn to Buchda’s influence on legal historiography. First, there is new 
information on the elder Buchda as a teacher. Rolf Henrich, one of the founders 
of the NEUES FORUM in 1989 and one of the most profound inside critics of 
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socialist law, who was a student of law at Jena from 1964 to 1967, mentions 
Buchda’s lectures in his recently published memoirs (Henrich, 2019, p. 54f.). 
Henrich certifies that Buchda had been a voice of courage and honesty who did 
not refer to the class struggle (Henrich, 2019, p. 54). Buchda’s Sachsenspiegel 
lecture was—according to Henrich—far away from any wisenheimery and pro-
vided the (very few) students with an understanding of normativity that any 
scholar had to ascertain for himself due to the fact that it referred to an under-
standing of law whose presuppositions modern people did not share (Henrich, 
2019, p. 55). Finally, Henrich notes that the Sachsenspiegel understanding of law 
(‘God is justice himself, that is why justice is beloved by him’ [‘got is selve recht, 
dar umme is em recht lef ’]—Sachsenspiegel prologue) appeared to him as a law 
student to be an antidote against Leninist legal nihilism (Henrich, 2019, p. 55). 
A strong comment, for sure—but are there echoes of this personally toned at-
titude in some contemporary scientific elaborations? 
Second: Between 1948 and 1967, the Jena Faculty of Law awarded seven 
scholars the doctorate of law with Buchda as doctoral supervisor (of course there 
were more doctorates at Jena in this period—but not focused on legal history). In 
1969 Buchda once more acted as doctoral supervisor emeritus. Two cases show a 
collaboration with Gertrud Schubart-Fikentscher (1896–1985) from Halle as the 
second reviewer; one thesis indicates that Rolf Lieberwirth (1920–2019) from 
Halle was the second reviewer. None of the seven Buchda scholars had 
ever published more than this one paper as a legal historian, and none of them had 
ever given their own lecture course on the history of law. This proves that a 
Buchda doctorate was in no case the take-off for an academic career as a legal 
historian in the GDR. But let us now take a closer look at these theses. Before 
starting, one should consider that the East German law of higher education did 
not obligate candidates to print doctoral theses with the help of a professional 
publisher. Consequently, doctoral theses did not circulate among libraries. One 
might say that they were not written for scientific discussion. Moreover, the 
papers were written on typed paper and are today in a very bad condition.  
1 The first thesis under the aegis of Buchda was written by Christian Hopf from 
Halle. It was disputed in 1951 and deals with ‘The utilization of forests and 
forest management within the limits of Thuringian sources of law from the 
16th to the 18th century’ (Hopf, 1952). After a short introduction and a 
description of the sources, Hopf discusses historic forest management. We 
found no reference to Marxism and cannot estimate whether Hopf followed a 
special Buchda interest. Anyway, he dealt with Thuringian history of law and 
thus chose both a traditional approach and method for his doctoral thesis.  
2 Gottfried Werner from Weimar was Buchda’s second doctoral candidate. 
He graduated in 1952. His thesis is about ‘The Constitution and municipal 
law of Arnstadt’ (Werner, 1952). This relatively brief paper of only 
89 pages provides some information on local constitutional history and 
reports in chapter 1 on Arnstadt as a settlement and marketplace by the end 
of the 12th century. Chapter 2 is about Arnstadt as a civic corporation by 
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1850. This paper contains descriptions rather than assessments. It is of 
interest for the local history of Arnstadt only and is in no way influenced by 
Marxist theory.  
3 In 1952 another scholar, Hermann Wolf from Greiz, graduated with a doctoral 
thesis entitled ‘The development of judicature, especially of penal jurisdiction in 
the former principality of junior branch Reuß ’ (Wolf, 1952). Wolf ’s paper is 
dedicated to the judicature of the smallest territory of German nationality in the 
Holy Roman Empire that ever existed. It offers a description of the courts’ 
constitutional history. The methodological approach is traditional. The 
chapters follow epochs as described by traditional historiography (e.g., 
offspring, the reception of Roman law, the fall of the Holy Roman Empire, 
the civil revolution of 1848, the foundation of the ‘Second Reich,’ etc.) and did 
not refer to ‘histMat’ stepping stones of social development. Wolf like Hopf 
and Werner did not publish any further articles.  
4 In 1955 Buchda’s fourth candidate was Witho Holland from Schmalkalden, 
a Thuringian town for toolmakers since the Middle Ages. Holland dealt with 
local Schmalkalden craftsmen’s guilds and their law (Holland, 1955). His 
thesis offers a sketch of how craftsmanship in Schmalkalden had developed, 
describing the guilds’ certificates and the constitution of the Schmalkalden 
guilds, including the law of the apprentices, journeymen and master 
craftsmen. He comments on the guilds’ courts and their penal law. Unlike 
Hopf, Werner and Wolf, Holland continued to write on legal matters and 
became active in legal affairs: later he worked as an in-house lawyer for the 
local, then the regional and finally the national ‘Konsum’ cooperative 
society, which was one of the two national players of trade in East 
Germany. In 2008 he published a paper about the legal and economic 
development of the ‘Konsum’ cooperatives in the GDR (Holland, 2008). 
It is noteworthy that Holland (like Buchda), a former member of the 
NSDAP joined the LDPD in 1946, was elected to the Volkskammer from 
1963 to 1990 and took part in the central ‘Round Table’ Discussions in 
Berlin in autumn and winter 1989–1990. 
Holland’s doctoral thesis under Buchda’s supervision can to a certain extent 
be described as innovative: It dealt with the legal history of corporations that 
had an impact on the economy, and Holland as an in-house expert may have 
used it to design a socialist law for cooperative societies. But to this day, we do 
not know more about Holland’s contributions to law-making. It would be 
useful to have a biography of Witho Holland.  
5 Gerhard Günther from Greiz was a graduate student of Buchda who worked 
as his tutor’s assistant for three years. Whilst his retirement was in process in 
1967, Buchda planned to make Günther his successor as chairman of his 
Institute for State and Legal History (Lingelbach, 1997, p. 42f.). However, 
the plan failed and Günther did not become Buchda’s successor. Günther’s 
doctoral thesis from 1956 was about how Roman civil law was received in 
Thuringia by 1350 (Günther, 1956). His topic is up to date: it is an 
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reception’ (Frührezeption) and would be in keeping with modern efforts to 
examine expert cultures. Probably in accordance with Buchda’s empirical 
research, Günther focuses on whether and to what extent ‘legal instruments’ 
(Urkunden) prove the application of Jus Commune already in the 13th and 
14th century. If this thesis had been produced in Göttingen or Freiburg, for 
example, Günter’s academic career may well have taken off. We did not find 
echoes of Marx’s and Engels’s positions in his work.  
6 Buchda’s next doctoral candidate proves that Buchda’s own work on 
municipal courts and jurymen’s votes may well have influenced others. 
Jörgen Haalck, born in Potsdam, graduated in 1957 with a thesis on the 
responses and sentences of the Rostock Faculty of Law (Haalck, 1957). He 
describes the process of the normative basis of responding and deciding for 
courts abroad (Aktenversendung) (Carolina, RPolO, Bützower Privileg 
1762), the process inside the Rostock Faculty (Rotulationsverfahren), the 
Rostock Faculty of Law as an authority for decisions in penal inquisitions 
and the content of the Rostock archive. Moreover, he examines how the 
faculty as a sentencing authority was organized internally and deals with the 
intensity and effect of the faculty’s activity concerning territories and the law 
itself. What Buchda did concerning Halle, Haalck did concerning Rostock.  
7 The last Jena scholar who Buchda actively and successfully supervised was 
Gerhard Haas from Chomutov/Komotau (Haas, 1967a). He returned to 
what Buchda’s second graduate, Gottfried Werner, did 15 years prior and 
worked on the constitution and on the municipal law of Arnstadt, though 
Haas included a few more Thuringian municipalities: Königsee, Saalfeld and 
Stadtilm. This thesis is remarkable due to the fact that Haas was not a 
graduated lawyer but nevertheless was awarded the ‘doctor iuris.’ Haas 
studied law from 1951 to 1955, did not graduate as a lawyer, studied 
history and education science and worked as a schoolteacher (cf. Haas’ CV; 
Haas, 1967b, appendix). His thesis is purely a presentation of municipal 
history, the constitution, courts, municipal iura regalia and municipal law. The 
focus is on the Middle Ages and Early Modern times. He gives, for example, 
only one page to the history of Arnstadt from the 17th to the end of the 19th 
century (Haas, 1967a, p. 64). Haas states that the 1543 statutes had remained 
the basis for ‘legal relations’ in Arnstadt by the 19th century and that they had 
not been critically worked over or emended since then. Only regulations on 
firefighting had been revised. Some decrees or edicts had been given by the 
Earls of Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt on guard service, on land surveys, on 
marriage, on mills and on public bookkeeping. And that is it—nothing 
whatsoever on socio-economic drivers of changes and developments in law. 
We find the same method concerning the municipal constitution of Arnstadt 
(Haas, 1967a, pp. 36–39): Haas lists, what the municipal council in the 19th 
century was, by whom it was elected, what the council was expected to do, 
and which authority supervised the execution of various matters.  
8 An eighth graduated student, who started with a (now) typical Buchda-topic 
in Jena, did not finish his work on ‘The constitution and the law of the 
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municipality of Gera in their historical development by the 17th century’ in 
the GDR. The author, Lothar Krahner, member of the CDU since 1949, left 
the GDR westbound and was—with this work (Krahner, 1965)—successfully 
awarded the legal doctorate at the Faculty of Law of the Goethe-University 
Frankfurt/M. in 1965 under the supervision of Adalbert Erler. We suppose 
correspondence or at least contact between Buchda and Erler according that 
case. Due to the fact that Krahner’s paper was not finished in Jena, we did not 
include it to our survey as regards content.  
9 Did things change after Buchda’s retirement? Yes, they did, especially 
when the class struggle and revolutionary events were introduced into 
graduate students’ work. In 1969 Hans-Jürgen Ziegler wrote on the 
influence of the French Revolution concerning the development of 
German commercial law (Ziegler, 1969). Like Günter, Ziegler worked as 
an assistant at the Institute for State and Legal History. Buchda and Haney 
acted as his doctoral reviewers. His thesis describes the condition of 
German commercial law ‘at the eve of the French Revolution,’ tries to give 
a picture of the ‘present condition of commercial law’ and gives a short 
history of the ‘bourgeois character of commercial law.’ He then discusses 
whether French commercial law was affected by the French Revolution 
(here a definition of class conflict and revolution is given; Ziegler, 1969, 
p. 73) and whether the French Revolution was a creative power for 
German commercial law. Ziegler uses ‘diaMat’ schemes: ‘The essential 
aspects of the socio-economic fabric of feudalism, respectively the 
municipality, the inner fabric, are decisive for explaining and assessing 
their politico-legal, external manifestations’ (Ziegler, 1969, p. 42). 
Moreover, Ziegler criticizes bourgeois legal historiography in detail—and 
this critique is like a door opener for socialist legal historiography. His 
point is that the ‘cosmopolitism of trade,’ as ‘bourgeois’ legal historians 
argued, made the development of commercial law ‘universal.’ Ziegler’s 
contradiction is as follows. By that argument (commercial law was 
universal) an aspect of bourgeois legal historiography that (generally) 
marked legal positivism came to light: that is to say ‘shortening of legal 
history to the history of the legal form only’ (Ziegler, 1969, p. 50f.). 
Economic history and political history would thus, if taken into 
consideration at all, only be marginal (Ziegler, 1969, p. 51). Hence, 
scientists who only referred to the continuity of a form without considering 
the discontinuity of its functions would be forced into error (Ziegler, 
1969, p. 51). Ultimately, Ziegler’s job, as he saw it, was to identify law- 
making both as an agent and as a result of revolutionary class conflicts: the 
‘Code de commerce,’ for instance, ‘accomplished the revolutionary creation 
of legal unity concerning commercial law. It maintained the revolutionary 
principle of civil equality and eliminated commercial law as a burgher’s 
privilege’ (Ziegler, 1969, p. 119). Ziegler then focuses on how the Code de 
commerce was received in Germany. Buchda had never himself taken this 
‘class conflict’ perspective. 
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The Faculty of Philosophy and the Faculty of Economics 
Buchda held a position as a reviewer of doctoral theses for the Faculty of 
Philosophy on three occasions. He cooperated with Friedrich Schneider 
(1887–1962), who held the chair for Medieval History at the FSU Jena from 
1947 to 1956. Schneider was a Dante Alighieri expert (Schneider, 1960) and it 
has been said that he was a ‘bourgeois historian’ (Heimpel, 1963, p. 249). In 
1946 he became a member of the LDPD (like Buchda and his student 
Hoffmann). The three Schneider graduate students worked on topics related to 
Thuringian history and matters of law. Their methods and results can be com-
pared with those of the Buchda scholars, Werner, Wolf and Günther. 
Gregor Richter (1927–2002) from Weimar dealt with the public policies of 
the Dukes of Sachsen-Weimar (Richter, 1956) from 1446 to 1589. Unlike 
Buchda’s students, Richter argued in 1956 that these policies were of class 
nature. Regulations on luxury, for example, marked the differences between 
noblemen, patricians, peasants and craftsmen (Richter, 1956, p. 4). One could 
say, however, that this was a badly chosen example and merely Marxist lip 
service. Helmut Roob (1924–2017) from Gotha, later regionally known as an 
archivist and historian of the city, wrote on the constitution of Gotha from the 
13th to the 19th century and especially focused on the Duchy of Sachsen-Gotha 
and Veit Ludwig von Seckendorff (Roob, 1958). Ruth Böckel (biographical 
data could not be found yet) presented a study on the relations between the 
University of Jena, the council of Jena and the Duchy of Sachsen-Weimar during 
the 18th century (Böckel, 1958). Her thesis is about student misrule, clashes 
with soldiers, expulsions (from the University), debt, illegitimate pregnancies 
and censorship, though with no echoes of ‘histMat’ or ‘diaMat.’ Buchda finally 
was second reviewer for theses written for the Faculty of Economics on two 
occasions, though these theses made no reference to legal history (Hädrich, 
1950; Kopp, 1950). 
Post-Buchda years 
After Buchda’s retirement, some more doctoral theses on legal history were 
written at Jena. Did they refer back to Buchda’s interests or are they examples of 
a new, socialist legal historiography like Ziegler’s thesis? 
In 1978 Gerhard Lingelbach from Greiz graduated with a doctoral thesis on 
the relation of German jurisprudence towards the French Revolution between 
1789 and 1820 (Lingelbach, 1978). This thesis originated under the aegis of 
Gerhard Haney, and ideological echoes can be heard: ‘Feudal nobility fought for 
the primacy of feudal ideology in jurisprudence’ (Lingelbach, 1978, p. 41), or 
‘The bourgeois state and bourgeois law are instruments of domination to 
maintain the power of a minority over the majority of the masses (…). 
The oppression of the exploited is the principal duty of the feudal and of the 
bourgeois state and government’ (Lingelbach, 1978, p. 41). Referring to the 
role of jurisprudence, Lingelbach writes: 
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Due to the fact that the bourgeois consciousness of law on the eve of the 
French Revolution was only weakly evolved and hung behind the material 
conditions of the second half of the 18th century, sciences and especially 
jurisprudence were ideological institutions that played an important role in 
protecting the power of feudal nobility. Hence the nobility tried to control it 
[the law]. (Lingelbach, 1978, p. 43)  
Lingelbach’s work refers to a ‘histMat’ and ‘diaMat’ scheme to assess German 
jurisprudence around 1800, and he used this scheme to measure whether a 
scholar was progressive or reactionary. Progressiveness around 1800 was credited 
to lawyers which spoke up for ‘bourgeois’ rights and liberties (e.g., civil equality), 
‘bourgeois’ law codes and the ‘bourgeois’ government of the state. This indicates 
that historical science on bourgeois lawyers and their work (here on the historical 
school of German jurisprudence) in a socialist setting was possible once re-
searchers dressed their topic in ‘diaMat’ clothing and showed an interest in 
dealing with classic topics of ‘histMat’ such as the French Revolution. In this 
way, researchers could in fact preserve historical knowledge and could even 
(courageously or ‘under cover’) emphasize liberal attitudes in a scientific world 
ruled over by a socialist ideology that intrinsically rejected such attitudes. Hence, 
Lingelbach’s paper is an example of historical science in a totalitarian setting, 
though contemporary readers may well have to read between the lines to discern 
the implicit and explicit meanings of the text. 
Lingelbach’s second thesis from 1985 about the change of the accused’s 
position in overcoming the feudal inquisitional procedure mirrored by German 
jurisprudence (Lingelbach, 1985) again under the aegis of Gerhard Haney, also 
uses the ‘diaMat’ scheme continuously. Such matters as penal law in general, 
procedure, ‘man price’ or ‘blood money’ (wergeld) penalties, torture, the po-
sition of a person charged with an offense following ‘objective circumstances,’ 
‘the processes of material appropriation,’ protected and guaranteed the prop-
erty conditions, ruled conflicts ‘objectively’ occurring—all these issues, it was 
argued, reflected economic and political structures, and gained new dimensions 
on account of and after revolutionary events (for all quotations cf. Lingelbach, 
1985, pp. 5–46, 74f.). Concerning to Lingelbach, the inquisitional procedure 
in particular was a product of a period that saw the decay of feudalism 
(Lingelbach, 1985, p. 29). He stated that the procedural position of the in-
dividual followed the individual’s social embedding in feudal society, and 
property conditions determined socio-economic and legal inequality as well as 
offering protection (Lingelbach, 1985, pp. 35–40)—truly an up-front appre-
ciation. Again one can say that Lingelbach made an attempt to understand the 
social and legal relations reigned by fiefdom and vassalage in a non-
unidimensional way. In his willingness to abstract from details (Lingelbach, 
1985, p. 48, p. 85f., p. 99) he showed an affinity for the new ‘diaMat’ approach 
yet remained open-minded about legal historiography. These comments also 
apply to Sigurd Leitel’s doctoral thesis from 1989 (Leitel, 1989). Haney and 
Lingelbach were Leitel’s reviewers. 
160 Adrian Schmidt-Recla and Zara Luisa Gries  
Conclusion 
Traditional history of law at Jena died quickly within the ‘Buchda years.’ The former 
Institute for State and Legal History (Institut für Staats- und Rechtsgeschichte) 
collapsed with the third Higher Education Reform (Hochschulreform) in 1969. The 
temporal coincidence between Buchda’s retirement and the collapse of his institute 
was not accidental. Buchda and seven of his scholarly followers did not succeed in 
offering any topic or any perspective on socialist legal historiography—or perhaps 
they did not want to offer such an approach. In fact, their works (which were carried 
out in quick chronology in the 1950s) did not refer to Marxist ‘diaMat’ at all. 
Neither Buchda nor his seven followers chose topics to do with socialist legal his-
toriography, such as ‘the revolution and the law,’ ‘the legal history of the working 
class movement’ or ‘capitalism or imperialism and the law,’ and instead they stuck to 
traditional topics. We assume that Buchda has supervised research with regional, 
sometimes local perspectives and has directed his students into the Middle Ages and 
Early Modern times. The legacy of Buchda’s own research apparently lived on in 
some of the theses he supervised (e.g., Günter and Haalck) but definitely not in the 
last one he supervised (Ziegler). All in all, this can be seen as a researcher’s and a 
teacher’s escape, a getaway from educational politics driven by the SED, from 
building a new socialist society, education and from establishing a new socialist 
(legal) historiography. Buchda had the chance to be more political in his 
teaching—expressions like ‘reality first’ and ‘contemporary attitude towards life’ 
were not mere rhetoric to him—but he chose not to. 
The first doctoral candidate with a topic of legal history who referred to ‘diaMat’ 
(Ziegler) graduated in 1969, with Gerhard Haney as the second reviewer. This 
cannot have been an accident. We did not find solid proof that Haney dictated the 
choice of topic and method for the candidate, and we do not know to what extent 
Buchda was the real spin doctor behind the last doctoral thesis under his aegis. 
Nevertheless, our review shows the possibility of pursuing legal history without 
using Marxist-Leninist theory in universities in East Germany during the 1950s 
and 1960s. ‘The Third Higher Education Reform’ of 1969, however, changed 
matters quickly and completely. Both the GDR system of higher education and the 
GDR legal system had no need for research that resembled Gerhard Buchda’s 
work—disconnected from the contemporary debates on the fundaments of socialist 
law and/or legality (cf. Klenner, 1953). Buchda stood alone on ‘Last Standing 
Hill.’ After a quick step in 1969 (Ziegler), it took the Jena law school 10 years to 
establish a new ‘diaMat’ affine legal historiography (Lingelbach). 
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9 Roman law and socialism 
Life and work of a Hungarian 
scholar, Elemér Pólay 
Éva Jakab   
Introduction 
A human being, as Aristotle emphasised, is a social being (zoon politikon). His life 
and work can be realised within the framework of a particular social system; in the 
20th century in Europe, this meant enormous challenges for many legal histor-
ians. Elemér Pólay, the most significant Hungarian Romanist in the 20th century 
(also my teacher and ‘Doktorvater’) suffered a turbulent fate—but tried to remain 
human (and professional) in a cruel and inhuman world.1 
Over 1915–1988, the beginning and the end of a scholar’s life. The 73 years 
cover a bloody period: the traumas of two world wars, the Soviet-type revolution 
of 1919, the Treaty of Trianon and the subsequent general depression, the 
communist dictatorship of the 1950s, the uprising of 1956, and the ‘goulash 
communism’ of the 1960s. Elemér Pólay’s life and work evolved in this socio- 
political environment, and he was forced to be a part of this world. His person 
and his internationally significant professional aspirations must be examined in 
this context to gain a true picture of him. 
Early life, National Socialism and the communist takeover 
Elemér Pólay was born on August 23, 1915 in Sombor, in South Hungary 
(Délvidék, today in Serbia). His father was a high school teacher who was forced 
to flee with his family after the Treaty of Trianon (a treaty that cut off two-thirds 
of the territory of Hungary after World War I) (Molnár, 1999, p. 184). They 
settled in Miskolc; Pólay became a pupil at the renowned Royal Catholic György 
Fráter Gymnasium.2 At the end of each school year, the high school published a 
bulletin and old copies testify to students’ performances. Almost every year, 
Pólay was among the best, decorated with awards and closing the school year as 
top in several subjects (reading, grammar, literature, translation, geography, 
drawing, and even physics). In addition, his final report in algebra underlined 
that Pólay was a model of accuracy. 
A note from the 1931–1932 school year reveals that he was also involved in 
the activities of youth associations. He was a member of the Vörösmarty self-
education group, where he regularly read from his literary work. In his last school 
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year, he won prizes for his dissertations on history and Hungarian literature in 
the self-education competition. He was one of three students who graduated 
with honours from the class. 
Pólay completed the high school curriculum with excellent results in all sub-
jects, but his personal interest focused mostly on Latin and history. However, 
he chose law (persuaded by his family) rather than humanities, and in 1933 he 
enrolled at the Miskolc Law Academy.3 Once there, Zoltán Sztehló’s strictly 
pandectist lectures introduced him to the world of Roman law, which fascinated 
the young student from the beginning. He therefore decided to write his 
doctoral thesis on Roman law. 
From this time on, newspaper articles and documents from Miskolc testify that 
Elemér Pólay was also an active member of the National Hungarian Protestant 
Student Association, which sought to educate its young members in social re-
sponsibility. For example, the Dean of the Law School, E. Somos, opened the 
Student Union’s Jubilee Congress at Eastern 1936 and gave a lecture entitled 
‘Pro liberis’ on the plight of the children of poor Hungarian families. Pólay at-
tended the Congress as youth president of the Miskolc Association and also gave 
a presentation. Perhaps his work in this student association, and the experience 
he gained there influenced him in the choice of his early research topics on the 
social role of law (Datio in solutum, 1938, and Relationship Between Land 
Ownership, Population Density and Population Growth, 1938) (Pólay, 1938a; 
Pólay, 1938b). 
At that time, the Miskolc Law Academy could only grant a diploma (gra-
duation certificate), while the doctoral degree had to be obtained at the Law 
Faculty of one of the Hungarian universities by passing the rigorosum. Pólay 
chose Pécs and applied for both doctoral examinations at Erzsébet University: 
in 1937 he obtained his doctorate in law and in 1938 in political science.4 
Two scholarships to the Law Academy of Miskolc, rewarding his outstanding 
student performance, proved to be decisive for his entire life and career. First, he 
received a two-month scholarship to Berlin and then another for a whole year, 
1938, for Roman law studies at the Friedrich Wilhelm University5 His teacher 
was Paul Koschaker, a highly educated professor of Austrian descent who had 
graduated in law from Graz and was also promoted there (sub auspiciis 
Imperatoris) (Beggio, 2018, pp. 33–49). He initially taught in Innsbruck and 
Prague and later received a university chair in Leipzig. He was appointed to 
Berlin in 1936, where, besides Roman private law and Roman legal history, he 
became an expert in cuneiform law and early Eastern legal cultures. Koschaker 
was the father of ‘ancient legal history’ who pointed out many Eastern influences 
in Greek and Roman law (Ries, 1980, p. 608). Koschaker’s personality and re-
search had a profound effect on Zoltán Sztehló, professor of Roman law at the 
Law Academy in Miskolc and also on Pólay, his pupil. This fertilising effect is 
reflected, for example, in the choice of topics in Pólay’s scientific articles from 
1936, which dealt with criminal law in Hammurabi’s Law collection (Miskolci 
Jogászélet (MJ) XII 1936, pp. 3–4, pp. 53–58) and the irrigation culture of 
ancient Egypt (A Földgömb VII, 1936, 6, pp. 218–223). 
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The illuminating year in Berlin along with the influence of Koschaker’s ideas 
led to a long study with the initially confusing title ‘The German Nationalist 
Socialist Conception of Law and Roman Law’ (A német nemzeti szocialista 
jogfelfogás és a római jog, 1938). But already the first few lines emphasize the 
author’s true creed: 
‘National socialism,’ says Wilhelm Coblitz, the leader of the German 
Reichsrechtsamt, ‘sees it as a historic task and a primary duty to give the 
German people a German law.’ This sentence sheds light on why the question 
of the status of Roman law is topical in the National Socialist German Empire. 
(Pólay 1939, p. 125)  
It is surely not a mere coincidence that Paul Koschaker published in 1938 an 
86-page monograph under the title Die Krise des römischen Rechts und die ro-
manistische Rechtswissenschaft. His ‘pamphlet’ (Kampfschrift) was the first volume 
of the series Schriften der Akademie für Deutsches Recht (edited by Dr. Frank, the 
president of the Akademie für Deutsches Recht); it contained an expanded version 
of Koschaker’s lecture at the Berlin Academy in December 1937 (Beggio, 2018, 
p. 173ff., esp. pp. 181–186). At that time in Germany, the lectures of many re-
nowned legal historians were suspended or outright banned, and many renowned 
professors were dismissed, often prompting them to leave the country as soon as 
possible (it suffices to refer to the fate of Fritz Schulz, whose unfortunate en-
counters with the Nazi administration have been documented in detail by Ernst 
2004, pp. 105–203). Roman law, in the eyes of National Socialist politics, em-
bodied a liberal, non-national civil law—which they wanted to replace with a truly 
‘national’ law based on Germanic folk customs. Many young docents had become 
advocates of National Socialist ideas, such as Franz Wieacker or Ernst 
Schönbauer.6 However, Koschaker consistently stood up for the importance of the 
Roman legal tradition in European private law systems—and this was the very 
message that Pólay, his eminent pupil, brought back to Hungary. 
After returning from Berlin, Pólay became a trainee lawyer, practising law in 
several places, and from 1940 on he worked as a court clerk and later as a clerk 
in Debrecen. In 1942 he was called to be a royal district judge for the Debrecen 
district (Molnár, 1999, p. 184). The schedule of the councils of the Royal Court 
of Debrecen for 1942 mentions Elemér Pólay as counsellor in the 1st Civil 
Council, which was competent to deal with ‘matters of inheritance, trust, da-
mages and other obligations, protection and resettlement cases, under the 
chairmanship of Lajos Oláh.’7 Between 1945 and 1949, Pólay served as a county 
court judge in Miskolc and was soon appointed as a counsellor. His involvement 
in teaching Roman law can be traced from 1945 on: first at the Law Academy of 
Miskolc as a lecturer, but soon as head of the department of Roman law at 
Miskolc. In 1946 he graduated from the University of Debrecen with a habili-
tation and became a private teacher qualified in Roman law (Szabó, 2015, 
39–46). His habilitation work, The Role of the Praetor in the Development of 
Roman Private Law, was published in Miskolc in 1944. 
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In 1949, his dynamic university and judicial career was at risk. In autumn 1949, 
the law academies were abolished throughout the country (among them also the 
Law Academy of Miskolc). Furthermore, the Faculty of Law and Political Science 
of the University of Debrecen was suspended. The professors lost their positions; 
some of them managed to find positions in the Law Faculties of Budapest, Szeged 
or Pécs—Géza Marton, for example, a famous professor of Roman law at Debrecen 
went to Budapest. Others had to change their teaching and research field for po-
litical reasons—Lóránd Boleratzky, for example, a professor of Protestant Church 
Law, was relocated to the Department of International Law in Budapest. 
Pólay succeeded in gaining a position as judge and university professor 
in Szeged. The official documents of his appointment have been preserved in the 
archives of the Court of Appeal.8 A note from the Minister of Justice to the 
President of the Szeged Court of Appeal dated August 6, 1949 states: 
Dr. Elemér Pólay, Judge of Miskolc, was transferred to the Szeged Court at 
his own request. I hereby notify Mr. President, as a further measure, that 
I have served him with the transfer document at the same time through the 
Chairman of the Debrecen Court of Appeal. From the order of the Minister: 
Dr. György Ruttkai, Public Prosecutor. (Igazságügyminiszter (‘Minister of 
Justice’), 14.754/1949.I.M.E.)  
A few weeks later, Pólay was already in Szeged and at work, as evidenced by the 
report of Dr. Dezső Kiss, Judge President, dated 29 August: 
With reference to the order of the Minister of Justice, dated August 6, 1949 
[…] and to the decree of the President of the Szeged Court of Justice, dated 
August 11, 1949, I declare that Dr. Elemér Pólay, judge, appeared before 
me and began his service today.  
At the same time, he was also appointed a lecturer in the Faculty of Law at the 
University of Szeged in the department of Roman Law. In the archives of the 
Court of Appeal, four short official papers testify to subsequent developments. 
A year after his move to Szeged, on September 28, 1950, Dr. Imre Lakatos, 
President of the Supreme Court, wrote to the President of the County Court: 
Dr. Elemér Pólay, judge of the County Court of Szeged was appointed by 
the Minister of Religion and Public Education for the Chair at the Faculty 
of Law and Political Science, University of Szeged, with this in mind the 
Minister of Justice removed him from the judiciary on the 25th of 
September of the current year, by resolution No. 26.320/1930.I.M. 
I call on Mr. President to relieve this judge of his position so far and to 
report the day of his release to me immediately.9 
This change took place on September 30, 1950. Elemér Pólay became a full 
university professor (ordinarius) in 1951 as head of the Department of Civil Law. 
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From then on, after eight years practising as a judge, his career focused solely on 
university teaching and research. His rich scientific oeuvre was marked by the 
publication of seven monographs, each of them critically analysing ancient sources 
and scholarly work in Roman law, and by about 140 studies published in 
Hungarian and also in several foreign languages. He gave presentations in about 
31 international conferences; his work was known and respected by the interna-
tional community of legal historians. All those who knew him felt the tragedy of 
his sudden death on November 30, 1988. It is characteristic of his unbroken 
professional interest that he attended a scientific conference in East Berlin just 
before his death. 
The Faculty of Law in a socialist state and the uprising 
of 1956 
Elemér Pólay’s career shows the peculiar ups and downs of a Central European 
scholarly life, drifted and battered by every storm of the twentieth century—but 
as the Hungarian poet, Endre Ady, has said, despite his heavy fate he remained 
‘still victorious, new and Hungarian.’ 
It is not easy for me to paint an objective picture of him, as my memories date 
back to my first entry into the Faculty of Law in Szeged. Being admitted to the 
Department of Roman Law as an undergraduate student, I was assigned to 
the committee under the chairmanship of Pólay. As a freshman, I diligently at-
tended his lectures: all the students admired, respected, and loved him for his 
imposing knowledge, his consistent treatment of students, and his general 
humanity. A few years later, after my graduation, I sat anxiously in the dean’s 
office and listened to his persuasive arguments about the necessity for having a 
new assistant position for Roman law—for me. 
Recently, a colleague of mine, Béla Szabó, reported on Pólay’s Debrecen years 
(see Szabó, 2015, p. 39ff), and his outstanding scientific achievements have been 
praised in several studies. But what do we know about his achievements in 
Szeged? What is the relationship between his significant work and its socio- 
historical context? To what extent does Pólay’s teaching and research reflect the 
external political constraints of the 1950s? After all, Pólay might well have said 
along with Miklós Radnóti (a famous Hungarian poet of Jewish origin, killed in a 
concentration camp) that  
I lived upon this earth in such an age 
that idolized the sly police informers, 
whose heroes were the killers, spies, the thieves— 
and the few who held their peace or only failed 
to cheer were loathed like victims of the plague.10 
Below, I recall a few moments of his rich life on the basis of some accidentally 
surviving documents I was able to find at the Department of Roman law, in the 
archives of the faculty, of the university, and the city of Szeged.11 Turning the 
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dilapidated pages of the Szeged daily newspaper Délmagyarország, we find the 
following small announcement: ‘The next lecture of the Soviet law course in 
Szeged will be held by Dr. Elemér Pólay, university lecturer, 30 May, in the 
Great hall of the University, Dugonics Square, with the title “The Soviet Family 
Law.”’ The date is May 27, 1951. This lecture was jointly organized by the 
Hungarian Lawyers’ Association and the University of Szeged. According to 
Délmagyarország, the ‘Soviet law course in Szeged’ continued for many years as a 
hallmark of legal activities in the city. The clear emphasis on Soviet law can be 
seen in a note from the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, which, even in 1955, 
strongly emphasized that ‘it is the duty of the political and legal sciences to 
deepen the knowledge of the Soviet state and law, to make it known, and to 
know, process and utilise the results of Soviet law and legal science.’ The writing, 
preserved purely by chance in the archives, comes from the proposal for the 
second five-year plan and was signed by Gyula Eörsi.12 
The ‘Journal of Jurisprudence’ (Jogtudományi Közlöny) regularly informed 
the legal community about continuing legal education (for lawyers rather a 
re-education or brainwashing) in major cities across the country. Page 36 of 
the January 1952 issue of a report on the Second Soviet Law Course of the 
Szeged Local Group of the Hungarian Lawyers Association underlines that 
‘the organizers of the Szeged course have emphasised in their circular the 
utmost importance of thorough knowledge of the Soviet legal institutions for 
any worker who contributes in any way to the application of our socialist 
law.’ Below it is posted the 1951–1952 schedule of the Soviet law course in 
Szeged, with names well known at the faculty, among them Pólay. In this 
academic year, Pólay hosted the first conference of the Civil Law department 
and gave a lecture on Soviet inheritance law on May 15 (Jogtudományi 
Közlöny, January 1952, p. 37). In April 1953, the official reports of the 
Hungarian Lawyers’ Association recorded that the Szeged local group 
started, ‘in addition to the series of professional training courses, a [new] 
Soviet law course in co-operation with the Szeged Section of Legal Sciences 
of the Hungarian-Soviet Society. The course consists of four civil law, 
criminal law and kolkhoz law lectures.’ The opening lecture of the course was 
given by Pólay with the following remarkable title: ‘The Development of 
Soviet Civil Law in the Light of Comrade Stalin’s Teachings on Foundation 
and Superstructure.’ The programme, published in the April 1953 issue of 
the Jogtudományi Közlöny, shows that all senior lecturers and professors were 
forced to produce lectures on highly political topics. János Martonyi (at 
that time already ‘Candidate’ of Law13 and a full university professor), for 
example, had to present a paper about ‘Issues of Discipline and Control in 
the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.’ These 
lectures were, of course, promoted by the local newspaper, highlighting the 
contribution of ‘the best professionals, many of whom have been awarded 
the title of Candidate.’ 
The spirit of the age is well represented in the introduction of the ‘Annales’ 
(Évkönyv) of the Law Faculty, dated 1953: 
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Comrade Stalin teaches that the superstructure, once it has become a 
powerful actor, will actively contribute to the creation of the basis […] to 
do its utmost to help eradicate the old basis and the old social classes. 
This teaching also sets the course for superstructure-type legal studies. We 
need to cultivate jurisprudence in such a way as to be a real promoter of 
the construction of the new order, of the socialist order. (Schultheisz, 
1953, p. 3)  
Parerga… blinks of light on the frozen air of the 1950s, when cruel pressures 
settled on civilian life, guiding personal fates with ‘cunning fear.’ But Elemér 
Pólay found—even in this fearful world—strength and faith to carry out ex-
cellent university teaching and scientific research. There are however ten years 
of silence in his publication list, no studies being published between 1944 and 
1953. His habilitation dissertation (enrolled 1944 but defended 1946 at the 
University of Debrecen) was published as a monograph in 1944 (Pólay, 1944, 
p. 175 and Pólay 1943, p. 24), and just prior to that, a comprehensive study 
on ‘Interest in Roman Law.’ The next publication, however, was not published 
until 1953, when Pólay tried to settle at the Faculty of Law in Szeged, after his 
judicial career had ended abruptly (under political pressure). It is something 
to respect that, in the oppressive atmosphere of the 1950s, he wrote valuable, 
enduring studies on Roman law, such as his paper on warranty for latent de-
fects (Pólay, 1953) or on Roman wills (Pólay, 1956).14 Despite political 
hardships, he enjoyed notable popularity as a university professor in the 
city’s cultural life. One example of this is that the local daily newspaper pub-
lished a photo-report on him, examining civil law at the Law Faculty 
(Délmagyarország, January 16, 1954, p. 4). 
On the other hand, the boxes of the Csongrád County Archives also contain 
a ‘Report on University Teachers,’ dated 1950, where handwritten notes are 
slipped between typed pages to indicate where and when a professor of the 
faculty has graduated in law, which languages he or she speaks, and whether 
the professor in question had ever been abroad. ‘Travelling abroad’ was divided 
into two categories: the Soviet Union or Western countries. In this era, the 
authorities had dangerous biographical data regarding Pólay’s studies as a 
graduate student in Berlin, at the Faculty of Law of the Friedrich Wilhelm 
University, with Paul Koschaker.15 Koschaker himself was convinced that the 
two most important pillars of European culture were Roman law and Christian 
religion. 
In contrast was the cold and tight Hungarian reality, the constant ideological 
struggle of the 1950s. The work plan of the Methodological Committee of the 
Szeged Faculty of Law for 1955–1956 aimed at ‘improving the moral-political 
education of students, their ideological training and the struggle to counter 
bourgeois views.’ But even in 1961 (on February 22), a dispute was organised at 
the faculty on the standard Marxist subject of ‘Fighting Bourgeois Nationalism 
and Cultivating Proletarian Internationalisation.’ According to the attendance 
sheet, the meeting was led by Pólay and attended by all lecturers in the 
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departments of civil law, Roman law, and criminal law. The focus of the ideo-
logical struggle was on the nationalist views of ‘Hungarian cultural dominance’ 
and ‘we are a lawyer nation.’16 
‘Hungarian cultural dominance’ was one of the characteristic issues of official 
Hungarian pre-war politics. The 1961 meeting found that one of the main 
features of this was the denial of foreign influence on Hungarian legal devel-
opment. It is obvious that the university teachers were expected to take this issue 
seriously and reflect deeply on the demands of communist propaganda. The 
lecturers themselves sought to formulate their reflections on a professionally 
tolerable level. The lecturers stated that ‘the teaching of the department of 
Roman Law strongly emphasises the fact that Hungarian legal development is far 
from being solely based on specific national customs, but that the reception of 
Roman law can be demonstrated in Hungary as well.’ The protocol continues in 
a similar tone; it is typical that the empty headlines dictated by official politics are 
referred to by the educators with feigned seriousness though responded to 
with genuine professional arguments. The following note from the meeting 
interestingly echoes the veiled ideological struggle: 
The nationalist view of the relationship between Hungarian and Soviet law 
is also implicit in the opinion that ‘codification work is superfluous, because, 
in the end, we are mechanically subsuming Soviet law.’ Our departments 
also regularly fight against this [nationalist] distortion by showing specific 
regulations that are appropriate to our circumstances, with regard to 
responsible custody and other institutions in civil law.17 
At this very meeting, the department of Civil Law was represented by Béla 
Kemenes, who was one of the leading figures of the (just finished) first codifi-
cation of Hungarian civil law (Act IV of 1959).18 This Hungarian Civil Code 
showed surprisingly little Soviet legal influence. 
The uneasy meeting must have been, of course, protocolled, and it had to be 
forwarded to the leading organs of the university and the Communist Party. This 
was not of course an exceptional case, but the usual way of faculty life. Faculty 
councils were obliged to regularly discuss the guidelines of the current con-
gresses of the CPSU (Soviet Communist Party) and the MSZMP (Hungarian 
Socialist Workers’ Party). 
On December 16 and 17, 1955, at the enlarged Faculty Council, the leading 
members of the Law Faculties in Szeged and Budapest, together with the lawyer 
members of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, discussed the draft of the na-
tionwide obligatory manual ‘Civil Law, Part One, General Rules’ written by 
Miklós Világhy.19 In addition to the professors, representatives of the Supreme 
Prosecutor’s Office and the Central Arbitration Committee, as well as invited 
judges and lawyers, also took part in the debate. The article on the event 
highlights that ‘the academic depth and success of the debate was greatly fa-
cilitated by Elemér Pólay, in his keynote study “The System of the General Part 
of the Hungarian Civil Law Textbook.”’ It is worth quoting some of the 
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professional-scientific arguments and politically coloured opinions: ‘Critics have 
uniformly found that the manual is generally firmly rooted in Marxism-
Leninism’; ‘there is a consistent Marxist-Leninist view of content and method’; 
‘the author’s position is in line with the party’s policy, clearly outlining the 
perspective of socialist legal development’; ‘he puts bourgeois views under 
creative criticism.’ However, Szilbereky (professor of civil procedure) made some 
harsh criticisms: the role of civil law was not emphasised enough in the devel-
opment of a socialist society. Nizsalovszky and Beck Salamon (professors in 
Budapest) accused the author of vulgarising Marxism. These were politically 
rather dangerous attacks. 
One feels somewhat uneasy when browsing through such archival materials. It 
is miraculous that, in such a class warrior milieu, some of the old professors 
attached to civic values may have somehow survived. Hidden away from the 
official worker-peasant revolutionary policy, there was still a strong cohesive force 
of a well-educated, humanist civil society. One could even teach Roman law, in a 
pandectist or historical spirit, in an almost ideologically free manner. Literature 
could be promoted, ordinary people educated—well-educated experts from the 
old world (if not resistant) were needed. The existence of civil society is well 
illustrated by a photo from the local newspaper: Pólay is shown in the jury of the 
Petofi Literary Competition for law students.20 
Pólay was respected and highly estimated in university and city circles. 
Between 1955 and 1957, he was deputy rector for science and education at the 
university of Szeged. In the Csongrád County Archives there are hardly any 
documents on the university’s life in 1956. 
These few uninteresting official records for this year suggest that the wind of 
uprising was not felt until the last minute. There are also only a few reports in the 
local newspaper Délmagyarország, about the university. For example, on March 3, 
1956, it records that the ‘Free University’ (lectures popularising science among 
lay audience) would resume its lectures after a period of extreme cold; later on, 
there is a report that Elemér Pólay, Deputy Rector, would give the first pre-
sentation titled ‘Legal Protection of the Family and the Child.’ On March 27, 
Pólay can be seen in a photo talking to the Soviet delegation on ‘The Soviet 
University Days.’ 
In the spring of 1956, the National Conference of Law Students was organised 
in Szeged: on April 26, the conference was opened by Dean I. Kovács and 
L. Németi, who, although only a young assistant professor, nevertheless held an 
important position as the secretary of the faculty representatives of the com-
munist party. Pólay as deputy rector acted as a chairman of the Section for Civil 
Law (see e.g. Délmagyarország April 25, 1956, p. 3). October 5, 1956, Pólay 
presented the work plan of the Scientific Committee to the Faculty—university 
routine as usual. In the archives, the only datum concerning the actions of the 
revolution is the announcement on October 22: ‘Until the introduction of a new 
regime for foreign language teaching, students will be exempted from attending 
Russian language classes.’21 What the archive does not say is that on October 
16th, 1956, the students of the University of Szeged held a great assembly at the 
174 Éva Jakab 
Auditorium Maximum, where they formulated 12 points that were transferred by 
a delegation to all other universities in the country. On October 23, there were 
violent demonstrations in Budapest and other big cities—the uprising had 
broken out (Perbíró, 2002, p. 19). 
During these turbulent weeks, there is some correspondence preserved be-
tween Rector D. Baróti and the dean of the Law Faculty, E. Schultheisz, for 
example, on rethinking the teaching of Marxist-Leninist subjects. Unfortunately, 
most of the documents have been lost and the important events can only be 
reconstructed from other sources. In fact, as Deputy Rector, Pólay was in a very 
dangerous position. Even in the summer of 1957,22 the local newspaper sum-
marised the events at the Law Faculty as follows, including also Pólay’s name and 
his activities: 
At the Faculty of Law, Baróti and Fodor’s loyal counter-revolutionary 
associates, György Bónis and Elemér Pólay, insisted on the removal of 
certain communists. The Baróti-Fodor group delegated Associate Professor 
József Perbíró to the City Council to influence the counter-revolutionary 
movements in the city (Délmagyarország, June 25, 1957, p. 3).  
Bónis, Perbíró, and his other colleagues lost their jobs or ended up in prison, 
but Pólay was somehow able to avoid their fate. Furthermore, he remained 
head of the department for Roman law until he became Professor Emeritus in 
1988. Although after 1951 he also headed the Department of Civil Law, he had 
to give it up, and from 1961 on he headed only the Department of Roman 
Law. His family and immediate co-workers always felt that he had never lived 
without fear. 
His expertise was, nevertheless, appreciated, and he was allowed to con-
tinue his teaching and research. As early as 1958, at the request of the 
National Museum, he was already working on the locatio conductio contracts 
on waxed tablets from Dacia and soon extended his work to all Latin 
documents from the Roman Empire found in Transylvania. During the late 
1950s, he also explored the relationship between Roman imperial law and 
local law, enthusiastically writing papers and reaching very high international 
standards of legal history. However, the atmosphere, the university faculty 
environment, and the political vulnerability did not change much in the 
late 1950s or early 1960s. Reports on the ideological development of uni-
versity teachers continued to be made. Teaching and research work were 
carried out under strict control of the Communist Party, shadowed by work 
plans and reports. 
Let us take a seemingly politically neutral topic, the expansion of the depart-
mental library. In 1962, the department of Roman law ordered books and 
journals to a total of HUF 3,332 (800 HUF for domestic literature, 800 HUF 
for literature from the socialist bloc, and 1,529 HUF for literature from the 
West).23 Alongside Pólay’s own hand-typed order, there is a disapproving 
circular from the state’s ‘Culture Foreign Trade Company’: 
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When reviewing the orders for foreign papers received in 1962, we found 
that the order for scientific books and journals of the People’s Republics, 
and especially of the Soviet Union, was, although showing some increase, 
far from satisfactory. The majority of our clients still prefer Western press 
products. 
It is well known that Pólay regularly published in foreign languages (in German, 
Italian, English) and tried to stay in the mainstream of international scientific life, 
for which up-to-date knowledge of the specialised literature would have been 
essential. It is almost inconceivable how he was able to keep up with international 
scientific life, despite such limited opportunities. 
In 1963, the local newspaper reported on his scientific journey to Italy: ‘Dr. 
Elemér Pólay, Professor at the József Attila University of Szeged, head of the 
Roman law department, travelled to Italy; he was invited by the University of 
Bologna. The professor from Szeged is attending scientific sessions on Roman 
law in Bologna and Florence’ (Délmagyarorszég October 19, 1963, p. 6). This 
was without a doubt his first trip to the West and the first international con-
ference he had been allowed to participate in since World War II. 
The distorted optics of Hungarian universities is well illustrated by the clearly 
forced tone of Pólay’s proposal for the designation of a new member of the 
department. On December 6th, 1960, as the head of the department, he com-
mended a ‘young meritorious applicant’ for the position of assistant professor to 
the Faculty Council: ‘Born in 1935, from a working peasant family [here the 
original text has been revised]. His father and family were actively involved in the 
struggles of the Soviet Republic and were therefore severely disadvantaged in 
the years of the counter-revolution.’24 How could the former vice-president of 
the National Protestant Student Association of Miskolc survive and keep in with 
such people in this twisted world? 
There is also an official letter among the old records of the department, dated 
1961, signed by János Molnár, Deputy Minister, addressed to György Antalffy, 
Rector of the University of Szeged, on the aims of education at the Law 
Faculties. Its emphasized elements are the following: 
The Faculties of State and Law Science need to train communist practi-
tioners who are familiar with the fundamental objective laws of society as 
revealed by Marxism-Leninism, with the theoretical foundations of state 
and law […] and who are able to participate in the enforcement activities 
of socialist law and legality […]. Philosophy, political economy, and 
scientific socialism must be taught in order to establish and consolidate 
the communist worldview.25 
Socialist history of Roman Law 
The last part of my article deals with two further topics: with the preparation of 
the famous Hungarian textbook of Roman law (written by Pólay and Brósz) and 
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with Pólay’s arduous pursuit of doctoral degree from the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences.26 Rather unexpectedly, these two topics are related. 
The Roman law textbook, published jointly by Róbert Brósz and Elemér 
Pólay, has since its publication become a legend. Even Wikipedia points out that 
generations of students have been socialised into the world of law and order with 
the ‘yellow book’ (decorated with a photo from Accursius’ Glossa ordinaria). 
The first edition was published in 1974 under the supervision of the state text-
book publisher. The original advertising emphasised that it was a modern work, 
combining the latest achievements of modern Roman law studies with socialist 
aims, and it ‘presents, from an exciting point of view, the nature and evolution of 
the Roman legal superstructure and demonstrates the decisive nature of eco-
nomic life´(Brósz and Pólay, 1974, 1). Under the Marxist ‘cover,’ however, there 
was indeed a modern textbook of high quality. 
The origins of the textbook date back to the early 1960s. The 30807/1960/ 
III resolution of the Ministry of Culture (including 260 appendices), addressed 
to all rectors and to the deans of the Law Faculties in all universities, called for 
proposals for a curriculum reform.27 The task was to compile and discuss training 
aims and methods by the Faculty Councils at each Faculty. At that time, edu-
cational reforms began directly from the initiative of the resolutions of the 
Hungarian Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government. 
On February 21, 1961, Pólay submitted three densely typed pages for the 
planned reform of Roman law education.28 Among its goals were the break 
with the pandectist system, the validation of the historical approach, the 
separation of medieval terms from the original Latin terminology, the re-
thinking of the chapter on the history of Roman law, and so on. He presented 
many ideas that were realised in the 1974 edition of the new textbook. 
Most of the goals listed by Pólay were not particularly socialist programmes 
but rather followed recent trends in Western legal history. He stressed, for 
example, the significant views of Wolfgang Kunkel and Dieter Nörr (then 
professor at Münster). 
At that time, Pólay already had a close professional relationship with Dieter 
Nörr, as evidenced by letters in the department’s folders. For example, on 
October 25, 1971, he wrote to Dieter Nörr: 
Dear Dieter, please allow me to contact you with a request […]. For a long 
time, I haven't received any message from you. Unfortunately, there was no 
possibility for me to take part in the German Legal History conference in 
Salzburg last year […]. Most likely, you were in Salzburg. How are you? 
[…] Now, together with colleague Brósz, we are writing the new textbook 
on Roman law, and just recently I gave my monograph on the contracts of 
the Transylvanian wax tablets into print. After five years, finally it will be 
published […].29 
First of all he asked for help, for any possible financial support for a few months’ 
research stay in Germany for his pupil, Imre Molnár. But the very personal, 
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friendly lines quoted above also reveal his sad personal isolation and his con-
tinued desire to belong to the community of international scholars. 
Finally, a few words about Pólay’s rough path to the doctoral title at the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences (DSC, Doctor Scientiarum). The annual Plan 
Completion Report of 1960 of the department of Roman Law emphasized that 
‘the first draft of a 25-print-sheet monograph’ on ‘Differentiation Processes in 
Roman Law’ was finished and included by the academic publisher in its 1962 
publication plan.30 The departmental documents provide insight into some de-
tails concerning the creation of this immense work. We have, for example, 
Pólay’s report, written in 1961, addressed to the rector, Dr. György Antalffy: 
‘On July 6, 1961, I applied to Comrade Rector for a 1,000 HUF domestic 
scholarship to cover the costs of my stay in Budapest for the sake of finishing my 
doctoral dissertation (bibliography research and consultations with Dr. Világhy 
Miklós).’ With the very poor salary of a university professor, he could hardly 
afford a week’s stay in Budapest. He did in fact receive the amount he applied for, 
and on January 12, 1962, he announced that he had completed his task.31 His 
dissertation was at long last finished and he had signed a contract with the 
academy publishers. 
Perhaps the quotations above, either from the contemporary press or from 
official papers of the universities and of the faculties, make it quite clear that in 
the early 1960s, official politics expected scholars to have Marxist-Leninist 
content and methods in their publications. According to the official order of 
the deputy ministry, quoted above, the purpose of cultivating legal history was to 
‘present the most important political and legal institutions in their development, 
according to Marxist history,’ to explain ‘the most important elements of the 
social experience accumulated in public and legal life, and thus contribute to a 
better understanding of the socialist legal system.’ 
Completing a doctoral dissertation for the Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
was a heavy task that led Pólay to inevitably provide a Marxist cover for the 
history of Roman private law. Indeed, when perusing the typewritten original 
manuscript (the only one was kept in the department’s library), we see that the 
table of contents indicates this endeavour: ‘I. Differentiation of the law of the 
slaveholder state’ and ‘II. Production conditions, forms of ownership and class 
struggle in the slaveholder society of Rome.’ The titles of the chapters are in 
line with the ‘customs of the age,’ and certainly when reading the work, the first 
50 pages are clearly marked by Marxist-Leninist historiography. 
The Marxist-Leninist reinterpretation of world history was a combative re-
search programme, strictly conducted from Moscow. This is reflected, for ex-
ample, in the organisation of an extensive international project in which Pólay 
was invited to contribute. On November 14, 1962, he wrote the following letter 
to the Department of Social and Historical Sciences of the Hungarian Academy 
of Sciences: 
I received the attached letter from the Executive Director of the Institute of 
Ancient Science of the German Academy of Sciences (GDR) inviting me to 
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participate in the publishing committee of a volume entitled ‘Society and 
Law in Greek-Roman Antiquity.’ Besides myself, the committee members 
would be a Polish and a Bulgarian professor, and the presiding Professor 
Irmscher. The purpose of this volume is to prove that ancient science is 
developing well in the socialist states. In my response to the letter of 
invitation, I expressed my willingness to be a member of the committee. 
I sincerely ask you to take note of my announcement.32 
With permission, Pólay also asked whether several colleagues in other depart-
ments could write studies for this volume. 
It is well known that Joseph Vogt, a member of the Mainz Academy of 
Sciences, started a large-scale scientific project in the Federal Republic of 
Germany in 1950 with the support of the DFG to combat Marxist historiography 
(Forschungen zur antiken Sklaverei).33 Ownership of slaves and the socio- 
economic integration of slaves into ancient societies had become one of the 
cornerstones of the ideological struggle in Hungary and beyond the Iron 
Curtain.34 In the light of all this, it is less surprising that Pólay (in consultation 
with Miklós Világhy) wrote the first 50 pages of his doctoral dissertation for 
the Academy in a class warrior spirit, based mainly on Soviet historiography: 
‘Production conditions, forms of ownership, class struggle in slaveholder 
Rome.’35 To illustrate the obligatory spirit of this age, I will provide just a few 
typical phrases: 
The fundamental aim of our work is to show […] what changes in the 
superstructure have resulted in changes in the base and how the development 
of the superstructure has affected the base. […] The law of the slaveholder 
society […] is focused on a single legal institution, on the property on slaves 
(Pólay, Diss., pp. 3–4, 6). […] It can be stated that there are two forms of 
ownership in Rome, namely ownership of slaves and common ownership. […] 
The class struggle was carried out not only between slaves and freemen, but 
also between freemen. Differences in property as well as differences of origin 
and nationality were also strongly reflected in the inequality of rights in the 
area of law. (Pólay, Diss., pp. 49–50)  
These first 50 pages, based strongly on Marxist ideas, represent about 10% of the 
531-page dissertation. The following chapter discusses the separation of law from 
other social norms in ancient Rome (ius, fas, mos, ius fetiale and ius gentium) as 
the law of peace and war (Pólay, Diss. 53–154). The author then analyses the 
heyday of Roman law in the chapter ‘Developing the perfect law for simple 
production of goods.’ The author touches on the delicate balance and layered 
formation of the ius civile, ius Latii, foreign rights, ius strictum, ius aequum, ius 
naturale, and ius praetorium in the latent legislative process of law enforcement. 
A separate subchapter deals with the slow and gradual separation of the norms 
of ius publicum and ius privatum and the codification of the late 6th-century 
Emperor Justinian (Pólay, Diss. pp. 344–401, pp. 402–446.) 
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Concluding remarks 
Turning over the yellowed pages of Pólay’s archived dissertation for the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, with corrections in Pólay’s own hand, the 
reader feels appreciation and respect: it is a thoughtful, well-grounded work 
that reflects on the results of contemporary international science. They show a 
sincere commitment to scientific research, a passionate desire for knowledge, 
and an infinite power to radiate knowledge from the pale pages. The ‘internal 
emigration’ of the creative mind: a distinguished lawyer, a dedicated uni-
versity professor, and a well-educated European scholar seeking and finding 
refuge in the relatively small, secluded, elegant, and exclusive world of 
Roman law, seeking protection against historical storms, injustice, humilia-
tion, inhumanity. 
The manuscript of Pólay’s dissertation for the academy was never published 
in Hungarian as a book.36 Why? The authorities no doubt judged that there 
was too much ‘bourgeois literature,’ and it seems likely that despite the first 50 
Marxist-Leninist pages, he delivered a too honest piece of professional work. 
But his manuscript did at least meet the expectations of the Hungarian 
Academy Sciences: in 1964 Pólay was awarded the degree of DSc.37 But after-
wards, as the years went by, certain circles blocked his further career, not con-
sidering him worthy of a membership in the academy. Seven monographs, 140 
scientific studies, and an international reputation were not considered sufficient 
for a membership in the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Perhaps the shadow of 
the deputy rector’s post of 1956 was never forgiven, nor his bourgeois origins 
and Western education. 
This is also indicated by the fact that the Agitation and Propaganda 
Committee of the Central Committee of the MSZMP (Hungarian Socialist 
Workers’ Party) even dealt with Pólay at its November 1986 meeting (just two 
years before the collapse of the communist world). Evaluating the initial ex-
periences of OTKA (Hungarian Research Funds), Pólay’s research was discussed 
extensively (his project on ‘The Advancement of Roman Legal Thinking’). It is 
ironic to discover his name on the agenda as the main topic of the meeting was to 
reflect on and consider ways to take more decisive actions against democratic 
opposition!38 
Notes 
1 Pólay was the most prominent Hungarian scholar of Roman law after the Second 
World War, both nationally and internationally. Of his generation of Roman law 
professors Pólay was the only one who, with great difficulty, obtained all (also the 
newly introduced Soviet-type) scientific degrees and titles and was constantly 
present also in international discussions. It is worth to mention, that at that time 
the significance of Roman law extended far beyond the boundaries of the 
discipline—it conveyed the dogmatics of private law to generations of lawyers at a 
time when civil law education was rather manipulated through Soviet patterns.  
2 Most of the students were Roman Catholic; but the report states that Lutheran, 
Greek Catholic, or Israeli boys were admitted to the high school as well. 
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3 On the structure, teaching, and scientific achievements of such law academies, see 
Stipta, 2019, p. 203–244.  
4 According to contemporaries, Lutheran students mostly chose Pécs to take 
doctoral examinations.  
5 A detailed analysis of Pólay’s life is also given in Molnár (1999), pp. 7–12.  
6 For the life and academic work of renowned Roman lawyers in dictatorships, see 
the work of the research group led by Kaius Tuori, ‘Reinventing the Foundations 
of European Legal Culture 1934–1964.’ See also Tuori, 2017.  
7 Igazságügyi Közlöny (Justice Bulletin), 1942, Személyi hírek (Personal news).  
8 My thanks to my colleague, Tamás Antal, for the copy. 
9 Ibid.; in 1950 the Hungarian courts were reestablished, and filled with trust-
worthy communists.  
10 Radnóti Miklós, Töredék (Fragment), dated May 19, 1944, shortly before he was 
killed in a concentration camp.  
11 Henceforth Arc. Dprt. Roman L. Szeged., Arc. Fac. L. Szeged, and Arc. C. 
Csongrád. For an overview on Roman law in the so-called socialist countries, see 
the chapter by Adrian Schmidt-Recla in this volume.  
12 Arc. C. Csongrád. There is not a great deal of material, only six boxes or so about 
the Faculty of Law. Until 1951, Eörsi served as Chief Justice of the Ministry of 
Justice, first in the private law and then in the law-making department. In 1951 
he was appointed consul for New York and Washington. He returned home in 
1952 and became head of the Legislative Preparatory Department of the Ministry 
of Justice, leading the department until 1957.  
13 An academic degree, introduced by the communist government, following the 
Soviet model.  
14 Pólay (1953), p. 21; he deals with the same topic in his thesis for his ‘candidate’ 
degree at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (see Pólay, 1955). At the same 
time, he was also occupied with the law of succession; see Pólay, 1956, p. 3. 
15 New colleagues, recruited from the worker class, usually spoke no foreign lan-
guages and had never visited a Western country. One can imagine their attitude 
towards Pólay.  
16 Arc. Fac. L. Szeged.  
17 Ibid.  
18 For the development of Hungarian civil law, see the chapter by A. Földi in this 
volume. 
19 Arc. Fac. L. Szeged; teaching and textbooks were regulated and strictly controlled 
by the ministry, and the universities had no autonomy to purchase teaching 
material on their own.  
20 Report in the local newspaper Délmagyarország, with a photo of Wagner Márton.  
21 Arc. Fac. L. Szeged.  
22 It is well known, and the revolution was soon suppressed. On November 4, 1956 
the Soviet troops started their invasion of Budapest.  
23 Arc. Fac. L. Szeged.  
24 Arc. Fac. L. Szeged; the report refers to the Soviet-type revolution of 1919 
in Hungary, which stayed in force for 133 days—and was admired by the 
communist government of Hungary. On the Horthy government, see 
Romsich, 2018.  
25 Arc. Fac. L. Szeged.  
26 At that time, scientific degrees were only granted by the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences. The universities had no autonomy and the academy controlled, ac-
cording Soviet patterns, all higher education and scientific research in the 
country. 
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28 Ibid.  
29 ‘Lieber Dieter, sei es mir gestattet mit einer Bitte an dich zu wenden […]. Seit 
langem habe ich von Dir keine Nachricht bekommen. Leider es gab mir keine 
Möglichkeit voriges Jahr an dem Deutschen Rechtshistorikertag in Salzburg 
teilnehmen zu können […]. Aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach warst Du in Salzburg. 
Wie geht es Dir? […] Jetzt schreiben wir mit Kollege Brósz das neue Lehrbuch 
des röm. Rechts und eben in diesen Tagen habe ich meine Monographie über die 
Verträge der siebenbürgischen Wachstafeln in Druck gegeben. Nach fünf Jahren 
wird es doch endlich erscheinen […].’  
30 Arc. Dprt. Roman L. Szeged; the book was actually published in 1964, but only 
in German.  
31 Arc. Dprt. Roman L. Szeged.  
32 Ibid.  
33 See www.sklaven.adwmainz.de for further information.  
34 See the article by Rudokvas and Erkkilä in this volume.  
35 The main sources of Marxism-Leninism were Maskin (1951) and Maskin (1953).  
36 A German translation was published in Hungary; see Pólay (1964a).  
37 For the contemporary scientific qualification system; see Pólay (1964b), 
pp. 586–590.  
38 I would like to thank my colleague Béla Révész for this information.  
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